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 Does international law work, and if so, how?  In the last twenty years eight 
regional intergovernmental organizations have adopted treaties requiring all participants 
to be democracies and specifying sanctions to be leveled against members that cease to 
be democracies.  In this work I examine to what extent these agreements are helping 
protect the governments of their members from coups.  I find that, between 1991 and 
2008, states subject to these treaties were less likely to experience attempted coups d’etat, 
and were less likely to be overthrown when coups were attempted, but that the evidence 
varies widely in particular cases.  Case studies of coups in Honduras, Mali and Thailand 
support the view that coup leaders do take such treaties into account when choosing coup 
consolidation tactics such as coup-legitimating rhetoric and selecting members of the 
coup coalition.  All in all, these regimes show promise if not yet dispositive effect.  
However, these findings cast some doubt on the efficacy of international human rights 
law more generally.  State leaders have a direct self-interest in maintaining an effective 
coup-prevention regime.  If they are no more effective at this than this evidence suggests, 
they are unlikely to enforce more conventional human rights agreements that less directly 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Shortly before dawn on the day of June 28, 2009, 200 soldiers stormed the presidential 
residence in Tegucigalpa, Honduras and seized leftist President Manuel Zelaya Rosales.  
Soldiers took Zelaya to a waiting military airplane and flew him to Costa Rica where they 
left him on an airstrip, still in his pajamas.  Shortly after noon that day, the Honduran 
Congress convened and considered the report of a secret commission that had ostensibly 
been created on June 25 to consider constitutional crimes attributed to Zelaya.  Also 
considered by Congress was a resignation letter supposedly written by Zelaya – dated 
three days before the coup.  The Congress voted to accept Zelaya’s “resignation” and 
then declared President of the Congress Roberto Micheletti Bain to be interim President 
until elections in November.  In accepting the position, Micheletti said “I do not arrive at 
this position via the ignomious route of a coup d’etat, I arrive as the product of an 
absolutely legal transition.”1   
 In some ways these facts fit in with a long pattern of coups d’etat in Latin 
America.  One recently-created dataset counts an astounding 145 coups and coup 
attempts in the region between 1950 and 1999 (Powell and Thyne 2011).  However, there 
was an important difference in the Honduran case that has received a great deal of 
attention in the popular media but less, to this point, in the academic literature: a robust 
international response condemning the coup because it contradicted the principles of a 
regional treaty called the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC).  In the IADC, 
signed in 2001, all members of the Organization of American States (OAS) pledged to 
punish the government of any regional state that came to power through “an 
                                            
1 Feldman et al. 2011, 11. 
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unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order” (Art. 19).  OAS members, other 
states and international organizations placed a variety of sanctions on the Micheletti 
government such as denying the coup regime international recognition and access to 
international credit and aid.  Honduras was suspended from the OAS, no country in the 
world recognized the new government, and the total economic sanctions may have been 
as great as US $2 billion (Legler 2010).  This is a very different international response 
than what Luttwak (1969) had described as typical during the Cold War:  
[R]ecognition is usually granted to illegitimate governments after a polite interval if there 
are convincing assurances about their continuity in terms of foreign relations.  After the 
necessary exchanges of information and assurances, the new government will usually be 
recognized; this will be so even if its illegality is an embarrassment, as in the case of the 
United States and Latin American coups (Luttwak 1969, 181). 
 
 In Honduras the Micheletti government managed to resist international pressure 
and hold elections in November 2009, with most of the international community over the 
next two years finally agreeing to recognize new President Porfirio Lobo.  However, the 
episode raises an interesting question as to whether the possibility of a similar 
international response may have dissuaded would-be coup leaders in other countries.  
Regional regimes for the defense of democracy have been adopted not only by the OAS 
but by many other IGOs as well, and it is an interesting question as to whether these 
“democracy clauses” (e.g. Farer 1995; Piccone 2006) are producing their desired effects.  
It is this question that motivates this dissertation: Do democracy clauses in fact help 
prevent governments from falling to coups? 
 
 What are Democracy Clauses? 
While democracy clauses are mostly post-Cold War phenomena, there is some history of 
states creating treaties that give the collective members the right to intervene in domestic 
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successions to executive power when those successions do not meet agreed-upon 
standards.  An early example was the 1826 Treaty of Union, League and Perpetual 
Confederation at the Congress of Panama, Simon Bolivar’s failed attempt to create a 
league of American states to counter the influence of Spain and the Holy Alliance 
(Fenwick 1957).  Other treaties of this sort were the 1907 Additional Treaty to the Treaty 
of Peace Concluded at the Central American Conference (see Stansifer 1967), and the 
1949 Statute of the Council of Europe.  Each of these treaties required member-states to 
be democratic and gave the collective members the power to employ non-recognition 
and/or suspension against governments that came to power by coup d’etat.     
 As of this writing, eight regional organizations have adopted democracy clauses 
that require all member states to be democracies, and that specify penalties to be applied 
if any member ceases to be a democracy, including the possibility of suspension.  For the 
purposes of this project, I use the following criteria to identify a democracy clause: it 
must be a treaty-level agreement and it must specify penalties to be imposed in the event 
of an interruption or overthrow of democracy, and one of those penalties must be the 
possibility of suspension from the IGO.  IGOs with democracy clauses per these criteria 
are shown in Table 1. 
 These are not the only regional organizations to adopt democracy requirements.  
Less stringent regimes have been adopted by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the 
Rio Group, and the Southern African Development Community.  For reasons I describe 
later I limit this study to regimes that meet the criteria described above.  Each treaty is 




Regional Organization Treaty Year of Effect 
Council of Europe Statute of the Council of Europe 1949 
EU Treaty of Maastricht on European Union 1992 
The Commonwealth of 
Nations 
Millbrook Action 




MERCOSUR The Ushuaia Protocol 1996 
The OAS The Washington Protocol 1997 
The Andean Community Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement 2000 
The AU Constitutive Act of the African Union 2001 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2001 
 
 Democracy clauses are unusual compared to other international treaties governing 
politically sensitive issues in that they are enforced with great consistency.  As will be 
shown, every successful coup that has occurred in a state subject to a democracy clause 
since 2000 has been suspended from relevant IGOs, or condemned and suspension 
withheld only after assurances that elections would be held shortly.  This is a very high 
level of enforcement for any international treaty, but especially so for treaties where core 
sovereignty issues are in play.  However, that these treaties are being enforced does not 
necessarily tell us whether they are working to prevent usurpations of power. 
 
 So What? 
 The question is important for several reasons.  Twenty years ago, Samuel 
Huntington looked at the remarkable increase in the number of democracies in the world 
from 1974 to 1991 and proclaimed this “Third Wave” of democracies to be one of the 
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most important events of the era (Huntington 1991, xiii).  Despite some notable setbacks, 
the democratization of the world’s states continues apace.  Since 1991, 342 more states 
have transitioned to democracy.  However, history has shown democratization is not 
irrevocable; 14 states transitioned from democracy to authoritarianism during this same 
time period.  It is now well-established that democratization is a difficult process and that 
many states that make democratic transitions eventually revert back to some form of 
authoritarianism (e.g. Kapstein and Converse 2008).  This is a troubling fact when we 
consider that democratic institutions are argued to be associated with many human goods, 
including interstate peace (e.g. Russet and Oneal 2001), intrastate peace (e.g. Hegre et al 
2001), economic growth and stability (e.g. North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012), protection of human rights (e.g. Davenport and Armstrong 2004; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al 2005), and of the environment (e.g. Farzin and Bond 2004).   
 However, most of the factors that have been found to influence the likelihood of 
democratic survival are beyond the control of human actors.  Some factors, like 
beneficial levels of economic development, region, historical legacies, and culture are 
endowments that new democracies either have or do not.  There is little if anything that 
anyone can do to influence these endowments, particularly in the unstable early years of a 
regime, and thereby increase the likelihood of democratic survival.  Other factors, like 
economic growth, level of inequality and choice of institutions are amenable to some 
human influence, but not much.  Implementing policies that spur economic growth and 
decrease inequality are very difficult in a technical sense and always involve trade-offs 
between rival interest groups that are difficult to manage in a political sense.  Moreover, 
whatever influence constitutional choices have on democratic survival, the choice of 
                                            
2 This number is based on the regime classifying criteria of Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010. 
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institutions during the transitional phase is rarely done with a view to long-term stability.  
It is far more likely that the motivation for choice of institutions is locking in the 
distributional prerogatives of those parties that happen to be involved in the constitution-
drafting process (Knight 1992; Frye 1997). 
 This provides motivation to look to whether the international community may 
play a role in the resilience of unconsolidated democracies.  However, here again we find 
few mechanisms by which this can occur.  Some international influences on democratic 
consolidation are now acknowledged, most prominently regional diffusion (Gleditsh and 
Ward 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2006), the influence of regional or global hegemons 
(e.g. Thyne 2011), and the conditionality requirements imposed by the European Union 
(e.g. Vachudova 2005).  However, as with the factors discussed above, the application of 
these influences to any particular country comes only from accidents of history.  No 
country can change its region or geopolitical importance in the hopes of preserving 
democracy. 
 Upon reviewing this literature one is left with the dismal prospect that in 
democracy we may have identified a way to increase peace, prosperity and protection of 
human rights, but no way of achieving it in any intentional way.  It is in this context that 
regional regimes to defend democracy become very interesting.  If they were to work 
they could provide a way for concerned parties in new democracies to shore up their 
regimes against the most common kind of authoritarian challenge.  This is no small thing 
when few other options are available.     
 The possibilities of democracy clauses have attracted attention and enthusiasm in 
some quarters.  In the wake of the apparently effective response of MERCOSUR and the 
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OAS to a coup in Paraguay in 1996, the Economist claimed “But for MERCOSUR, 
Paraguay would this year almost certainly have gone back to military rule” (Economist 
1996).  In reviewing the incident, Larry Diamond described the regional response to the 
Paraguay incident as “decisive” to “preserving Parguay’s fragile democratic experiment” 
(Diamond 2007, 136).  Munoz (1998, 1) argued that the creation of the OAS regime was 
an “historic stride toward reaffirming democracy.”  More recent appraisals of the OAS 
system like Cooper and Legler (2006) and Boniface (2007) are less effusive, but still 
cautiously optimistic (see Chapter 3).   
 In addition, there are reasons to believe that the response of the African Union 
may have led to rapid restoration of democracy after two coups in 2003 in Guinea-Bissau 
and in Sao Tome and Principe (Diamond 2007, 148-149), and Legler and Tieku (2010) 
and McGowan (2006, 242) have argued that the democracy clauses of the AU and of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) may well have prevented 
coups since they were enacted a decade ago. 
 There is one more reason it is worth knowing if democracy clauses are effective: 
the question of whether the sovereignty costs of membership are worth paying.  As Farer 
(1996) said in an early discussion of the OAS defense-of-democracy regime, the rise of 
these treaties represents a very interesting aspect of the evolution of sovereignty.  Upon 
reviewing studies of OAS action in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru in the 






[N]othing in the case studies subverts the conviction all of us began with – that external 
action wisely conceived and sensitively executed can do much to advance the democratic 
agenda.  The possibility of effective external action has been widened by a growing 
tolerance for measures, from electoral observation to economic embargos, that would 
once have been indicted by key Latin elites on the grounds of principle, if no other.  This 
widened tolerance, if not active enthusiasm, for collective action represents a new and 
very great retreat from the original and intrinsically flawed idea of sovereignty as 
unbounded national will, a retreat made inevitable by the contradictory interests of the 
governing elites, who irrespective of their will form a loose but still recognizable regional 
political system. (Farer 1996, 5) 
 
 This trend has only intensified since Farer wrote those words fifteen years ago, 
even within fora like the AU and ECOWAS that have historically been very protective of 
their rights to non-interference.  The reason, most likely, is that offered up by Farer, 
Moravcsik (2000), Hawkins and Shaw (2007), Parish and Peceny (2002) and others: 
democratic leaders of unconsolidated democratic states desire some third-party guarantor 
to protect them against their anti-democratic domestic political opponents.  As Farer said 
at the outset of his inquiry, “the premise is that, although external action is not often 
decisive, the credible threat of externally imposed economic or military sanctions can 
give an incipient democracy breathing space or can facilitate its restoration after a coup” 
(Farer 1996, 4-5). 
 When states join these regional democracy treaties, they give up to regional IGOs 
a portion of their right to non-interference, and it is over a very sensitive area of domestic 
politics.  Succession is one of the core aspects of domestic sovereignty, and one that is 
often politically fraught, a fact as well known to the United States as any other country.  
Giving a regional IGO the right to interpret a state’s own constitution to validate 
successions to executive office is a substantial sovereignty cost.  If states are paying such 
a costly toll for the benefit of protecting their regimes against unconstitutional overthrow, 
it would be good to know whether the price is worth it. 
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 Whether such ambitious schemes will work is a separate question, and one that 
this dissertation will try to answer.  Can an international treaty really prevent a 
determined would-be autocrat from overturning the democratic order and seizing power 
for himself/herself?   
 
 Overview of the Dissertation 
The expectations one would have about the efficacy of democracy clauses, based on the 
existing literature, would depend on which literature was examined.  The literatures on 
democratic consolidation and on international law would both tend to be skeptical that 
these treaties would have any effect on democratic reversals.  However, the literature 
looking specifically at these regional regimes is cautiously optimistic about their ability 
to achieve their aims.   
 Part of the reason for this difference of opinion is a remarkable gap in existing 
scholarship regarding the ways that democratic regimes break down.  As Barbara Geddes 
(2009), Ko Maeda (2010) and Jay Ulfelder (2010) have argued in recent years, the 
reversal process has been “black boxed” in most political science research, and this has 
stymied progress in our understanding of how and why democracies break down, and 
concomitantly stymied our understanding of what factors can reduce the occurrence of 
democratic reversals.  To understand the potential influence of democracy clauses it is 
therefore necessary to develop a theory of how they could influence the actions of 
domestic political actors involved in reversals.  This dissertation does that with respect to 
the most common form of democratic reversal – the coup d’etat – and proposes that 
democracy clauses could impede coups by complicating 1) the coup conspiracy process 
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and 2) the post-coup consolidation of power.  The theory described in Chapter 3 both 
directs my inquiry into how and when democracy clauses may be effective, and helps 
close the aforementioned gap in research on democratic breakdowns. 
 A brief summary of the theory begins with the near-universal agreement in the 
coups literature that they are difficult to execute.  A successful coup requires the close 
coordination of large numbers of people, who often have conflicting interests, in secret, 
to attempt to overthrow an incumbent already ensconced in office.  It is therefore no 
surprise that both the Powell and Thyne (2011) dataset for coups d’etat and the Marshall 
and Marshall (2009) dataset show that almost half of coup attempts in the post-World 
War II era failed.  The literature also shows there are several points in the coup process 
that are particularly difficult to navigate, most prominently the assembly of the initial 
coup conspiracy, and consolidation of authority over the state apparatus in the days 
immediately after the coup.  If democracy clauses are to influence the coup process, it is 
most likely during one of these two stages. 
 Take first the conspiracy stage.  At least one commentator has stated that, more 
than any other phase of the coup process, it is the assembly of a sufficient coup 
conspiracy that decides whether a coup will be successful (Farcau 1994, 15).  The 
difficulty arises because this is governed by the rules of an assurance game that has 
significant rewards for defection and severe penalties for failure (see Sutter 2000).  An 
assurance game is a kind of collective action problem in which multiple actors must 
cooperate to achieve some collective goal, and it is only rational for any individual actor 
to cooperate if s/he believes a minimally sufficient number of other actors will also 
cooperate (e.g. Sen 1967).  Rousseau’s stag hunt is a classic example.  The hunters will 
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achieve greater payoffs by cooperating to bring down the stag, but if any of them believe 
that any of the others may not cooperate, it makes no sense for the individual to 
participate in a venture destined to fail.   
 In the context of a coup conspiracy, potential participants have good reasons to be 
reticent about joining a coup plot.  Membership in a coup conspiracy constitutes treason, 
regardless of whether the coup is ever actually attempted, with severe consequences for 
those implicated should the plot be foiled.  Moreover, potential conspirators know that 
each of their fellows faces incentives to betray the plot to the authorities; the whistle-
blower(s) can bolster their standing with the incumbent government and potentially enjoy 
promotion as a result.  The combined effect is that the choice to join such a conspiracy is 
only rational when the participants can expect substantial rewards for participation and a 
good likelihood of success. 
 These are two aspects of the coup process that could well be impeded by the 
presence of a democracy clause.  Among the most important rewards of participation are 
likely material benefits.  Suspension from a regional organization is almost always 
accompanied by suspension of foreign aid, loans, and even trade.  The international 
response to the 1993 autogolpe in Peru led to the suspension of more than US $1 billion 
in loans and aid (Parish and Peceny 2002, 240).  More recently, it is estimated that the 
Honduran economy may have lost as much as US $2 billion from the response to the 
2009 coup (Legler 2010), and the Malian finance minister estimated that the sanctions 
imposed after the 2012 coup cost that country more than US $1 billion (Xinhua News 
Service 2012).  These numbers may be exaggerated, but even if the true costs are only 
half those reported these are still large amounts of money, and there is that much less to 
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spread around to potential coup supporters.  This predictable diminishment in material 
resources available to a coup-based regime could make it difficult to credibly promise 
potential coup conspirators that they will receive large material rewards for participation.  
Moreover, even if a particular conspirator is not motivated by money, or can expect to be 
insulated from the effect of sanctions, the knowledge that other conspirators might be 
inhibited by reduced rents could bring the assurance game into play and cause them to 
abstain from the coup plot.  The result would be fewer coups attempted, and that more of 
the coups attempted would fail for insufficient support. 
 The second mechanism proposed here is that democracy clauses could lead 
potential coup conspirators to anticipate that the international reaction may reduce the 
likelihood of coup success by making it more difficult to consolidate power immediately 
after toppling the incumbent government.  Luttwak (1969, 168) places great emphasis on 
how precarious this stage of a coup can be, in which the coup participants have little 
more than purely physical control over certain parts of the state apparatus.  He argues that 
coup success requires that at this stage the coup leaders “freeze” the political situation 
and wait for key elements of the bureaucracy, civil society, and business community to 
accept the transition as a fait accompli.  Any incident that evidences resistance to the new 
regime could undermine this process of acquiescence, and “even one well-organized 
demonstration, or a well-timed strike, could pose a serious threat to the coup in the 
delicate transitional phase” (Luttwak 1969, 130). 
 The theory here proposes two ways democracy clauses might increase the 
likelihood of resistance to a coup d’etat.  The first is that the possibility of economic 
dislocation resulting from international sanctions could lead certain actors who would 
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otherwise be relatively indifferent to the usurpation to actively oppose the coup.  It is, 
after all, the logic of sanctions to impose pain on some portion of a regime’s constituency 
in the hopes that this affected group will influence the regime’s leadership to make some 
change desired by the sanctioning state (see e.g. Marinov 2005).  Those whose 
livelihoods depend on international commerce could suddenly find themselves with 
interests deeply contrary to the new regime, which might well have not been the case 
before the promulgation of the treaty. 
 There is support in the existing literature for the adverse effects of sanctions on 
domestic political stability.  Marinov (2005) found that implementation of sanctions 
against a state in the post-World War II era increased the likelihood that the incumbent 
leader would lose power during the sanctions episode by about 28%.  Moreover, Allen 
(2008) found that there was a substantial increase in the likelihood of both anti-
government demonstrations and riots in states subject to sanctions.  In her study, states 
under international sanctions were about 75% more likely to experience demonstrations, 
and about 31% more likely to experience riots, on average, than were other similar states 
(Allen 2008, 935).   
 The second way democracy clauses could increase the likelihood of resistance is 
by delegitimizing the new leadership and adding to the legitimacy of opposition groups.  
This mechanism has been identified as possibly being important to the enforcement of 
human rights treaties by Beth Simmons (2009).  Such treaties can provide “intangible 
resources” (Simmons 2009, 146-47) to domestic political forces, including a benchmark 
by which to judge the actions of the government and the opposition, and reassurance to 
domestic actors that rights demands are not unreasonable.  In the context of democracy 
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clauses, this could mean that one of these treaties could lead potential members of a 
coup-opposition movement to be both more certain of the validity of their cause, and 
more likely to successfully recruit others to join them.  Donno’s (2007) finding that 
opposition mobilization against election fraud was significantly strengthened by the 
involvement of regional IGOs offers some empirical support for this idea in the 
democracy context. 
 
 Testing the Theory 
If this theory is correct, several empirical implications about the world should be 
observable.  First, states that are subject to democracy clauses ought to experience fewer 
coup attempts than we would otherwise expect given their other political and economic 
characteristics.  Second, states subject to democracy clauses should be more likely 
survive coup attempts, i.e. coups attempted in such states should be more likely, on 
average, to fail.  Third, when coups are attempted in states subject to democracy clauses, 
the coup leaders would have strong incentives to try to cloak their actions in the guise of 
constitutional action.  They would do this because the international community has been 
less willing to intervene in states when a threat to an existing regime comes not from a 
coup but from some procedure that may be constitutionally defensible (Arceneaux and 
Pion-Berlin 2007).  Simply put, regional organizations have shown that they do not like 
being in the position of interpreting the constitutions of their member-states, and when 
domestic actions are unusual but still constitutionally “colorable,” IGOs have tended to 
demure from enforcing democracy clauses.3  By observing whether these theoretical 
                                            
3 The recent response of MERCOSUR to an irregular impeachment in Paraguay may signal a shift in this 
tendency. 
 15 
implications play out in the real world we can learn whether the theory proposed above is 
correct. 
 The first two hypotheses concerning coup attempts and coup successes are 
amenable to statistical analysis, and this is the work of Chapters 4 and 5.  Chapter 4 
shows that there is a negative correlation between democracy clauses and coup attempts 
during the post-Cold War period – from 1990 until 2008 states with democracy clauses 
were, on average, about 25% less likely to experience a coup attempt than were other 
states.  However, this finding is not very reliable.  The coefficient for democracy clauses 
in the model used in Chapter 4 is not statistically significant.  The data are very “noisy,” 
and while it is clearly the case that there were fewer coup attempts in these states during 
this time period, it is impossible to say (within the conventional standards of statistical 
inference) whether this pattern is likely to be repeated outside this sample period.  
Moreover, including control variables for regional and global democratic diffusion 
substantially impact the model, and demonstrate that non-formal influences are probably 
more important for understanding international influences on regime stability than formal 
international agreements.  Global democracy diffusion is the chief alternative explanation 
for a decline in coups, and the simultaneous operation of democracy clauses and 
diffusion, and their potential endogeneity, present difficult inferential problems.  
Interactions of the two make the picture less murky, but it does appear that democracy 
clauses, on their own, do not strongly influence decisions to attempt coups.   
 The findings in Chapter 5 on coup outcomes are similar.  States subject to 
democracy clauses are less likely, on average, to succumb to coups than are other similar 
states.  Using one coup dataset they were about 20% less likely to be overthrown, while 
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another dataset showed them to be about 30% less likely to be overthrown.  However, 
once again the coefficients are not statistically significant and so we cannot say whether 
this pattern is an artifact of the time and states included in the sample or whether this is a 
reproducible finding.  Only more observations, based on the continuing experience of 
states attempting to apply these regimes in the future, will be able to settle the matter. 
 Chapter 6 looks at the third hypothesis concerning coup legitimation and 
consolidation tactics.  The nature of this research question lends itself better to case study 
analysis, and so I examine recent coups in Honduras (2009), Mali (2012), and Thailand 
(2006).  These cases were selected as typical of their respective regimes: Honduras as a 
typical case of a coup within the OAS framework, Mali as typical within the frameworks 
of the AU and ECOWAS, and Thailand as typical of a coup that occurred within a state 
not subject to a democracy clause.  A clear pattern emerges from observing these cases.  
First, in Honduras and Mali the coup leaders either chose, or were forced, to include far 
more members of the civilian political establishment in their post-coup regime than was 
observed in Thailand.  Moreover, there were more members of the civilian political 
establishment in Honduras and Mali than one would expect based on the theoretical 
literature on coups such as that of Finer (1962) and Farcau (1994) which would anticipate 
smaller juntas to ensure tighter control for coup leaders.  I argue that the reason for this is 
that expanding these coup coalitions were attempts to impede opposition to the coups not 
only domestically, but also to confuse or mollify the international community as it 
considered applying the sanctions provided for in regional democracy clauses. 
 Second, in Honduras and Mali the coup leaders made public statements 
legitimating their power grabs by referencing the pre-coup constitution.  Particularly in 
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Honduras, coup leaders took great pains to present their coup as legal, as action in 
compliance with constitutional procedures for unseating an incumbent president.  The 
leaders of the more extemporaneous Malian coup also eventually ended up to be acting 
within the bounds of the pre-coup constitution once international pressure ratcheted up, 
including a complete embargo by its ECOWAS neighbors.  In Thailand, on the other 
hand, there was never any claim that the coup was a constitutional impeachment.  In fact, 
the junta explicitly and repeatedly rejected the legitimacy of the pre-coup constitution and 
called for a new coup to be written that would better protect the interests of the army and 
the monarchy.  I argue that the difference in the legitimating strategies is based at least in 
part on the need of the coup leaders in Honduras and Mali to attempt a “colorable” legal 
defense of their actions to the international community.  As mentioned earlier, democracy 
clauses require regional organizations to judge the validity of successions to power 
according to the criteria of domestic constitutions.  This is something that state-members 
of IGOs do not like to do (see Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007; Chapter 3 infra), and 
confusion created by domestic actors over the constitutionality of actions is one way of 
deterring coordinated regional action against such usurpers.   
 These findings show that democracy clauses are not substantially decreasing the 
likelihood of coups, and they are not substantially changing the likely outcomes of coups, 
but they do appear to be changing the ways that coups are organized and publicly 
defended.  This may not be an earthshaking set of findings, but they are interesting 
nonetheless.  They show that international legal agreements based on normative rules are 
extraordinarily difficult to apply effectively, even when the self-interest of regional 
leaders (in stopping diffusion of coups or unrest more generally) is involved.  This means 
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that those who are interested in the effectiveness of international human rights law may 
do well to follow the lead of scholars like Koh (1997), Cardenas (2004) and Simmons 
(2009) in putting the primary emphasis of research on the ways international law 
influences domestic political actors rather than inter-state relations. 
 Moreover, the change in consolidating and legitimating strategies described in 
Chapter 6 may have important effects in the future.  It may be that coup leaders are in a 
learning stage and that as they see that new international dynamics will result in them 
having to share power or be otherwise limited in new ways that they will gradually come 
to see coup as less attractive.  It is also possible that the leadership of recent coups or 
coups to come may become trapped by their pro-constitutional rhetoric and thereby 
constrained by constitutional requirements.   
 
 Contributions 
The first and primary contribution of this project is to add to the literature on regional 
defense-of-democracy regimes.  The great bulk of existing research on such treaties is 
qualitative work looking at particular regimes.  In this dissertation I take the broader, 
global, view and can state more generally that the cautious optimism expressed in the 
earlier scholarship should probably place greater emphasis on the caution than the 
optimism.  The sovereignty costs that states have paid to join these treaties have not 
unambiguously paid off, at least through the period of this study. 
 The findings presented here also speak to the literature on international law, 
particularly the international law of human rights.  Many scholars of international human 
rights bemoan the difficulty of enforcing human rights treaties, and more generally the 
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reticence that many states demonstrate to include human rights standards in their foreign 
policies toward other states (e.g. Gibney 2008).  However, we see here that even when an 
international treaty is enforced in essentially every case of violation, it still may not have 
a huge impact on the regulated behavior.  To this extent, concern about international 
enforcement can be over-emphasized, and my findings support the recent moves by some 
scholars to examine how international law may influence the calculations of domestic 
actors in a variety of different ways (e.g. Cardenas 2004; Simmons 2009).   
 Finally, the theory proposed here adds substantially to the existing body of theory 
about the ways international influences may affect the calculations of those actors 
relevant to the staging and outcomes of coups d’etat.  As mentioned earlier, there is very 
little scholarship on the mechanisms of democratic breakdown; most scholars examining 
regime consolidation issues treat transitions as an undifferentiated class of events.  
However, Maeda (2010) and Ulfelder (2010) have shown that this is in error and that it is 
necessary to understand the different pathways of transition – coup, incumbent reversal, 
rebellion, “impeachment coup”, etc. – if we are to make further progress in understanding 
which domestic regimes survive.  This dissertation builds on previous qualitative work 
and formal theory to construct a novel theory of the coup process that can serve as the 
starting point for further research about how and why some democracies last and others 
revert back to authoritarianism.  As described above, understanding that question is 
important to the humanitarian project of pursuing international peace and the domestic 




CHAPTER 2: DEMOCRACY CLAUSES 
 To begin this study, it is first necessary to understand what sorts of agreements 
are being discussed.  What follows is a brief overview of the most important regional 
regimes for the defense of democracy.  The first section of this chapter reviews regimes 
adopted by major IGOs that require all member states to be democracies, and specify 
some punishment to be carried out by the membership against any state that breaches that 
rule.  As will be seen, these regimes vary greatly in legal strength and specificity, from 
the very weak regime of the OSCE to the very robust African Union regime. 
 However, in the second section of this chapter we will see that the legal language 
does not necessarily co-vary with the strength of the regime itself.  The previous 
academic literature on democracy clauses has focused on the regimes of the OAS and the 
AU.  This literature would lead us to be cautiously optimistic about the possibility that 
such treaties are reducing the general likelihood of coups in their member states, but to 
date there has been little cross-national research, particularly quantitative cross-national 
research, that could determine whether this was true. 
 
 The Form of Democracy Clauses 
  1.  The Organization of American States (OAS) 
 Promoting democracy has long been among the OAS’s stated goals.  A 
commitment to democracy can be found in the 1948 OAS Charter, in which Article 5 
stated that American solidarity is based “on the effective exercise of representative 
democracy.”  Democracy is also discussed in the regional American human rights 
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framework.  However, the exigencies of the Cold War ensured that these rules were 
largely ignored for the first four decades of the organization’s existence, and when they 
were mentioned at all it was usually as cover for political purposes having more to do 
with superpower rivalry than any real interest in democracy (Farer 1996).  However, the 
decline of the Soviet Union opened up new opportunities for the inter-American system 
to take an interest in the domestic politics of member States. 
The OAS created its defense of democracy regime in two documents promulgated at 
a 1991 meeting in Santiago, Chile.  The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of 
Delegation issued a document known as the “Santiago Commitment to Democracy and 
the Renewal of the Inter-American System” [hereinafter Santiago Commitment], in 
which they declared “their inescapable commitment to the defense and promotion of 
representative democracy and human rights in the region, within the framework of 
respect for the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.”  The next day the 
OAS General Assembly passed the second founding document of the regime, General 
Assembly Resolution 1080.  While purporting to preserve “due respect for the principle 
of non-intervention,” the resolution crafted a new mechanism through which the OAS 
could respond to threats to democracy.  Under the terms of Resolution 1080, the OAS 
Secretary General and Permanent Council were instructed to call for an immediate ad hoc 
meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the OAS General Assembly “in the event 
of any occurrence giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic 
political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically 
elected government in any of the Organization’s member states. . .”  At such a meeting 
the member States were empowered to “adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in 
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accordance with the Charter and international law.”   
 Applying such vague language proved difficult as the OAS responded to crises in 
Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Venezuela (1992), and Guatemala (1993).  In December 1992, 
the OAS General Assembly proposed a series of amendments to the OAS Charter that 
sought to make the powers of the OAS clearer and describe what procedures it must use 
to invoke them.  Known as the “Washington Protocol,” the primary change was the 
codification of a new Article 9 to the Charter.  This allowed the OAS General Assembly, 
upon a two-thirds vote, to suspend from the organization any member state “whose 
democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force.”   
 The Washington Protocol went into effect in 1997 after ratification by two-thirds 
of OAS members.4  However, this was not the end of the legalization of the democracy 
norm in the Americas.  In 2001 the Washington Protocol was strengthened by unanimous 
adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC).  The IADC was a 
resolution5 of the OAS General Assembly that spelled out in much greater detail a 
definition of democracy and steps to be followed should a threat to democracy arise in a 
member state.  The language of the Charter substantially strengthens the OAS’s powers.  
Membership may now be revoked not only when a democratic government is 
‘overthrown’ as provided for by the Washington Protocol, but also whenever there is ‘an 
                                            
4 As of December 12, 2012, the following states have not ratified the Washington Protocol: Dominica, 
Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago. 
5 While not an amendment of the OAS Charter like the Washington Protocol, the IADC has special legal 
status as an interpretation of the Charter.  When asked to comment on the IADC in the weeks before the 
vote on its adoption, the Inter-American Juridical Committee stated that “it would be unnecessary to amend 
the OAS Charter, provided that the text of the Democratic Charter explicitly states that it is setting forth an 
interpretation of the OAS Charter, and assuming, of course, that the Democratic Charter is adopted by 
consensus.” (Rudy 2005-2006, 241, quoting CJI Res. 32, para. 40, LIX O/01 (Aug. 24, 2001) in Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to the General Assembly, OEA/Ser.Q/VI.32, doc. 79 
(2001). 
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unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of 
the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state.”  
This expanded language allows for OAS involvement not only in coups but also in the 
event of less obvious reversals like autogolpes or “incumbent consolidation” of power 
(Rudy 2005-2006; Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007, 4). 
 The IADC also places an emphasis on the constitutionality of succession - a 
double-edged sword that came back to haunt the OAS response to crises in Ecuador and 
Honduras in the 2000s.  Focusing on the member states’ constitutional procedures for 
succession the IADC removed the ambiguity involved in the word “overthrown” and took 
countenance of other ways democracy can be undermined.  However, it also placed the 
OAS in the position of interpreting the constitutional law of its different member states 
when questionable successions occurred.  This has caused some difficulty for the OAS in 
cases not involving transparent coups d’etat (Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007). 
 
  2.  MERCOSUR 
 In June 1996 MERCOSUR adopted a document called the Ushuaia Declaration 
stating that “fully functioning democratic institutions are an indispensable condition” to 
the organization (Art. 1) and that outlined procedures to be taken in the event of a 
“breakdown of democracy”.  Per Article 5, the membership of MERCOSUR can agree by 
consensus to impose penalties that “may range from suspension of the right to participate 
in various bodies of the respective integration processes to suspension of the rights and 
obligations deriving from those procedures.”  The Ushuaia Declaration further states that 
these rules apply to the associate members Bolivia and Chile as well as the full members 
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Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
 The June adoption of the Ushuaia Declaration came shortly after an attempted 
coup in Paraguay in April 1996, and was a direct response to that event (Van der Vleuten 
and Hoffman 2010, 748).  Brazil and other MERCOSUR members had forcefully resisted 
that coup, threatening to cut Paraguay off from regional trade benefits if General Oviedo 
succeeded in coming to power.  MERCOSUR threatened sanctions after the adoption of 
the treaty in response to another constitutional crisis in Paraguay in 1999, but the crisis 
was resolved without a coup or reversal and no regional action was taken (ibid, 749-50). 
 
  3.  The Andean Community 
The Andean Community is a trade and customs union made up of Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  Its founding document, the 1969 Cartagena Agreement, 
called for cooperation based on ‘the principles of equality, justice, peace, solidarity and 
democracy” though this last criteria did not reach the level of a requirement until 2000.  
In that year the Community adopted the Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement.  
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Additional Protocol, if the Council of Foreign Ministers finds 
that a member State has suffered a “disruption of the democratic order”, it can adopt any 
of the following measures as it deems “appropriate”: 
 a. Suspension of the Member Country’s participation in any of the bodies of the Andean 
 Integration System; 
 b.  Suspension of its participation in the international cooperation projects carried out by the 
 Member Countries; 
 c.  Extension of the suspension to other System bodies, including its disqualification by 
 Andean financial institutions from obtaining access to facilities or loans; 
 d.  Suspension of rights to which it is entitled under the Cartagena Agreement and of the right 
 to coordinate external action in other spheres; and 
 e.  Other measures and actions that are deemed pertinent under International Law. 
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 4.  The European Union 
 In addition to the economic integration fostered by the EU, the organization has 
also been a proponent of democracy and human rights.  Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Turkey were all excluded from the European Community in the early 1960s because of 
their failure to meet criteria for democratic governance (see Pridham 2002).  It also 
adopted a rule in 1962 requiring existing member-states to “guarantee on their territories 
truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms” (Whitehead 
1986, 21; Diamond 2008, 136-137).  This commitment to democracy was reaffirmed in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (Piccone 2005) and previous research has shown that 
the EU has had a powerful democratizing effect on both prospective and existing 
members (e.g. Vachudova 2005; Pridham 2008, 2009; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010).   
 Under the current European Union Treaty, the operative language regarding 
reversal of democracy is found in Articles 2, 6 and 7.  Article 2 states: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities.  
 
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.  
 Article 6(3) furthermore states that: 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.  
 The enforcement clause is found in Article 7. There are two means by which a 
state might be sanctioned.  Under Article 7(1), four-fifths of the European Council and a 
majority of the European Parliament can label a member state as being in “clear risk of a 
serious breach . . . of the values referred to in Article 2”.  If this happens, Council will 
make recommendations to the state at issue.  More serious is the procedure under Article 
 26 
7(2-3).  Under this procedure, a unanimous decision of the European Council and a 
majority of the European Parliament may determine the “existence of a serious and 
persistent breach . . . of the values referred to in Article 2”.  If this occurs, a majority of 
the Council can then suspend the offending member state’s rights under the treating, 
including the voting rights of that state in the Council. 
 The EU enforcement mechanism in Article 7 has been invoked only once, in 
January 2000 to impose diplomatic sanctions on Austria for the inclusion of the ultra-
rightist Freedom Party in the country’s government.  The EU member states agreed to 
freeze bilateral relations with Austria, and that no European head of state would visit 
Austria while the Freedom Party was in government.  Furthermore the European 
Commission announced it would monitor the situation and implement the Article 7 
suspension mechanism if necessary.  These sanctions were lifted once the Freedom 
Party’s most extreme leaders, including nationalist Jörg Haider, stepped down in 
September 2000 (Van der Vleuten and Hoffman 2010, 744-45). 
 
  5.  The Council of Europe 
 The oldest existing regime that may be considered a “democracy clause” is found 
in the Council of Europe.  Article 3 of the 1949 Statute of the Council of Europe requires 
all states to uphold the rule of law and human rights, and Article 8 provides a mechanism 




Any member of the Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be 
suspended from its rights of representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers 
to withdraw under Article 7.  If such member does not comply with this request, the 
Committee may decide that it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such 
date as the Committee may determine. 
 The only time the Council considered suspending a member came in 1969 as a 
result of a coup d’etat in Greece.  The European Commission of Human Rights had 
determined that the Greek junta had violated a variety of provisions in the ECHR 
(Duxbury 2011, 141) and the Council was moving towards suspension when Greece 
withdrew from the organization prior to a vote (Duxbury 2011, 141).  When Greece 
reapplied for admission in 1974, the Parliamentary Assembly conditioned reacceptance 
on, among other things, “the holding of free parliamentary elections.”  The Council also 
threatened to apply the Article 8 procedure against Turkey following a coup in 1980, but 
ultimately refrained (Duxbury 2011, 141). 
 After the Cold War, the Council relaxed its requirements for membership as the 
desire “to achieve universal membership amongst European states began to overcome the 
desire to restrict the organisation to only those states achieving certain human rights and 
democracy standards” (Duxbury 2011, 145).  The Parliamentary Assembly threatened to 
suspend Turkey in 1995 for intervention in northern Iraq, Ukraine in 1998 and 1999 
under Article 8 for its refusal to abandon the death penalty, and Russia in 2000 over 
events in Chechnya, but did not end up doing so in any of those cases (Duxbury 2011, 
152-53).  No state, however, has been seriously threatened with suspension on account of 





  6.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 Some ascribe to the OSCE, a group of 56 states in Europe, Central Asia and North 
America, the distinction of being the IGO to initiate the widespread adoption of 
democracy clauses after the end of the Cold War (e.g. Piccone 2005).  The 1990 Charter 
of Paris, the founding document of the OSCE, describes adherence to democracy and 
human rights as a condition of membership.  The democracy clause was first iterated in 
the Concluding Document of the 1991 Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension.  
Article 17.1 condemns “unreservedly forces which seek to take power from a 
representative government of a participating state against the will of the people as 
expressed in free and fair elections”, and directs member States to not recognize a 
government that comes to power by usurping a democratically elected government. 
 The OSCE also has two further means of assessing whether a state is backsliding 
on democracy.  The “Vienna Mechanism” lists several different ways by which the 
Permanent Council can send a mission to the state in question, and then issue 
“recommendations” based on the resulting report.  Furthermore, each year the OSCE 
undertakes an “Implementation Review Conference” where state representatives and 
NGOs may raise concerns about democratic consolidation in member states, though these 
conferences have tended to focus on matters general to the OSCE rather than discussing 
failings in any particular state (Piccone 2005, 116).  It is because these enforcement 
mechanisms are so limited, and particularly because they do not provide for suspension 




  7.  The African Union 
 The African Union presents a very interesting case when it comes to the defense 
of democracy.  For most of their history, the OAU and its successor-organization have 
actively defended the prerogatives of sovereignty, being mostly concerned with 
colonialism and the problems of development.  Africa adopted a human rights instrument 
later than Europe or the Americas, adopting the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights only in 1981.  That treaty lists a right to democracy in Article 13 in language 
similar to the right in Article 25 of the ICCPR, but it was largely ignored by African 
governments that were mostly authoritarian.  That said, the OAU did bar Togo from its 
first conference meeting in 1963 because of the illegal seizure of power by Eyadema 
Gnassingbe (though Togo was later admitted), and attempts were made to bar Ghana 
from participating in 1966 because of a coup, and Uganda in 1971 for the same reason 
(Duxbury 2011, 187). 
 The formal African defense of democracy regime began as a response to a 
military coup in Sierra Leone in 1997.  Then OAU secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim 
proposed to the OAU Council of Ministers that they request “all African countries, and 
the International Community at large, to refrain from recognizing the new regime and 
lending support in any form whatsoever to the perpetrators of the coup d’etat” (Legler 
and Tieku 2010, 469; quoting OAU 1997).  Declarations against governments that come 
to power through unconstitutional means were adopted at the OAU annual summits of 
1998, 1999, and 2000 (Legler and Tieku 2010, 470), but it was in the AU Constitutive 
Act that the democracy clause was codified. 
 Signed in 2000, the AU Constitutive Act went into effect on May 26, 2001, after 
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ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU.  The democracy clause of the 
AU is found in Article 30 of Constitutive Act, which states simply “Governments which 
shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in 
the activities of the Union.”  Enforcement of Article 30 occurs through two mechanisms: 
the AU Assembly, composed of the Heads of State and Government of the AU member 
states (or their representatives), and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) created by the 
Protocol Relating the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union.  The Assembly has the power under Article 23 to punish any member state “that 
fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union” and may impose sanctions 
“such as denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and 
other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly.”   
 This has been supplemented by a further document, the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance.  Proposed in 2004, the Charter was adopted in 
2007, and will go into effect upon ratification by fifteen member states6.  The Charter 
would make several major changes to the African democracy protection regime.  First, it 
would add an additional means of democratic usurpation that would fall under the AU’s 
competence: “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which 
is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government” (Art 23)7.  
Second, Article 24 would give the PSC the power to intervene in a state before an 
overthrow “when a situation arises in a State Party that may affect its democratic political 
institutional arrangements or the legitimate exercise of power.”   
                                            
6 As of late 2011, only Ethiopia, Mauritania and Sierra Leone have ratified the Charter. 
7 For an excellent discussion of the recent rise of coup by constitutional amendment (focusing on Latin 
America), see Newman 2011. 
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 The Charter includes other important innovations.  Perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change are not to be allowed to participate in subsequent elections to 
restore democratic order (Art 25(4)), and may be tried before “the competent court of the 
Union”, presumably the African Court of Justice (Art 25(5))8.  The Assembly is 
empowered to impose sanctions on any member states that supported an unconstitutional 
change in another state (Art. 25(6)).  States are prohibited from giving sanctuary to any 
perpetrators of an attempted usurpation (Art 25(8)) and are required to extradite them to 
the affected state or, if that is not possible, try them themselves (Art 25(9)).  If it should 
ever receive sufficient ratifications to go into effect, the Charter will substantially 
increase the power of the AU to respond to threats to democracy in member states.  
However, even without the Charter the Assembly has substantially strengthened the 
regime by using its authority under Art 23(2) of the Constitutive Act to issue a 
declaration on February 2, 2010 stating as follows:  
In cases of unconstitutional change of Government, in addition to the suspension of the country 
concerned, the following measures shall apply: 
 a. non-participation of the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change in the elections held to 
 restore constitutional order; 
 b. implementation of sanctions against any Member State that is proved to have 
 instigated or supported an unconstitutional change in another State; 
 c.  implementation by the Assembly of other sanctions, including punitive  economic 
 sanctions. 
… 
(See Omorogbe 2011, 137 for more discussion). 
All told, the combined effect of Article 30 and the February 2 Declaration make the AU 
one of the most legally stringent democracy clauses currently in existence.  The only 
democracy clause to surpass it comes from another African IGO, ECOWAS. 
 
                                            
8 “presumably” because there is some debate as to what this clause means; see Omorogbe (2011); Legler 
and Tieku (2010). 
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  8.  ECOWAS 
 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) began in 1975 as 
a trade bloc but has significantly expanded its political activity since the end of the Cold 
War, including the adoption of a robust democracy clause.  The first expressions of 
democracy as a principle of ECOWAS are found in the 1991 Declaration of Political 
Principles, and this was formally incorporated into the ECOWAS structure itself in the 
revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1994, where Article 4(j) listed as a fundamental principle of 
the organization the “promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance 
in each Member State as envisaged in the Declaration of Political Principles.” 
 The experiences of applying these rules in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s 
likely contributed to the decision to adopt the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (1999 
Protocol) and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (Protocol on 
Democracy).  Among other things, the 1999 Protocol created the Mediation and Security 
Council to make decisions on peace and security within the region.  It also created three 
organs that make up the “mechanism”: the Defense and Security Commission, the 
Council of Elders, and the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).  The 
Defense and Security Commission is a body that coordinates the activities of the member 
states’ military, diplomatic, security, police, immigration, customs, narcotics and civil 
protection agencies.  The Council of Elders is an interesting body consisting of “eminent 
persons from various segments of society, including women, political, traditional and 
religious leaders” who are to “use their good offices and experience to play the role of 
mediators, conciliators and facilitators” (Art 20).  Finally, ECOMOG consists of “several 
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stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and 
ready for immediate deployment” (Art 21) and is tasked with monitoring, peace-keeping, 
peace-building, and “other operations as mandated by the Mediation and Security 
Council.”  Under Article 25 of the 1999 Protocol, the mechanism “shall” be applied in a 
variety of crisis situations, one of which is “in the event of an overthrow or attempted 
overthrow of a democratically elected government.” 
 The democracy component was strengthened in the Protocol on Democracy.  
After proclaiming “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional 
means” (Art 1(c)), the treaty sets out an extensive democracy clause in Article 45.  The 
clause begins with the following “trigger” clause: 
1.  In the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is 




 The Authority - the body of the Heads of Government - is then empowered to 
implement sanctions against the offending state.  Preliminary sanctions to be used are 
refusal to allow the affected state to place candidates in ECOWAS elective posts and 
refusal to hold ECOWAS meetings in the state, and, if necessary, suspension from the 
organization.  However, even beyond these sanctions the Authority can, on the 
recommendation of the Mediation and Security Council, resort to the conflict 
management mechanism in the 1999 Protocol.  This opens the door to a wide range of 
possible tools and sanctions, including the possibility of military intervention against the 
offending state through ECOMOG.  This is the strongest enforcement scheme in any 
democracy clause currently in place. 
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  9.  The Commonwealth of Nations  
 The Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the British Commonwealth, 
was one of the first inter-governmental organizations to consider making democracy a 
requirement for membership.  The Commonwealth consists of 54 states spread out on six 
continents, nearly all of which used to be members of the British Empire9.  A 
commitment to democracy can be found in the 1971 Declaration of Commonwealth 
Principles (also known as the Singapore Declaration), and is reiterated in the Harare 
Declaration of 1991.  The Commonwealth’s democracy clause is found in the 1995 
Millbrook Action Programme on the Harare Declaration.  Under the Programme, in the 
event of an “unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected government” the 
offending state is to be suspended from meetings at the ministerial and heads-of-state 
level, and suspension from any technical assistance if the usurpation lasts two years.  
Furthermore, member states are to bilaterally refuse recognition to the new regime, and, 
under Section B(3), the Commonwealth can consider “further bilateral and multilateral 
measures” including “trade restrictions . . . and in exceptional cases suspension from the 
organization”.  Whether to implement such sanctions is the decision of the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), a committee of eight foreign 
ministers who appraise alleged violations of democratic rule and recommend what 
measures, if any, should be adopted by the broader membership.  (See Piccone 2005, 
110). 
 
 Literature on the Implementation of Democracy Clauses 
                                            
9 The two exceptions are Rwanda and Mozambique. 
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  Efficacy of the OAS Regime 
 There is a substantial literature examining the OAS democracy regime, exploring 
the reasons for its development, the politics of its implementation, and, less 
systematically, its effectiveness in preventing democratic reversals in the Western 
Hemisphere.  The most prominent early work was a volume edited by Tom Farer (1996) 
that examined the early development of the regime.  The Farer volume identified more 
promise than effect in the nascent OAS regime, but did note that it appeared to have been 
at least partially effective in responding to autogolpes in Peru (1992) and Guatemala 
(1993) (see Remmer 1996; also Boniface 2007).  Similar conclusions were reached by 
Valenzuela (1997), Bloomfield (1994) and Hakim (1993).  Deficiencies were laid bare in 
the response to the Haitian crisis from 1991-1994, to the extent that the economic 
sanctions imposed on Haiti were poorly executed, and what limited effect there was 
probably favored the coup leaders because they were able to benefit from a monopoly on 
black-market trade (Farer 1996; Levitt 2006).  However, the political condemnation of 
General Cedras was swift and uniform within the OAS.  A more impressive showing 
came in response to the coup in Paraguay in 1996.  The international reaction to General 
Oviedo’s coup, with joint condemnations from the OAS and MERCOSUR, and 
coordinated pressure from the United States and Brazil, has been cited as important to the 
coup’s failure (Pena 1997; Munoz 1998; Diamond 2007).   
 The 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter has been invoked four times.  
Twice member states have invoked Article 18 with allows states to invite the OAS 
Secretary General to conduct an investigation when “situations arise in a member state 
that may affect the development of its democratic political institutional process or the 
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legitimate exercise of power.”  This occurred in Ecuador in 2005 and in Nicaragua in 
2005.     
 In Ecuador, President Lucio Gutierrez was “impeached” on April 20, 2005 for 
“neglecting his constitutional duties” by a special session of Congress (a procedure not 
provided for in the Ecuadoran Constitution) after Gutierrez attempted to replace most of 
the judges of the Supreme Electoral Council, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the 
Supreme Court (also not permissible under the Ecuadoran Constitution) (Levitt 2007, 
231-32).  A struggle for power ensued that ended with Vice President Alfredo Palacio 
assuming the presidency and Gutierrez fleeing into exile in Brazil by the end of the same 
day.  Interestingly, at least one source claims that during the uncertainty of the April 20 
political machinations, the military leadership considered imposing a military 
government, but they were dissuaded “only when foreign governments made it clear that 
this would be unacceptable in view of the commitment to democracy by important allies 
and the OAS” (Levitt 2007, 233, quoting Bruneau 2006). 
 Under pressure from the OAS, the new Ecuadoran government extended an 
invitation for an OAS mission to assess the situation, which arrived on April 26.  By then, 
the tumult had ended, and the mission’s only action was to issue a report that suggested 
several institutional reforms and the initiation of a national dialogue of reconciliation in 
Ecuador (see Levitt 2007, 236-37).  Even this minimalist response was decried by the 
new Ecuadoran government as an infringement on its sovereignty, though it appears that 
most of the other member states were nonplussed by this argument (see Levitt 2007). 
 In Nicaragua President Enrique Bolanos invoked Article 18 after domestic 
political opponents passed legislation stripping him of prosecutorial immunity and 
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attempting to have him jailed on corruption charges.  This again resulted in an OAS 
mission and report, though there is some evidence that Bolanos retained power in part 
because of the threat that Nicaragua could be punished by the international community 
for a breach of democratic order (Boniface 2007, 53).  The experiences of the OAS’s 
implementation of Article 18 led Rudy to argue “As the examples of Nicaragua and 
Ecuador show, the Democratic Charter can be a preventative diplomatic device that may 
put anti-democrats on the defensive.” (Rudy 2005-2006, 248). 
 The “democracy clause” component of the IADC in Article 19 has been invoked 
twice, in response to coups in Venezuela in 2002 and in Honduras in 2009.  In the 
Venezuelan case the OAS response was slow and the outcome was quickly decided by 
domestic factors, particularly serious miscalculations by the coup leader Pedro Carmona 
in the consolidation phase.  However, the OAS may have had some ancillary influence 
(Cooper and Legler 2006, Chapter 6).  It is difficult to know whether it would have been 
more important to the outcome if Chavez had not been able to retake power so quickly.10 
 In the Honduran case the mechanism appeared to operate as intended.  Honduras 
was suspended from the OAS shortly after the coup and member-states imposed a range 
of sanctions against the new Micheletti regime (Legler 2010).  Nevertheless, the regime 
stayed in power until the next elections, which were used to consolidate its position (see 
Legler 2010 for an analysis). 
 But this is not to say that these were the only opportunities for the OAS to 
exercise its defense of democracy regime in the last two decades, and this issue is where 
most scholars of the regime have focused their efforts.  Boniface (2007) counts 19 
incidents between 1990 and 2005 that involved substantial constitutional irregularities of 
                                            
10 Chavez was displaced from power for only about 36 hours (Cooper and Legler 2006, 114). 
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the sort broadly contemplated by the Santiago Commitment; McCoy (2006) counted 70 
country-years of “internal sources of democratic crisis in Latin America and the 
Caribbean” for the same period.  But the OAS has exercised Resolution 1080 and the 
IADC selectively, responding formally (if not always effectively) in cases like Haiti 
(1991), Venezuela (2002), and Honduras (2009), but relying on informal measures in 
response to events like those in Ecuador (2000), Bolivia (2003), and Haiti (2004) 
(Boniface 2007).  There is consensus among the scholars of the OAS that the selectivity 
is tied to the nature of the crisis.  Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2007) say “the clarity of 
the threat to democracy acts as a ‘gatekeeper: when the threat is unambiguous the OAS 
acts decisively; but as clarity diminishes, OAS willingness to intervene varies and 
depends on other factors,” particularly whether the state’s civil society effectively 
demands international help, and on the foreign policy interests of the United States 
(Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007, 2). 
When the threat to a democratic order is clear and grave, as in the case of a coup or coup attempt, 
it is much easier for OAS members to summon the will to act, because they immediately 
understand what is at stake for them as well as for the afflicted nation. . . . Where the threat is 
lower, more ambiguous, or in dispute, a commitment to act is harder, though not impossible to 
achieve. 
 
(Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007, 9). 
 Similar views are held by Levitt (2006), Cooper and Legler (2006), McCoy 
(2006), and Boniface (2007).  Writing prior to the Honduran episode, Boniface said “in 
marked contrast with the Cold War period, classic coups d’etat have now become 
effectively proscribed as a legitimate means of domestic political change” (Boniface 
2007, 54), though he noted the difficulties in responding to the Ecuadoran (2000) and 
Venezuelan (2002) crises.  But when the case is not so clear cut, when the contending 
parties all have some claimed constitutional justification for their actions (however 
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weak), this makes OAS intervention both much more difficult and less likely to occur.  
There are several different reasons proposed for this distinction.  Levitt highlights the 
lack of an authoritative interpretation of what constitutes an “unconstitutional interruption 
of democratic order,” and argues that this vagueness restricts the effectiveness of the 
IADC to only the most transparent cases (Levitt 2006, 97).  He also points to the 
collective action problem between enforcing member states (Levitt 2006, 98).  McCoy 
(2006) additionally points to “fear of reciprocal intervention when flaws in one’s own 
state are identified by outsiders; fear of offending an important neighbor; and ‘veto’ 
power of the affected state or another member-state in an organization that practices 
consensus decision-making” (McCoy 2006, 769).11 
 All in all, the performance of the OAS in protecting democracy since the creation 
of its defense of democracy regime has been mixed, though the chief distinction between 
cases of strong versus weak implementation appears to predominantly be the nature of 
the crisis rather than the geopolitics of the situation (the American response to Venezuela 
2002 being a notable exception to this).  This suggests the regime is working to harness 
the foreign policies of the OAS member states to protect democracy, at least in the 
transparent cases of coups d’etat.  As Boniface said:  
I conclude that OAS actions have had an immediate but short-lived positive impact.  In 
short, a dispassionate summary of OAS practice might be as follows: it is a relatively 
weak organization doing an imperfect job of promoting a rather limited notion of 
representative democracy.  Yet, in spite of all its weaknesses, the OAS still makes a 
contribution to the promotion of democracy that would be impossible without it.   
 
(Boniface 2007, 43). 
                                            
11 It is in response to these difficulties that the OAS has additionally developed a range of informal 
procedures as well (Boniface 2007), in particular the “mesa,” a high-level OAS mission acting as a broker 
between parties that was used to good effect in Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2002) (Cooper and Legler 
2005).  These informal mechanisms are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but should not be discounted 





 Assessing the AU Regime 
 The AU has the world’s most robust defense of democracy regime, and it has 
been exercised fairly consistently, at least in response to coups.  In fact, the AU has 
suspended every member state that underwent a successful coup d’etat since 2003: 
Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe in 2003, Togo in 2005, Mauritania in 2005 
and 2008, Guinea in 2008, Madagascar in 2009 and Niger in 2010.  This is an impressive 
level of enforcement for any international treaty, but particularly for one where 
sovereignty issues are at play.  Legler and Tieku (2010, 474) argue that this represents a 
successful institutionalization of a norm that coups cannot give rise to legitimate 
governments.  Omorogbe (2011, 138) tentatively agrees, though he believes AU action 
has been aimed predominantly at protecting incumbents, not democracy.  Another 
observer of Africa Politics, McGowan (2006, 242), states the AU regime may well 
deterred militaries from plotting and attempting some coups. 
 This is not to say the AU’s regime has been flawless in protecting democracy 
from overthrow.  In the cases of Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Mauritania and Guinea, the 
candidates favored by the usurpers won the elections that were designed to “normalize” 
democracy.  After re-admitting the first three states, the AU decided to no longer allow 
this practice in the case of Guinea, and has to this date refused to lift its suspension. 
The case of Guinea shows the evolution of the AU policy against coups.  Whereas its response to 
the coups in Togo and Mauritania allowed a coup outcome to be validated, on this occasion, the 
AU’s support of mediation was instrumental in barring members of the junta from the election of 
June 2010. It is [end of 148] significant that it was during the events in Guinea that the AU 
Assembly adopted its Decision of February 2, 2010, not to allow perpetrators of unconstitutional 
change to participate in elections held to restore constitutional order.  While the AU, so far, has 
not been successful in achieving a return to constitutional government in Guinea, its policy 
prevented the legitimization of the coup of 2008. 
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(Omorogbe 2011, 148-149). 
 Legler and Tieku (2010) have also been critical of the AU’s low standard for re-
admitting states, but this criticism was primarily leveled at the cases of Togo and 
Mauritania. 
 Why has the regime been effective, at least at the level of formal execution?  
Legler and Tieku point to the origins of the regime.  Unlike the state-driven process that 
led to the creation of the OAS democracy regime, the AU regime was created largely 
because of the work of OAS bureaucrats and civil society actors within Africa.  These 
actors preferred legalistic and indeed mechanistic enforcement mechanisms rather than 
the more discretionary approach used in the OAS.  Consistent with the legalization 
literature (Goldstein et al 2000; Chayes and Chayes 1995), they argue that this more 
precise delimiting of options in the event of a coup d’etat made it difficult for the AU to 
do anything but suspend the offending state when an overthrow occurred: 
Unlike the OAS practice of exhausting all possible non-confrontational diplomatic measures 
before suspending a member state, in the African context a coup automatically triggers 
suspension.  Additionally, the affected state cannot rejoin the AU club until elections have been 
organized and constitutional order restored.  This mechanical operation of the regime has made it 
less prone to political manipulation. 




 This chapter has aimed to provide a base of knowledge about the regional IGOs 
that have adopted democracy clauses, what the content of these treaties is, and how that 
content varies.  As can be seen, democracy treaties vary in their form and their 
stringency.  One of the most interesting patterns that emerges from this variance is that 
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stricter democracy clauses tend to be adopted in regions where the threat of coups is 
greatest.  This makes sense given the “lock in” logic of Farer, Moravcsik and others who 
are argue that these and other human rights treaties are often pursued by democratic 
leaders seeking to buttress their positions against domestic authoritarian political 
opponents. 
 The next chapter develops a theory of how democracy clauses could work.  This 
requires some novel theorizing because the standard theories of international legal 
efficacy, based on state interests and normative suasion, do not work well in the context 
of treaties that are ultimately aimed at dissuading activity by sub-state, would-be 
authoritarian, actors.  However, Chapter 3 will demonstrate that it may still be possible 
for democracy clauses to influence the rational calculations of coup leaders and thereby 




CHAPTER 3: A THEORY OF DEMOCRACY CLAUSES 
 
This chapter describes the ways regional defense of democracy regimes may be able to 
contribute to the lock-in of democracy in their member states.  The theory proposed here 
examines the interests and incentives of those persons who might be interested in 
overthrowing a government by coup d’etat, and describes ways that democracy clauses 
may impact them.  It is a rationalist, actor-oriented theory that proposes that democracy 
clauses influence the coup process in two primary ways.  Democracy clauses may make it 
more difficult for coup leaders to assemble a minimally sufficient coup conspiracy to 
launch the coup, and democracy clauses may make it more difficult for coup leaders to 
consolidate their authority immediately after the coup by decreasing the likelihood of 
public acquiescence.  Potential coup participants, anticipating these effects, may choose 
to forego coups as a result, and those coups that are attempted may be more likely to fail.  
Furthermore, these influences could force coup plotters to adopt tactics to cloak their 
actions in a veneer of democratic legitimacy, such as the inclusion of legislative, judicial 
and civil society actors in the coup coalition, or to retain the pre-coup constitution so as 
to create the appearance of compliance with its requirements rather than subversion.  If 
these effects do play out, this would signify a substantial change to the political 
environment for democratization in those states subject to democracy clauses. 
 Before introducing the theory, two issues need to be addressed.  First, this 
dissertation looks at the influence of democracy clauses on only a subset of regime 
reversals: coups.  As explained below, there are several theoretical reasons for taking this 
approach.  Second, a brief review of the causal mechanisms often attributed to 
international law’s influence on domestic politics will help situate the theory that follows.  
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 Focusing on Coups as a Subset of Democratic Reversals 
Most of the major empirical works in the democratic consolidation canon have treated 
democratic reversal as a single, undivided concept.  Linz (1978), Linz and Stepan (1996), 
Przeworski et al (2000), Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Cheibub (2007), 
Ulfelder and Lustik (2007), Svolik (2008), etc. all treat reversal as a dichotomous 
variable that either occurs or does not.  All of these works investigate whether some 
variable(s) – economic, cultural, institutional, etc. – impact the likelihood that democratic 
institutions will be replaced with either less-democratic institutions, or unambiguously 
autocratic institutions.  The problem with this is that there are different kinds of 
democratic reversal that follow different pathways and are conducted by different kinds 
of actors.  A coup is a different phenomenon than an autogolpe or a revolution or a 
gradual consolidation of incumbent advantage.  The failure of most existing consolidation 
literature to recognize these distinctions has led to an overemphasis on correlation and an 
under-appreciation of causal mechanisms.   
 These points were illustrated by Maeda (2010).  He replicated some of the most 
prominent democratic consolidation studies, with one change: he divided reversals into 
two broad categories: exogenous (e.g. coups and rebellions) and endogenous (e.g. 
autogolpes and election fraud).  As he argued: 
These two types of termination are different in many ways, most notably in that the actor 
that initiates the transition is usually the military in exogenous terminations, whereas it is 
the chief executive in endogenous terminations.  They are also different in that the 
incumbent chief executive loses power in exogenous terminations but stays in office 
following endogenous terminations.  It is thus reasonable to consider that the two paths 
are facilitated by different factors although this consideration is presently untheorized in 
the literature. 
 
(Maeda 2010, 1130). 
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 And so it turns out.  Maeda showed that a more nuanced understanding of 
influences on democratic consolidation emerges than when treating all reversals as the 
same.  He found, for example, that high levels of economic development and high levels 
of growth both reduced the likelihood of exogenous breakdowns, but had no influence on 
the likelihood of endogenous breakdowns.  Moreover, the presence of presidential or 
mixed institutions had no influence on the likelihood of reversal by coup or rebellion, but 
they substantially increased the likelihood of endogenous reversals.  Ulfelder (2010) had 
similar findings.  Through a combination of statistics and case studies he shows that the 
great majority of democratic reversals occur by way of coup d’etat and that the failure to 
include the military in previous theory had significantly obscured our understanding of 
the consolidation process.  The combined case is persuasive: in order to understand 
democratic consolidation we have to consider different mechanisms of reversal.   
 This study focuses on coups, rather than other mechanisms, for three reasons.  
First, the overwhelming majority of democratic reversals occur by way of coup.  
Depending on what definition of “coup” and “reversal” one uses, somewhere between 
half and 80% of all reversals in the post-World War II era occurred by coup.  (e.g. 
Ulfelder 2010, 60; Powell and Thyne 2011; Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010).  If 
democracy clauses work to substantially reduce the number of coups, or if they make 
attempted coups less likely to succeed, this would be a significant step toward preventing 
the reversal of the large number of unconsolidated democracies that emerged in the Third 
Wave of democracy.  Second, as described in the previous chapter the language and 
legislative history of most regional defense-of-democracy treaties makes clear they are 
aimed predominantly at coups.  Third, a coup is a relatively transparent event.  It is often 
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difficult to identify when or if a state slips from unconsolidated democracy back to 
autocracy by way of “endogenous reversal.”  As previously described, this difficulty has 
led at least some regional IGOs to focus their enforcement efforts on coups (e.g. 
Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007).  This means that if democracy clauses are not 
successful at stopping coups, for which they are relatively well-designed to address, we 
can be also expect that they are not likely to be successful at stopping other reversals. 
 
 Mechanisms of International Law 
A theory of democracy clauses needs to take into consideration the existing theories of 
the efficacy of international law, but one discovers that these theories do not easily apply 
to this kind of treaty.  This section will briefly review theories based on state interests, 
norms, and legal process, and show that each of these contemplates different kinds of 
international legal arrangements than we see in the case of regional democracy regimes. 
 Regarding interests, some have argued that even if one accepts the realists’ 
assumption that states are rational self-interested power maximizers, there are still good 
reasons why states would support the creation of international legal rules and regimes, 
and comply with them.  It is at least occasionally in a state’s self-interest to cooperate 
with other states to achieve mutual goals, but negotiating the terms of that cooperation 
imposes transaction costs on the participants.  The creation of international law reduces 
those transaction costs by eliminating the need to haggle over every particular interaction 
(e.g. Keohane 1984).  Moreover, states have good reason to comply with legal regimes so 
created because non-compliance can produce like behavior from other states 
(reciprocity), punishment if the non-breaching parties are sufficiently aggrieved 
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(retaliation), and make it more difficult to convince other states to enter into such 
agreements in the future (reputation) (Guzman 2008). 
 These interest-based approaches do not work well in the case of human rights 
treaties because enforcement requires a state to take actions outside the bounds of treaty 
obligations (Simmons 2009, 116-25).12  If State A reneges on a trade pact by raising 
tariffs, State B can punish A by raising B’s own tariffs.  If State A reneges of a human 
rights treaty by suppressing freedom of speech, State B cannot punish A by clamping 
down on speech in its own borders.  To punish a human rights offender requires an 
enforcer to impose a sanction that is unrelated to the subject matter of the treaty, 
something that states are often reticent to do because this can influence relations in other 
areas of cooperation like trade or security.  The same problem afflicts democracy clauses. 
 There is a bigger problem with interest-based theories in that they are focused on 
the interests of the state qua state.  States wish to maintain their reputations for 
compliance with international law because it preserves their access to mutually beneficial 
cooperation with other states.  But who, precisely, benefits?  As government is a 
distributional enterprise, those who control it have the capacity to implement their 
favored distributions, and those outside of government must accept less-favored 
distributions.  When a regime is overthrown, one incumbent government is replaced with 
another, and the members of the new government will enjoy substantial benefits from 
being able to impose their favored distributional policies.  It is at least possible, and in 
fact almost certain, that any losses experienced by coup leaders resulting from breaching 
a democracy treaty will be more than adequately compensated for by gaining access to 
                                            
12 While it is debatable as to whether democracy clauses are human rights treaties, it is clear that both kinds 
of treaty share this problem.  Furthermore, a right to democracy is found in both the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (Art. 21) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 25). 
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the privileged position in the government.   
 For most international law, the imperative or admonition of the law is directed at 
the state.  The law instructs state actors to behave in specified ways, or it instructs state 
actors to use their domestic power to force private actors within their jurisdiction to 
behave in specified ways.  However, a violation of a democracy clause occurs when a 
domestic actor engages in an activity the state actor is powerless to stop.  This is not an 
instance where a treaty signatory will fail to meet its treaty obligations because of lack of 
political will to enforce the treaty.  Every incumbent regime faced with usurpation will 
have the will to resist; the question is whether it has the capacity.  Some scholars of 
international law have raised the issue of capacity in compliance, whether in regulatory 
regimes (Chayes and Chayes 1995) or regarding human rights (Englehart 2009), but this 
problem arises in a particularly acute form in the context of democracy clauses. 
 Another mechanism attributed to international law, especially international human 
rights law, is the power of international norms to persuade political actors to act in ways 
congruent with the norms.  The essence of the persuasive mechanism is that “actors are 
consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or appropriateness of a norm, belief or 
practice . . . and ‘change their minds’” (Goodman and Jinks 2004, 635).  This is based on 
the view of Wendt (e.g. 1992; 1999), Finnemore (1996), Checkel (2001; 2005), and 
others that the very idea of “self interest” is contingent on the identity of the actor in 
question.  If a norm changes the way an actor thinks about his or her identity, it will 
change the way s/he conceives of self-interest and therefore change the ends sought after 
and means considered appropriate for their pursuit.  It does not constrain actors from 
pursuing certain preferences so much as change the preferences they pursue (Finnemore 
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1996, 5-6).   
 There are two reasons the norm-based identity change mechanism would probably 
not work well for democracy clauses.  The first is based on the likelihood that not all 
actors are equally influenced by normative suasion.  There is probably some distribution 
within any given population of the susceptibility of individuals to normative influence, 
and the sorts of people who would contemplate a democratic reversal are precisely those 
least likely to be so influenced.  It is an example of a selection effect.  The strongest 
influence of whatever normative power democracy clauses might have would be seen in 
the behavior of those least likely to violate them in the first place, and vice versa.  It is a 
problem that democracy clauses share with human rights treaties.  Scholars like 
Neumayer (2005), Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007), and Simmons (2009) have argued 
(and demonstrated) that human rights treaties have little or no influence on human rights 
outcomes in authoritarian states because those states sign them with no intent of 
compliance.13  Moreover, democracy clauses are similar to human rights treaties in that 
they attempt to influence the ways that some domestic actors maintain and maximize 
their own political power.  Since coups are just as important to the interests of some 
domestic actors as suppressing free speech or state terror can be, there are strong 
incentives for those actors to ignore international agreements.   
 Secondly, no regional IGO (with the exception of the Council of Europe) has 
adopted a democracy clause without previously being subject to some other international 
democracy norm.  These treaties are relatively new, and follow on earlier, normatively 
powerful international agreements that enshrine a human right to democracy: the 
                                            
13 In fact, Hathaway (2002) found a slightly higher propensity for violations of the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT) and the ICCPR among ratifiers than non-ratifiers. 
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.14  When one considers the empirical evidence that parties to the ICCPR 
are no more likely to avoid democratic reversals than other states (Ulfelder 2008, 286), it 
becomes hard to conceive how the normative power of democracy clauses could produce 
a difference.  This is especially true when one considers that one of the factors that 
constructivists often stress is the length of time that actors can interact with a norm and 
internalize its prescriptions (e.g. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, 5-7).   
 The last major family of mechanisms for the efficacy of international law are the 
“process schools,” divided between horizontal legal process (e.g. Chayes and Chayes 
1995) and vertical legal process (e.g. Koh 1997).  Horizontal legal process, also known as 
the managerial approach, proposes that “maintaining compliance with treaties at an 
acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organization, and the wider public” (Chayes and Chayes 1995, 25).  The chief norm in 
this process is the legal doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements are to be obeyed”), 
and as relevant actors interact on issues related to an international legal regime, they will 
usually attempt to conform their behavior to its requirements.  Even when they may wish 
to deviate from a rule, they will usually attempt to make their behavior justifiable under 
the terms of the law, which can curb or narrow the range of behaviors available to them 
and induce at least partial compliance. 
 Vertical legal process takes this one step farther to argue that not only do 
governmental actors engage in this interactive process with representatives of other 
states, but also with domestic actors in their own state (e.g. Henkin 1979; Koh 1997).  
Koh emphasizes the need for states to “internalize” international legal rules in their 
                                            
14 Articles 21 and 25, respectively. 
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domestic politics, most importantly when the de jure political institutions of a state – 
executive, legislative, and/or judicial – adopt the international legal rule and transform it 
into a domestically enforceable rule (Koh 1997, 2654-55).  When domestic actors then 
have to interact with the domestically-adopted international rule, the identity-
reconstituting process described by the constructivists is strengthened, and compliance 
therefore also strengthens. 
 These mechanisms do not fit democracy clauses very well either.  The process 
approaches are principally concerned with incumbent members of the regime.  It is the 
repeated interaction of government officials with the norm in the international context 
that is supposed to lead to changes in those officials’ identities and/or behavior.  
However, the persons whose behavior must be changed for a democracy clause to be 
effective, at least in the context of coups d’etat, are outside the incumbent government 
and are not usually in a position where they have this kind of interaction with the 
requirements of the international democracy regime.15  At the very least, such actors 
would have a more attenuated connection with the international regime than the sorts 
actors the authors of these theories had in mind, making a democracy clause a “least 
likely” case for such mechanisms to work. 
 However, the legal process schools do provide a starting point for thinking about 
the way democracy clauses might work by putting the focus squarely on domestic 
political actors as they pursue their goals in the political arena.  As Elster (2007, 36) says, 
“[i]n the social sciences, a satisfactory explanation must ultimately be anchored in 
hypotheses about individual behavior.”  Using this frame I identify a theory of how actors 
                                            
15 It is true there is in NATO at least one military pact with a democracy norm, but NATO has not yet 
adopted a democracy clause, and the treatment of Greece and Turkey in the Cold War period show that the 
norm has been at best secondary to other goals (see Piccone 2005). 
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not involved in the “process” of the application of international law can still be 
influenced by the law while making their political calculations.  This is the subject of the 
next section. 
 
A Theory of Coups and Democracy Clauses 
 A coup d’etat is a complex social event.  To succeed, the coup conspirators must 
coordinate – in secret – the activities of a large number of people, who often have 
conflicting interests, to launch a well-timed strike at those who hold the power of the 
state.  They must prevent the incumbent government from coordinating a response, and 
they must convince relevant third parties like the business community, mass public, and 
international community to accept the result afterwards.  This is not an easy thing to do.  
It is therefore no surprise that both the Powell and Thyne (2011) dataset for coups d’etat 
and the Marshall and Marshall (2009) dataset show that almost half of the coup attempts 
in the post-World War II era have failed.16   
 There are two primary ways democracy clauses could influence the likelihood of 
coups d’etat.  Democracy clauses may make it more difficult for coup leaders to assemble 
a minimally sufficient coup conspiracy to launch the coup, and democracy clauses may 
make it more difficult for coup leaders to consolidate their authority immediately after 
the coup by decreasing the likelihood of public acquiescence.  If these hold, then we 
could anticipate that there would be three observable effects.  First, potential coup leaders 
would anticipate the potential influence of democracy clauses, and the increased 
likelihood of failure would make them less willing to attempt coups.  The consequence 
would be that states subject to democracy clauses would experience fewer coups 
                                            
16 See also Luttwak 1969, Appendix C. 
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attempts.  Second, the influence of democracy clauses could make it more likely that 
coups attempted in their member states would fail.  Third, the tactics used by coup 
leaders could change as they attempt to avoid the adverse impacts of democracy clauses 
by cloaking their actions with justifications of constitutional legitimacy.  When the 
displacement of a sitting executive is arguably constitutional it makes it less likely that 
IGOs will interfere because such groups do not appear to want to be in the position of 
parsing the succession requirements of their member-states’ constitutions (Arceneaux and 
Pion-Berlin 2007).  Furthermore, by claiming action compliant with the constitution, 
usurpers may be able to reduce or impede the increased collective action hypothesized 
above because the resulting ambiguity about the size of the threat to regime (not the 
government) might lead fewer people to be willing to pay the costs of participation in 
public opposition (Weingast 1997).  Each of these points will be explained in more detail 
below.  This chapter will focus on organizing coup conspiracies and coup consolidation, 
and each of the hypotheses will be described further in the chapters devoted to them. 
 
The Coup Conspiracy Process 
 A review of the literature shows there are several points in the coup process that 
are particularly difficult to navigate, most prominently the assembly of the initial coup 
conspiracy (sometimes called trabajos and compromisos in the Latin American 
context),17 and consolidation of authority over the state apparatus in the days immediately 
after the coup.  As the most difficult parts of a coup these are the components that are 
most influential on its ultimate success.  The stages of trabajos and compromisos (in 
English “tasks” and “compromises”) consist in identifying the persons that will 
                                            
17 E.g. Farcau 1994. 
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participate in the overthrow, what tasks they will perform during the coup, and what 
spoils each of them will receive after power has been achieved (Farcau 1994).  At least 
one commentator has stated that, more than any other phase of the coup process, it is the 
assembly of a sufficient coup conspiracy that decides whether a coup will be successful 
(Farcau 1994, 15).   
 The difficulty arises because this process is governed by the rules of an assurance 
game that has significant rewards for defection and severe penalties for failure (see Sutter 
2000).  An assurance game is a kind of collective action problem in which multiple actors 
must cooperate to achieve some collective goal, and it is only rational for any individual 
actor to cooperate if s/he believes a minimally sufficient number of other actors will also 
cooperate (e.g. Sen 1967).  Rousseau’s stag hunt is a classic example.  The hunters will 
achieve greater payoffs by cooperating to bring down the stag, but if any of them believe 
that any of the others may not cooperate, it makes no sense for the individual to 
participate in a venture destined to fail.  The same kind of calculation occurs when an 
actor is considering participating in a coup.  If that person participates, and all other 
relevant actors participate, then the coup will succeed.  However, if the actor chooses to 
participate and enough others choose not to participate, that colonel and the other 
participants could be left out to dry. 
 This assurance game is further complicated by three important dynamics: that 
building the coup conspiracy must be conducted in secret, that any participants will suffer 
significant losses if the coup fails, and that there are significant gains available to any 
approached actor who betrays the plot to the authorities.   
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 Secrecy is easy to understand.  It is well-established that collective action 
problems are more difficult to “solve” when communication between actors is impeded 
(e.g. Axelrod 1984).  While military officers sometimes have a level of collegiality that 
allows them to discuss the prospects of a coup between themselves, such discussions are 
always delicate (Farcau 1994, 99-110), and can be further complicated by the possibility 
that a broaching of such matters could be part of a government-led “sting” to test the 
loyalty of a military officer.  The inability for potential participants to openly discuss the 
possibility of successfully assembling a coalition capable of solving this assurance game 
is therefore a significant barrier to coup success. 
 Second, coup failure can be disastrous for any participating military officer.  
Membership in a coup conspiracy constitutes treason, even regardless of whether the 
coup is ever actually attempted, with concomitantly severe consequences for individuals 
implicated should the plot be foiled.  At best, being exposed as a member of an 
unsuccessful coup conspiracy will result in a ruined career with no real possibility of 
promotion or other advancement.  At worst, members could be executed as punishment 
and as a deterrent against other potential usurpers (Farcau 1994, 107).  This obviously 
creates a strong incentive for officers approached about a possible coup to demure unless 
there are strong reasons to believe the coup will be successful. 
 This is only exacerbated by the third complication, which is that all approached 
officers know that other people with knowledge of the conspiracy may have incentives to 
betray the plot to the authorities.  Whistle-blower(s) can bolster their standing with the 
incumbent government and potentially enjoy promotion as a result.  The risk of this only 
increases as more members join the conspiracy.  Conspirators face an important dilemma 
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in assembling a minimally-sufficient coup conspiracy.  On the one hand, coup leaders 
want to have as large a force as possible at their disposal to increase the likelihood of 
success.  “The more men, tanks, guns, and so on, the plotters can amass, the better for 
them. . . . A coup d’etat is largely a psychological operation; the larger the force the 
plotters can put into the streets, the less likely determined opposition will be” (Farcau 
1994, 50).  However, as more people become involved the more likely it becomes that the 
plot will cease to be secret, whether because of carelessness on the part of some 
conspirator, or because some conspirator will decide it is in their own self-interest to 
betray the plot to the government (Farcau 1994, 110).  The knowledge of this fact may 
create a security dilemma between the members of the conspiracy, wherein the possibility 
that someone else may “turn state’s evidence” could lead an otherwise committed 
conspirator to expose the plot first in anticipatory self-defense.  Every military officer 
approached about the possibility of participating in a coup has the option to either join the 
coup (thereby increasing its likelihood of success), or denounce the plot to the authorities 
and earn the benefits of showing loyalty to the government, perhaps with promotion to 
the positions vacated by the newly-disgraced conspirators. 
 The combined effect of these three complications is that the choice to join such a 
conspiracy is only rational when the participants can expect substantial rewards for 
participation and a good likelihood of success.  These are two aspects of the coup process 
that could well be impeded by the presence of a democracy clause.  Among the most 
important rewards of participation are likely material resources (see Farcau 1994, 139), 
i.e. will participation in the coup lead an individual officer to be better off than they were 
beforehand?  Suspension from a regional organization by operation of a democracy 
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clause is almost always accompanied by suspension of foreign aid, loans, and even trade 
(See e.g. Boniface 2007, 50-51; Duxbury 2011, Chapter 4).  For example, the 
international response to the 1993 autogolpe in Peru led to the suspension of more than 
$1 billion in loans and aid (Parish and Peceny 2002, 240).  More recently, the Honduran 
government lost access to at least $320 million in aid and loans in the six months between 
the June 2009 coup and the subsequent November election (Economist 2011; see also 
Legler 2010).  This required the Honduran government to finance government spending 
by issuing public debt, mostly to domestic creditors, at rates far higher than would 
otherwise have been the case.  The Economist reported in 2011 that repaying the 
principal on this debt “will cost Honduras 1-2% of GDP each year until 2015” 
(Economist 2011).  The Malian coup of March 2012 resulted in its neighbors enforcing a 
complete embargo on the movement of all non-humanitarian goods into or out of the 
country (see Chapter 6, infra).  Beyond specific cases, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990) 
found that the imposition of sanctions on a state led to economic losses of between 1%-
2.5% per year, on average, for the years between World War I and 1990, substantial 
amounts of money, and the decline of global ideological conflicts has probably only 
increased these effects.  This predictable diminishment in material resources available to 
a coup-based regime could make it difficult to credibly promise potential coup 
conspirators that they will receive large material rewards for participation.  Moreover, 
even if a particular conspirator is not motivated by money, or can expect to be insulated 
from the effect of sanctions, the knowledge that other conspirators might be inhibited by 
reduced rents could bring the assurance game into play and cause them to abstain from 
the coup plot. 
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 To be clear, it is surely not the case that democracy clauses eliminate the material 
benefits of autocratic rule.  It has been well-demonstrated that autocrats are frequently 
able to insulate themselves from international sanctions, or even see their positions 
strengthened by such measures (e.g. Drezner 2011).  However, there is an important 
distinction between a sanction leveled at an incumbent leader and a potential sanction to 
be applied against a potential usurper.  This stems from what Bueno de Mesquita et al 
(2003, 59) call “the challenger’s commitment problem.”  In order for coup leaders to 
convince military officers and relevant civilian sectors to join the coup coalition, they 
must promise them benefits in excess of what they currently receive from the incumbent 
government.  However, once in office, an autocrat can easily choose not to fulfill that 
promise, and cannot credibly promise otherwise before the fact.  This creates an incentive 
for all actors who benefit from the current regime, however directly or indirectly, to not 
join a coup plot.  The theory offered here is that this problem for the challenger could be 
exacerbated by a predictable international response that would decrease the total amount 
of resources available to the government.  If there will be fewer resources to spread 
around, the likelihood that any individual conspirator will be cut out of substantial gains 
only increases.  Material expectations could therefore shift from some higher level to 
some lower level, and could dissuade some potential coup conspirators.  Moreover, when 
potential conspirators consider this, and consider that all other potential conspirators are 
making the same calculations, the dynamics of the assurance game could exacerbate this 




The Coup Consolidation Process 
 The second mechanism proposed here is that democracy clauses could lead 
potential coup conspirators to anticipate that the international reaction may reduce the 
likelihood of coup success by making it more difficult to consolidate power immediately 
after toppling the incumbent government.  Luttwak (1969, 168) places great emphasis on 
how precarious this stage of a coup can be, in which the coup participants have little 
more than purely physical control over certain parts of the state apparatus.  He argues that 
coup success requires that at this stage the coup leaders “freeze” the political situation 
and wait for key elements of the bureaucracy, civil society, and business community to 
accept the transition as a fait accompli.  Any incident that evidences resistance to the new 
regime could undermine this process of acquiescence, and “even one well-organized 
demonstration, or a well-timed strike, could pose a serious threat to the coup in the 
delicate transitional phase” (Luttwak 1969, 130).  It is for this reason he goes on to say 
that “[t]he masses have neither the weapons of the military nor the administrative 
facilities of the bureaucracy, but their attitude to the new government established after the 
coup will ultimately be decisive.”  (Luttwak 1969, 173; for a similar argument, see 
Farcau 1994, 139-142). 
 The theory here proposes two ways democracy clauses might increase the 
likelihood of resistance to a coup d’etat.  The first is that the possibility of economic 
dislocation resulting from international sanctions could lead certain actors who would 
otherwise be relatively indifferent to the usurpation to actively oppose the coup.  It is, 
after all, the logic of sanctions to impose pain on some portion of a regime’s constituency 
in the hopes that this affected group will somehow influence the regime’s leadership to 
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make some change desired by the sanctioning state (see e.g. Marinov 2005).  Those 
whose livelihoods depend on imports or exports could suddenly find themselves with 
interests deeply contrary to the new regime, which might well have not been the case 
before the promulgation of the treaty. 
 There is support in the existing literature for the adverse effects of sanctions on 
domestic political stability.  Marinov (2005) found that implementation of sanctions 
against a state during the period 1947-1999 increased the likelihood that the incumbent 
leader would lose power during the sanctions episode by 28%.  The study that most 
closely examines the mechanisms by which this happens, Allen (2008), offers strong 
support for the theory offered here.  Allen found that there was a substantial increase in 
the likelihood of both anti-government demonstrations and riots in states subject to 
sanctions.  In her study, states under international sanctions were about 75% more likely 
to experience demonstrations, and about 31% more likely to experience riots, on average, 
than were other similar states (Allen 2008, 935).  It is interesting to note that she finds 
that this increased likelihood is particularly strong in states with Polity scores of -3 or 
higher, which roughly corresponds with that category of states that might be called 
unconsolidated democracies. 
 It is true that sanctions against authoritarian states sometimes have the result of 
strengthening the position of autocrats.  Both Marinov and Allen found moderated effects 
for authoritarian regimes.  Escriba-Folch and Wright (2010) found that the imposition of 
international sanctions slightly increased the survival rate of military and single-party 
regimes, though they also found that they significantly decreased the survival rate of 
personalist regimes.  However, it is important to note that the theoretical reasons offered 
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for this have to do with the power of entrenched regimes to withstand shocks by relying 
on their institutional capacity to extract domestic rents and repress domestic opposition 
(see Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010, 355).  In the context of coup consolidation, that 
institutional capacity is at best inchoate.  This is related to the challenger’s credibility 
problem described above.  Members of the coalition necessary to consolidate power may 
be less willing to engage in these extraction and repression behaviors when the coup 
leadership is not yet firmly in power.   
 Second, democracy clauses could increase the likelihood of resistance by 
delegitimizing the new leadership and adding to the legitimacy of any opposition groups.  
Farcau (1994) and Luttwak (1969) both highlight the importance of international 
recognition for consolidation of the regime.  As Luttwak says,  
Diplomatic recognition is one of the elements in the general process of establishing the 
authority of the new government; until this is achieved, [the coup leaders] will have to 
rely on the brittle instruments of physical coercion and [their] position will be vulnerable 
to many threats – including that of coup d’etat. 
 
(Luttwak 1969, 181-182). 
 Suspension from a regional IGO is not strictly the same thing as non-recognition, 
but as a practical matter they often go together (see e.g. Levitt 2006), and the signal of 
suspension sends the same message of illegitimacy to the domestic public of the state 
suffering the coup as non-recognition does, with the added opprobrium that comes from 
being the statement of not only one state, but of the regional community in which the 
state sits.   
 This mechanism has been identified as possibly being important to the 
enforcement of human rights treaties by Beth Simmons (2009).  Such treaties can provide 
“intangible resources” (Simmons 2009, 146-47) to domestic political forces, including a 
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benchmark by which to judge the actions of the government and the opposition, and 
reassurance to domestic actors that their rights demands are not unreasonable.  In the 
context of democracy clauses, this could mean that one of these treaties could lead 
potential members of a coup-opposition movement to be both more certain of the validity 
of their cause, and more likely to successfully recruit others to join them.  Donno’s 
(2007) finding that opposition mobilization against election fraud was significantly 
strengthened by the involvement of regional IGOs18 offers some empirical support for 
this idea in the democracy context. 
 
An Assurance Game with a Vengeance 
 Finally, it is not necessary for this theory that any of the possible individual 
effects just described be particularly large in order to potentially have a significant 
influence on likelihood of coup attempts.  As mentioned, assembling a coup conspiracy is 
an assurance game, and assurance games tend to be resolved by “cascades” in which 
small movements one way or another create a bandwagon effect, pulling all the players to 
make the same choice (see e.g. Kuran 1989; Sutter 2000, 213).  This occurs because 
potential coup conspirators are likely to want more than anything else to be on the 
winning side.  Participating in a coup that fails is very bad for one’s military career, but 
so is abstaining from a coup that succeeds; “it is absolutely vital for the career 
progression of an officer to choose correctly when the option is placed before him” 
(Farcau 1994, 107).  If a coup is less likely to succeed because of an increased likelihood 
of domestic mobilization, or if the payoffs from coup participation are less certain, the 
                                            
18 Donno operationalized IGO involvement as “targeted IGO policies of pressure, incentives, mediation or 
assistance that are specifically tailored to the election in question” (Donno 2007, 7). 
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decision of an individual to join a coup conspiracy in its initial stages appears less 
attractive.  What this means is that even if a regional treaty fails to directly have any 
impact on the conspiracy-building part of the coup process, it could indirectly influence it 
by influencing appraisals of how smoothly the consolidation phase will go.  Since the 
success of this assurance game depends on sufficient participation, and an individual’s 
choice to participate depends on his/her appraisal of how likely success is, small 
adjustments in appraisals could potentially lead to large changes in the outcomes for final 
group behavior. 
 It is for this reason that Farcau argues that it is in the conspiracy stage that the 
anticipation of foreign response will have the greatest influence on coup likelihood.  In 
his discussion of Latin American coups he describes how coup plotters sometimes 
claimed to have received assurances of support from the United States should they take 
power, and that these claims were an important part of the process by which military 
officers decided to participate in coups or not (Farcau 1994, 108).  As he says, while 
international support is rarely strictly necessary for a coup-based regime to survive, it can 
be very helpful:  “The possibility of foreign economic aid or the ability to purchase 
military supplies abroad will greatly contribute to the survivability of any regime, just as 
a cutoff of existing aid programs, the difficulty of obtaining loans from multilateral 
agencies, or even the harboring of exiled oppositionists and the use of diplomatic 
channels for antiregime propaganda will all work against such survival” (Farcau 1994, 
108).  But he makes clear that he believes the international reaction is more likely to 
influence the ability of conspirators to attempt the coup in the first place than it is to 
influence their ability to actually hold on to power. 
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 If a democracy clause dissuades even a small number of potential conspirators, 
other uncommitted individuals may refuse to participate for fear that the plot may not 
reach critical mass.  Moreover, even if the disadvantages from a democracy clause are 
insufficient to individually dissuade any potential coup participants, it is unlikely that 
these potential conspirators would be certain that none of their other potential partners are 
dissuaded.  The uncertainty about whether some (necessary) members might be dissuaded 
could be sufficient to make joining the conspiracy unattractive, and make it more 
attractive to report the plot to authorities.  The net result is that a cascade of actors in 
favor of launching a coup is less likely to occur, and it is more likely that the cascade in 
this assurance game would be against participation.  Consequently, coup conspiracies 





 This chapter has attempted to lay out an actor-based description of the decision to 
attempt a reversal of a democratic government, and the ways that international law could 
intrude into that decision.  This required a novel approach to democratic breakdown.  
Most of the previous work on why states breakdown has been correlational, identifying 
macro-level variables like economic, cultural and institutional conditions that are 
correlated with higher or lower rates of reversal.  This work has made important strides, 
but suffers from the fact that it almost uniformly assumes that all democratic reversals are 
more or less the same, and that all macro-level factors have equivalent effects on 
different kinds of democratic reversal.  As Maeda (2010) has shown, this assumption is 
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incorrect.  Different kinds of reversal are correlated with different kinds of conditions.  
The implication is that in the causal theorizing of breakdown, scholars need to be very 
specific about what kinds of breakdown they are discussing, and explain how the 
independent variable they are considering could interact with the way individual political 
actors would attempt to navigate that pathway of reversal. 
 I have tried to do this with regard to the ways regional defense-of-democracy 
treaties may impede the ability of would-be usurpers to successfully launch coups against 
democratic governments.  By way of the causal mechanisms described above, these 
treaties have the potential to make autocratic office less attractive, to reduce the 
likelihood of successfully conducting a coup, and increasing the costs borne by 
conspirators who try a coup and fail.  This could both decrease the likelihood that coups 
will be attempted in states subject to these treaties, and increase the likelihood that when 
coups are attempted that they will fail.  Since the coup d’etat is the most common 
pathway of democratic reversal, the widespread adoption of these treaties could therefore 
be a very important development for the world’s democracies.   
 I want to be clear that these treaties will probably not be a “silver bullet” when it 
comes to democratic survival.  Like nearly all other issues in the social sciences, the 
causal effects hypothesized here are probabilistic, not deterministic.  As Farer noted after 
observing the initial development of these regimes:  
The premise is that, although external action is not often decisive, the credible threat of 
externally imposed economic or military sanctions can give an incipient democracy 
breathing space or can facilitate its restoration after a coup. 
 
(Farer 1996, 4-5) 
 
 Unlike Farer, however, we now have twenty years of experience with these 
treaties, which may provide enough information to conduct some tests on whether these 
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treaties are successful in achieving their aims.  While the previous literature has 
examined the creation of the regimes and their application in individual cases, there 
currently is no work that systematically considers their influence cross-nationally.  




CHAPTER 4: DEMOCRACY CLAUSES AND COUP 
ATTEMPTS 
 
Since World War II, coups d’etat have been the most common process by which 
democracies reverse back to authoritarianism, and indeed one of the most common means 
by which all regimes have undergone unconstitutional successions to power.  
Consequently, understanding what factors influence the likelihood of coups, whether as 
accelerants or inhibitors, is essential to understanding what factors will influence the fate 
of the many new democracies that emerged in the Third Wave of Democracy.   
 The advent of regional regimes to protect democracy is an interesting attempt to 
overcome this problem.  For one thing, these treaties are premised on an interesting shift 
in the concept of sovereignty in international law, whereby states agree to foreswear the 
long-standing “effective control” test for governmental recognition, and instead impose a 
process standard based on the affected state’s own constitution.  Moreover, it is plausible 
that these treaties could work.  Unlike the great majority of human rights treaties, the 
breach of a democracy clause creates a strong self-interest in the non-breaching parties to 
enforce the treaty.  Democratic governments desire the protection of regional IGOs 
against their domestic autocratic opponents, and they know that if they fail to enforce the 
regime against one of their fellows, they may find help lacking should they ever face a 
coup themselves.19  More directly, the failure to enforce a democracy clause could 
precipitate a “coup contagion” effect in the near term, threatening that government’s own 
survival (e.g. Thompson 1975). 
                                            
19 This is in the vein of Yogi Berra’s famous admonition “Always go to other people’s funerals, otherwise 
they won’t go to yours.” 
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 It is perhaps for this reason that state leaders have been willing to pay the 
sovereignty costs of allowing international organizations to judge the validity of their 
successessions to power.  Giving international actors this kind of authority is a significant 
development in the evolution of sovereignty.  It is worth knowing whether these 
sovereignty costs are netting democratic leaders any safety against the would-be autocrats 
among their domestic opponents. 
 As will be seen, the answer appears to be that these treaties have not significantly 
reduced the likelihood that their member-states would experience coup attempts during 
the post-Cold War era.  Once the influences of important controls are accounted for, a 
negative correlation is found but it is not statistically significant.  In other words, the 
pattern in this data is too weak and erratic to have any confidence that it will be observed 
in samples of other states in other times.  This finding is robust across the two most 
popular datasets of coups d’etat.  It appears that the hopes of those who drafted these 
treaties have not come to fruition, at least not yet. 
 
How Could Democracy Clauses Prevent Coup Attempts? 
Chapter 3 discussed the theory used here in detail, and it will only be recounted briefly 
here.  Democracy clauses have the potential to interfere with the two most important 
stages of a coup d’etat: assembling a minimally sufficient group of coup conspirators, and 
consolidating power in the days immediately after unseating the incumbent.  These are 
the two most important stages because they are the points in the coup process when a 
coup is most likely to fail.  Given that roughly half of coup attempts fail anyway (Thyne 
and Powell 2011), any significant influence that democracy clauses would have on these 
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stages could tip the odds against would-be coup leaders, and, foreseeing an increased 
likelihood of failure, they may choose to forego coup attempts and pursue their political 
objectives by other means. 
 Democracy clauses could interfere with recruiting a coup conspiracy by 
predictably diminishing the anticipated benefits of participation in a successful coup.  As 
described in Chapter 3, when democracy clauses are implemented they are typically 
accompanied by sanctions on trade, aid, travel for participating government officials, and 
so on.  These sanctions could lower the expected “payoff” of participation from some 
higher level to some lower level and thereby make participation less attractive.  
 Democracy clauses could interfere with post-coup consolidation by increasing the 
likelihood of domestic opposition to the new regime.  Coup leaders rely on domestic 
acquiescence so that people return to work (especially bureaucrats) and they can solidify 
their hold on the top positions of government.  Democracy clauses could make this 
acquiescence less likely in two ways.  First, the logic of sanctions is to impose pain on 
the domestic population (Marinov 2005), and that portion of the population threatened by 
sanctions could see their interests shift, from indifference to a coup to active opposition.  
Second, regional condemnation could provide moral support (“intangible resources” in 
the language of Simmons 2009) to those domestic forces willing to defend the 
constitutional regime.   
 Finally, neither of these forces would necessarily have to be large in order to 
significantly influence the likelihood of coup attempts because the single most important 
factor influencing the decision of a military officer (or other official) about whether to 
join a coup attempt is the likelihood of success (Farcau 1994).  In other words, the 
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decision of whether to participate in a coup is a kind of assurance game (Sutter 2000).  
An assurance game is typically resolved with a “behavioral cascade,” i.e. a bandwagon 
effect, whereby small changes in probabilities can cause all the “players” of the game to 
coalesce around a single common position (Kuran 1989; Sutter 2000).   
 What this means for democracy clauses is that it is not necessary for them to work 
for democracy clauses to directly affect potential participants’ appraisals of the likelihood 
of coup success.  Put another way, even if a colonel does not think the treaty will 
substantially affect a coup outcome, he might still be worried that other colonels are not 
so sanguine.  If that colonel is unsure about whether a minimally sufficient number of 
participants will be on board with the coup, he may choose to forego participation to 
avoid the possibility that his name be tied to a failed, treasonous, venture. 
 There is one published piece that has attempted to examine whether democracy 
clauses have a cross-national influence, that of Powell and Lasley (2011).  They restricted 
their analysis to only the occurrence of coups and found sizeable effects for both the AU 
and OAS regimes.  Looking at the period of 1950-2010, they found that the adoption of 
the AU Constitutive Act in 2001 was correlated with a reduction in the likelihood of 
coups by 54% compared to the period of 1950-2000, and the adoption of Resolution 1080 
in 1991 was associated with a 48% decline in the likelihood of coups in OAS compared 
to the period of 1950-1990.  This effect remained significant even after controlling for 
average income, economic growth levels, Polity score and the number of years since the 
last coup.  This result supports the idea that the OAS and AU defense of democracy 
regimes are important influences in the global decline of coups and the increase in the 
number of democratic states worldwide.  However, one must wonder whether the absence 
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of other likely control variables, particularly global or regional diffusion effects distinct 
from formal treaties, has influenced this finding. 
 
Do Democracy Clauses Reduce the Likelihood of Coup Attempts? 
To test whether democracy clauses reduce the likelihood of coup attempts I gathered data 
for the period 1991 to 2008 on coups, democracy clauses, and relevant control variables 
for all states with populations greater than 500,000 people.  The dependent variable used 
here is a dichotomous measure of whether a country-year experienced any coup attempts.  
I take my coups data from the dataset of Powell and Thyne (2011) and code a country-
year as “1” if it experienced at least one successful coup or other coup attempt in that 
year, or otherwise as “0.”  To account for the primary independent variable of democracy 
clauses, I made a dichotomous measure of whether a state was subject to a democracy 
clause, defined for the purposes of this project as a regional international treaty 
committing the member-states to punish any other member-state that has a government 
come to power by unconstitutional means, and that such treaty specifically provide for 
suspension or expulsion from the organization as one means of punishment.  Table 1 
describes the regional organizations that have democracy clauses according to these 
criteria, along with the dates the relevant treaties went into force. 
 
A Potential Alternative Explanation: Democratic Diffusion 
It may be that the correlation identified in the literature discussed above is not causal.  It 
may be that both the spread of democracy clauses and the decline in coups are 
simultaneous products of diffusion effects from the Third Wave (Huntington 1991) of  
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Table 1: Democracy Clauses and Year of Effect 
Regional Organization Treaty Year of Effect 
Council of Europe Statute of the Council of Europe 1949 
The Commonwealth of 
Nations 
Millbrook Action 
Programme on the Harare 
Declaration 
1995 




The EU The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 
The OAS The Washington Protocol 1997 
The Andean Community Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement 2000 
The AU Constitutive Act of the African Union 2001 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2005 
 
democracy.  If this is the case, then a decline in the incidence of coups would be observed 
but it would not be appropriate to attribute this to regional democracy treaties.   
 It is increasingly recognized that diffusion is one of the most important 
explanations for the spread and resilience of democratic institutions (see Brinks and 
Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Gassebner, Lamla and Vreeland 2012).  
While causal explanations vary between researchers, the four mechanisms described by 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006) are a useful summary of possible diffusion effects.  
First, stronger states can coerce weaker states into adopting policies preferred by the 
stronger state.  Second, competition for international markets and/or capital can lead 
states to simultaneously converge on institutions shown to be successful in that 
competition.  Third, stronger international ties increase the likelihood that political actors 
can learn from the experiences of similar actors in other states, leading to the 
identification of useful strategies or best practices for dealing with common political 
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problems.  Fourth is a mechanism Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett called “emulation” 
whereby contact across borders can lead to a contagion of ideas as accepted normative or 
causal beliefs are challenged by alternative views.  Coercion, learning and emulation 
could all plausibly explain a decline in coups.   
 To account for diffusion effects I include variables for regional and global levels 
of democracy.  Regional diffusion effects are those from a state’s close neighbors.  
Gleditsch and Ward (2006) argue that regional effects may be particularly influential 
simply because states usually have more international interactions with their neighbors 
than they have with states outside their regions.  In order to capture this, I calculated the 
regional average Unified Democracy Score (Pemstein, Meserve and Melton 2010, see 
Appendix 1) for each country year, using the regional categories of the United Nations 
Statistics Division.  Those regions are described in Table 2. 

























Regions are those used by the United Nations Statistics Division. 
Global diffusion is the influence of the larger international community.  I measure global 
diffusion in two different ways.  First, I use a simple ratio of the number of democracies 
in the world to the number of autocracies.20  This, however, may be misleading because it 
does not account for the amount of power held by states with different regime types, so I 
                                            
20 “Democracy” and “autocracy” are ascribed using the criteria of the Political Instability Task Force.  See 
Appendix for details. 
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also constructed a second variable where for every country-year in the world I multiply 
that state’s Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), from the Correlates of War 
dataset, by that state’s Unified Democracy Score.  The combined country scores are then 
added up for every year to provide a measure of how numerous and powerful were 
democratic states worldwide.   
 
Table 3: Cross tab using Powell and Thyne 2011 coup attempts 
  Democracy Clause Totals 
  0 1  
0 1287 1480 2767 Coup Attempt 1 41 27 68 
Column 
Percentages  .031 .018 .024 
Totals  1328 1507 2835 
Powell and Thyne Coup Attempts 
Pearson Chi2 = 5.0625, p = 0.024 
 
Table 4: Cross tab using Marshall and Marshall 2009 coup attempts 
  Democracy Clause Totals 
  0 1  
0 1268 1474 2742 Coup Attempt 1 60 33 93 
Column 
Percentages  .045 .022 .033 
Totals  1328 1507 2835 
Marshall and Marshall Coup Attempts 
Pearson chi2 = 12.0611, p = 0.001 
 
Analysis 
The analysis here begins with a simple comparison of the incidence of coup attempts in 
states that were subject to democracy clauses and those that were not.  The results for the 
Powell and Thyne coups dataset are presented in Table 3 and the results for the Marshall 
and Marshall coups dataset are in Table 4.  There are substantial differences between 
those with democracy clauses and those without.  In the Powell and Thyne data states 
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subject to these treaties were about 40% less likely to experience a coup attempt, while 
those in the Marshall and Marshall data were half as likely to have a coup.  Furthermore, 
both of these results are statistically significant.  So far, this corroborates the findings of 
Powell and Lasley. 
 Examining this relationship further requires a multivariate model that could 
account for other potential influences on coup outcomes.  The model selected was King 
and Zeng’s (2001) rare events logistic regression.  As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, 
positive observations on the dependent variable coup attempts are relatively rare in these 
datasets.  As King and Zeng describe, when the number of positive observations is a 
small portion of the total number, especially less than ten percent, normal logistic 
regression yields estimated event probabilities that are inappropriately small.  To achieve 
more accurate estimates I use the “relogit” program for Stata created by Tomz, King and 
Zeng (1999), clustering observations by country.   
 There have been a variety of control variables used in previous attempts to 
quantitatively model coup attempts (see e.g. Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and 
Schofer 2003; Thyne 2010, Powell and Lasley 2011; Powell 2012).  My core model is 
based on variables that both 1) have previously been found to predict coup likelihoods, 
and 2) are available for most states up through the end of my test period, which is 2008.  
These variables are GDP per capita, GDP change in the previous year, the Banks 
Weighted Conflict Index, the level of democracy in the state, a dichotomous variable of 
whether the incumbent government is a military regime,21 and the number of years since 
                                            
21 The reader will note that the population examined in this analysis is not limited to democracies.  This 
choice is based on the fact that regional organizations have not discriminated in their application of 
democracy clauses based on the de facto political conditions of the relevant states.  As evidenced by the 
AU suspensions of Togo in 2005, Guinea in 2008 and Niger in 2010, regional organizations have applied 
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the last coup in that state.  Taking the cue of Powell (2012), cubic splines associated with 
the number years since the last coup are included to deal with temporal dependence.  
These variables, along with their anticipated effects, are described in the Appendix to this 
article. 
 To account for diffusion effects several separate models were estimated using 
measures of regional and global diffusion.  For regional diffusion I calculated the 
regional average level of democracy.  To account for global diffusion effects two 
different measures were created, the global ratio of democracies to autocracies, and the 
global average level of democracy weighted by state power levels as measured by the 
Correlates of War Project’s Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores.  The 
weighted global average was constructed by multiplying every country-year’s CINC 
score by its UDS score and then adding the total together to get a measure of the amount 
of global material power held by democratic and less-democratic governments.  These 
variables are described in greater detail in the Appendix.   
 For both the Powell and Thyne data and the Marshall and Marshall data analyses 
were done looking at all states and also looking only at those states that qualified as 
democracies using the criteria of the Political Instability Task Force (Ulfelder and Lustik 
2007, see Appendix).  The results show that the basic negative correlation between 
democracy clauses and coup likelihoods is not robust to the inclusion of important 
control variables.   Looking at all states in the Powell and Thyne data (Table 5) we see 
                                            
democracy clauses against states regardless of whether the displaced regimes met academically-accepted 
criteria for democracy.  This being the case, a variable for military government is essential to control for 
the oft-confirmed observation that military governments are much more likely to fall to coups than other 
forms of government (e.g. Belkin and Schofer 2003; Thyne 2010; Powell 2012).  
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that, while democracy clauses are negatively associated with coups, the relationship is not 
significant and coups are much more influenced by levels of economic development,  
economic growth in the previous year, the number of years since the last coup, and the 
presence of a military government.22  Global diffusion effects, as measured by the global 
ratio of democracies to autocracies, also are correlated with a reduction in coups when 
added in Models 2 and 3.  No interaction effect between diffusion and democracy clauses 
is observed in these data. 
 The story is same when looking at Powell and Thyne coups in only democratic 
countries in Table 6.  The number of years since the last coup and global diffusion effects 
again show up as significant predictors, and in this sub-set of states the level of 
democracy significantly predicts coups, but again democracy clauses fail to achieve 
significance.  Moreover, the sign on the democracy clause variable is not stable, showing 
a positive correlation in Models 3 and 4 that include different measures of global 
diffusion effects.  A weak and unstable relationship between democracy clauses and coup 





                                            
22 Higher levels of economic development and economic growth are negatively correlated with the 
incidence of coups, as are a greater number of years since the last coup in a country.  Military governments, 
on the other hand, stimulate more coups.  These results are as expected and in accord with previous 
findings by Belkin and Schofer (2003) and Powell (2012). 
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Table 5: All states 1990-2008, Powell and Thyne coup data 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      









      









      









      









      









      









      









      







      
Global Ratio of Democracies  




(.914) -- -- 
      
Democracy Clause * Global Democracy Ratio -- -- .828 (1.501) -- -- 
      
Weighted Global Average Democracy -- -- -- -3.068 (3.384) 
1.538 
(7.547) 
      
Democracy Clause * Weighted Global 
Democracy -- -- -- -- 
-3.120 
(11.141) 
      









      
Observations 2653 2653 2653 2653 2533 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -237.57 -235.92 -235.78 -237.25 -213.59 
      
Wald Chi2 83.19 105.84 120.80 85.78 87.09 
      
Prob. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
      
Pseudo R2 .171 .177 .178 .172 .182 
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Table 6:  Democracies (PITF criteria) 1990-2008, Powell and Thyne coup data 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
      









      









      









      









      









      









      







      
Global Ratio of Democracies  




(3.246) -- -- 
      
Democracy Clause * Global Democracy 
Ratio -- -- 
-2.467 
(3.900) -- -- 
      
Weighted Global Average Democracy -- -- -- -7.634 (7.895) 
-14.584 
(11.063) 
      
Democracy Clause * Weighted Global 
Democracy -- -- -- -- 
-13.835 
(10.784) 
      









      
Observations 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -100.481 -98.978 -98.735 -99.152 -98.616 
      
Wald Chi2 26.69 29.15 33.17 33.55 37.24 
      
Prob. .002 .002 .000 .000 .000 
      
Pseudo R2 .239 .250 .252 .249 .252 
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 The Marshall and Marshall data show a similar pattern in Tables 7 and 8.  The 
negative correlation between democracy clauses and coups is slightly stronger in this 
data, but still fails to achieve statistical significance.  The findings for all states, 
democracies and autocracies alike, are essentially the same as they were for the Powell 
and Thyne coups data, though the controls for social conflict and level of democracy23 
are significant here and the variable for economic growth is not.  The one exception 
occurs when looking at potential interaction effects between democracy clauses and 
global diffusion effects within only democracies.  I discount this finding because of its 
status as an outlier and because the inflated coefficient suggests it is based on very small 
portion of the total variance. 
 The basic finding of the model is presented in graphic form in Figure 1.  Using 
Clarify I estimated the predicted likelihood that a state will experience a coup d’etat in a 
given year for every percentile of GDP, holding all other variables in Model 1 constant. 
In other words, the estimates on the left side of Figure 1 represent the likelihood that the 
poorest states in the international system will experience a coup in a given year, holding 
all other variables constant at their means (if continuous) or modes (if categorical), while 
the estimates on the right side of Figure 1 represent the likelihood that the richest states 
will experience a coup in that year.  As expected, as GDP per capita increases in a state 
the risk of coup decreases.   
                                            
23 That democracy levels are positively correlated with coups when looking at all states (Tables 5 and 7), 
but negatively correlated with coups in democracies (Tables 6 and 8), is likely the result of increased 
instability in transitional or mixed regimes E.g. Goldstone et al 2010.  In other words, the likelihood of a 
coup attempt appears to higher in mixed regimes than it is in regimes that are firmly authoritarian or 
democratic. 
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Table 7: All states 1990-2008, Marshall and Marshall coup data 
Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 









      









      









      









      









      









      









      







      
Global Ratio of Democracies  




(.716) -- -- 
      
Democracy Clause * Global Democracy 
Ratio -- -- 
-.102 
(1.512) -- -- 
      
Weighted Global Average Democracy -- -- -- -1.347 (2.906) 
-2.036 
(3.315) 
      
Democracy Clause * Weighted Global 
Democracy -- -- -- -- 
2.804 
(7.242) 
      









      
Observations 2653 2653 2653 2653 2653 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -298.85 -297.85 -297.85 -297.91 -297.84 
      
Wald Chi2 109.40 120.87 121.01 111.25 111.37 
      
Prob. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
      
Pseudo R2 .183 .186 .186 .186 .186 
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Table 8: Democracies (PITF criteria) 1990-2008, Marshall and Marshall coup data 
Variable Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
      









      









      









      









      









      









      







      
Global Ratio of Democracies  




(1.196) -- -- 
      
Democracy Clause * Global Democracy Ratio -- -- -3.556* (2.017) -- -- 
      
Weighted Global Average Democracy -- -- -- -3.001 (4.630) 
-5.361 
(4.930) 
      
Democracy Clause * Weighted Global 
Democracy -- -- -- -- 
7.956 
(8.512) 
      









      
Observations 1606 1606 1606 1606 1606 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -148.80 -146.51 -144.98 -146.47 -146.19 
      
Wald Chi2 55.77 54.56 50.11 50.98 51.51 
      
Prob. .000 .009 .000 .000 .000 
      
Pseudo R2 .173 .185 .194 .185 .187 
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 Figure 1: Influence of Democracy Clauses on Likelihood of Coup Attempts 
 
I ran the model twice, first omitting the variable for democracy clauses and then 
including it, along with 95% confidence intervals around the democracy clause estimate.  
As can be seen, states with democracy clauses were, on average, less likely to experience 
coup d’etats.  The relative risk ratio printed under the model shows that states with 
democracy clauses were about 18% less likely to have coup attempts.  However, the 
confidence intervals around those estimations are very large.  The inconsistency of the 
influence of democracy clauses makes it very difficult to know whether this pattern of a 
reduced likelihood of coups is a real change or an artifact of the particular time period 
studied. 
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 These results show that democracy clauses have not reduced the general 
likelihood that their member-states will experience coups d’etat.  States subject to these 
treaties are not significantly less likely to experience coups than are other states once we 
factor in influences like economic development, diffusion, and the amount of time since 
the last coup.  These findings do not mean that democracy clauses are completely 
ineffective at dissuading potential usurpers, but they do signify that if these treaties are 
ever effective it is only in an exceptional case.  Democracy clauses are not silver bullets 
against coup attempts. 
 
Conclusion 
In his 2008 book The Spirit of Democracy, democracy expert Larry Diamond hopefully 
pointed to the apparent success of the MERCOSUR democracy clause in deterring a coup 
in Paraguay in 1996 (Diamond 2008, 135-36) and to the efforts of Malian diplomats to 
create a similar regime in Africa (ibid, 107-08).  As we now know, the AU and 
ECOWAS democracy regimes ultimately failed to protect Mali’s government in 2012.  
The findings of this paper suggest that the Malian case may be representative of the more 
general experience of states subject to democracy clauses.  Regional defense of 
democracy regimes do not appear to significantly reduce the likelihood that member-
states will experience coup attempts. 
 This is a disappointing result for the states that paid the sovereignty costs of 
allowing regional actors authority to judge the validity of domestic successions, and it is 
a disappointing result for those looking to identify ways that political actors can increase 
the likelihood of democratic consolidation.  However, it is important to note the limited 
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scope of these findings.  The study here speaks only to coup attempts, and does not deal 
with the topic of coup outcomes – it is possible that coups are no less likely to occur, but 
they may be less likely to succeed.  Moreover, it may be the case that democracy clauses 
could constrain the options of coup leaders as they consolidate their regimes in ways that 
increase the likelihood that some form of quasi-democratic constitutional government 
will be restored sooner than would otherwise be the case.  A superficial examination of 
the 2012 Malian coup supports this view.  By all appearances the Malian junta leaders 
would have preferred to exercise uncontested power but were forced to accept a quasi-
constitutional transitional regime by pressure from ECOWAS and the AU.  However, far 
more rigorous study is necessary to establish whether these propositions are true. 
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Summary statistics for all states, 1990-2008 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Powell and Thyne Coup Attempts 2835 .024 .153 0 1 
Marshall and Marshall Coup Attempts 2835 .033 .178 0 1 
Democracy Clause 2835 .532 .499 0 1 
Global Democracy Ratio 2835 1.67 .196 1.22 2.02 
Weighted Global Democracy Score 2806 .435 .034 .358 .484 
Democracy Clause * Weighted Global 
Democracy 2835 .923 .876 0 2.02 
Democracy Clause * Democracy Ratio 2806 .232 .217 0 .484 
Logged GDP per capita 2668 7.461 1.608 4.057 10.643 
Trade per GDP 2655 79.133 45.015 .225 438.902 
Regional Average UDS 2835 .218 .687 -.905 2.011 
Years Since Last Powell and Thyne Coup 2835 23.764 18.166 0 58 
Years Since Last Marshall and Marshall 
Coup 2835 22.352 18.206 0 58 
Military Government 2835 .151 .358 0 1 





Summary statistics for democracies, 1990-2008 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Powell and Thyne Coup Attempts 1635 .018 .132 0 1 
Marshall and Marshall Coup Attempts 1635 .024 .153 0 1 
Democracy Clause 1635 .720 .449 0 1 
Global Democracy Ratio 1635 1.685 .196 1.22 2.02 
Weighted Global Democracy Score 1635 .435 .033 .358 .484 
Democracy Clause * Weighted Global 
Democracy 1635 1.240 .789 0 2.02 
Democracy Clause * Democracy Ratio 1635 .313 .197 0 .484 
Logged GDP 1613 7.976 1.566 4.057 10.643 
Economic Growth 1610 2.323 5.314 -45.33 92.586 
Regional Average UDS 1635 .556 .671 -.526 2.012 
Years Since Last Powell and Thyne Coup 1635 28.438 18.768 0 58 
Years Since Last Marshall and Marshall 
Coup 1635 26.493 18.792 0 58 
Military Government 1635 .011 .104 0 1 




Appendix: Control Variables 
 
GDP per Capita and Yearly Change in GDP per Capita 
 
The most consistently-used control variables in quantitative studies of coups are 
GDP per capita and GDP growth in the previous year.  Londregan and Poole 
(1990) found that higher levels on both variables decreased the likelihood of 
coups, and Belkin and Schofer (2003) confirmed the inhibitory effect of at least 
GDP per capita.  Powell (2012), however, did not find an effect for either 
measure.  The measures used here were taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
 
Years Since the Last Coup 
 
Next, a variable is included in all models that accounts for how recently that state 
previously experienced a coup.  This was one of the most important variables 
identified by Powell (2012).  In the years immediately following a coup another 
overthrow might appear to be a attractive means of acquiring power; as time goes 
by the coup may acquire a air of illegitimacy (Belkin and Schofer 2003, 608).  
Farcau notes that the skills necessary to conduct a coup are learned, and those 
skills tend to atrophy with the passage of time (Farcau 1994, 165).  A variable 
indicating the number of years since the last coup attempt is thus included, along 
with associated cubic splines, as recommended by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) 
for dealing with temporal dependence.  The data for years since the last coup are 
left-censored, with the initial count beginning in 1950. 
 
Banks Conflict Index 
 
The Banks Weighted Conflict Index (Banks 2000) is a measure of assassinations, 
general strikes, guerilla wars, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and 
anti-government demonstrations.  I include it because in times of crisis the 
military’s power relative to other domestic institutions increases (Finer 1962) and 
they may be tempted to capitalize on their ascendance by taking power so as to 
“save the nation.”  For this reason, it has become standard within the coups 
literature to include the Banks index as a control (see Belkin and Schofer 2003; 




To distinguish states that have military governments I include a dichotomous 
variable denoting if the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions indicates 
that the chief executive for that country-year was a military officer.   This data 
was acquired through Teorell et al’s (2011) excellent Quality of Governance 






There are many ways to measure levels of democracy and a vigorous debate is 
ongoing in political science as to which ones are preferable for which kinds of 
research projects (see generally Munck 2009; Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
2010).  For this study I chose the Unified Democracy Score (UDS) created by 
Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010).  The UDS treats the other major 
democracy indexes as imperfect sources of information about each country-year’s 
level of democracy and aggregates them together into a single measure.  This 
approach appears to mitigate some of the deficiencies identified in popular 
measures such as those of Freedom House or Polity IV.  For more information, 
see Pemstein, Meserve and Melton, ibid. 
 
Following Belkin and Schofer (2003), I expect states with more democratic 
institutions to be less likely to experience coups. 
 
Regional Average Democracy 
 
Regional democracy diffusion effects are accounted for by calculating the average 
UDS score for the regions of the United Nations Statistics Division, described in 
Table 2.  I prefer these relatively small regions (compared to larger regional 
designations such as “Latin America” or “Sub-Saharan Africa”) because diffusion 
effects are expected to be most important between close neighbors.  More 
democratic regions are expected to experience fewer coups. 
 
Global Ratio of Democracy to Autocracies 
 
The first measure of global democratic diffusion used here is the global ratio of 
democracies to autocracies.  The higher the ratio, the fewer coups are expected.  
To create this ratio required the use of a dichotomous variable for democracy / 
autocracy.  The UDS does not lend itself neatly to creating such a dichotomy, so I 
instead opted for the regime-type variables used by the Political Instability Task 
Force (e.g. Ulfelder and Lustik 2007; Goldstone et al 2010).  States categorized 
by the PITF as “Democracy” or “Partial Democracy” were labeled as democratic 
in this study, while those categorized by the PITF as “Authoritarian” or “Partial 
Authoritarian” were labeled autocratic. 
 
Weighted Global Democracy Average 
 
The alternative measure of global democratic diffusion takes into account 
differing power resources available to democratic and autocratic states.  For each 
country-year I multiplied the observation’s Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC), from the Correlates of War dataset, with that state’s Unified 
Democracy Score.  The combined country-scores for each year were then added 
up to create a measure of the amount of global power resources that were 
controlled by democratic states. 
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CHAPTER 5: DEMOCRACY CLAUSES AND COUP 
OUTCOMES 
 
 In Chapter 4 we looked at whether democracy clauses reduced the likelihood of 
coup attempts in their member-states.  However, the theory proposed in this dissertation 
argues not only that potential coup leaders might be dissuaded from attempting coups by 
these treaties, but also that when coups are attempted, that they ought to be more likely to 
fail.  It is this question of coup outcomes that is the focus of this chapter. 
 The existing literatures on the efficacy of international human rights law and on 
the determinants of coup outcomes would tend to be skeptical.  A bare-knuckled struggle 
for power such as a coup d’etat would be in that realm of activities that would seem least 
amenable to influence from something as insubstantial as a treaty.  However, the previous 
research looking specifically at democracy clause regimes has a distinctly optimistic 
bent.24  This may be because previous work on democracy clauses has predominantly 
been tested using qualitative methods, and therefore might be subject to the effect that 
Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009) identified where researchers of human rights issues tend 
to find positive effects in qualitative research that do not appear in quantitative cross-
national research.   
 There are several reasons that these treaties could decrease the likelihood of coup 
success.  First, the likelihood of external sanctions could exacerbate what Bueno de 
Mesquita et al (2003) called “the challenger’s commitment problem” of credibly 
promising those who engage in a risky coup attempt that they will be rewarded for their 
efforts.  Second, the likelihood of external sanctions could make consolidation of power 
                                            
24 E.g. “in marked contrast with the Cold War period, classic coups d’etat have now become effectively 
proscribed as a legitimate means of domestic political change” (Boniface 2007, 54). 
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during a coup more difficult by decreasing the likelihood of acquiescence by the mass 
population.  Third, both of these mechanisms could create uncertainty in the minds of 
potential coup participants such that they might hesitate to participate for fear that other 
necessary coup participants might abstain because they do not want to be implicated in a 
failed coup.  This is an example of an assurance game, in which actors can have an 
increased incentive to “defect” when they doubt the other players’ commitment to 
cooperation, even if they themselves are otherwise committed to cooperation. 
 If this theory is correct, then it ought to be the case that states subject to 
democracy clauses would be less likely to succumb to coup attempts.  I test this by 
examining the outcome of coups d’etat in a cross-national statistical analysis for the 
period of 1991-2008.  This test shows that state-parties to these treaties were, on average, 
20-30% less likely to experience successful coups than were other states, after controlling 
for other expected influences on coup outcomes.   However, it is important to note that 
the confidence intervals around these estimates are quite large and so it is very difficult to 
infer from this result whether we can expect to see a continued effect going forward.   
 
Literature on Coup Outcomes 
 It is interesting that while there is a fairly substantial literature on the influences 
that increase or decrease the likelihood of coup attempts, the literature on coup outcomes 
is sparse – a point discussed in Feaver’s (1999) review of the civil-military relations 
literature for the Annual Review of Political Science.  There are, however, some 
foundations that can be built upon.  Luttwak’s (1969) analysis placed great emphasis on 
the importance of planning for coup outcomes.  Unlike most military operations, he 
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argues (Luttwak 1969), coups are compressed in time to the point that there is no 
possibility to make tactical adjustments in the heat of the moment.  There are simply too 
many things happening in too short of a period of time for the coup leadership to 
significantly influence the outcome on the fly.  Farcau (1994, 123-24) disputes this, 
arguing that something akin to Clausewitz’s “friction of war” is to be expected in the 
conduct of a coup, and this requires flexibility in coup planning, and the ability of coup 
leaders to make alternate plans on the spot to meet contingencies and to communicate 
those plans to relevant members of the coup coalition.   
 The important point for our purposes here is that both of them emphasize the 
importance of organizational cohesion for coup success.  It is consistent with both of 
these views to say that anything that impedes the cohesion of the coup plotters could 
decrease the likelihood of success.  Uncertainty about the response flowing from a 
predictable backlash from a regional IGO could be one of those things.  If such doubts 
keep a significant percentage of soldiers in the barracks, it could result in an execution 
phase of the coup characterized by “half-measures” (Farcau 1994, 137) that “cost time 
and affect the morale of opposing forces negatively for the rebels and favorably for the 
loyalists.”  Thompson (1976) makes a similar argument that coups are more likely to 
succeed when multiple military branches are involved in the power grab.  Any influence 
that could keep some potential coup participants from joining will likely decrease the 
chance of successful coups. 
 The most recent piece on the factors that influence coup outcomes, and by far the 
most comprehensive in its quantitative empirical tests, is Powell (2012).  Powell’s focus 
was on military-specific factors relevant to coup attempts and outcomes, including 
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military size, military budget and military structure.  He hypothesized that state leaders 
were in a dilemma when it came to strengthening their own militaries.  Providing for high 
levels of military spending could keep military officers satisfied with their status and 
prevent them from launching coups, but if they did launch a coup, a better-equipped and 
better-trained military would be more likely to succeed in the attempt.  However, his 
findings showed the opposite effect.  Militaries that received the most funding per soldier 
not only had fewer coups, but were also less likely to succeed if they launched a coup 
(Powell 2012, 19-20).  As Powell says, the most likely reason is that high levels of 
funding exacerbate the coordination problems for coup conspirators.  “Well-funded 
soldiers will be less likely to risk their spoils by cooperating with a conspiracy” (Powell 
2012, 20).  Moreover, Powell found that large militaries were less likely to conduct 
successful coups, probably for a similar reason in that larger groups impose greater 
collective action problems. 
 Finally, Powell discovered that states that engaged in “coup-proofing” were less 
likely to experience successful coups (Powell 2012, 21).  Coup-proofing occurs when 
leaders divide “their armies into numerous, mutually suspicious rival forces that check 
and balance one another” (Belkin and Schofer 2003, 596).  In examples such as Mobutu’s 
Zaire or Qaddafi’s Libya, insecure leaders built up competing security services that could 
be balanced against each other to preserve the leaders’ power (Powell 2012, 25-26; 
Belkin and Schofer 2003; see also Migdal 1989).  This continues today as a common 
practice in authoritarian and transitional states, despite the fact that it impedes the 
military’s ability to handle threats from other states (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011; Powell 
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2012, 26).25  It is easy to see why such counterbalancing could impede coup success; it 
creates an armed, capable party with a potentially strong self-interest in repelling the 
coup attempt.  Unfortunately, coup-proofing had to be omitted from the analysis in 
Chapter 4 for lack of data, and the same is true in this chapter as well.26 
 
How Democracy Clauses Could Influence Coup Outcomes 
The theory presented in Chapter 3 proposed that regional treaties to protect democracy 
could impact coup outcomes primarily by way of three mechanisms.  The first two of 
these mechanisms have to do with the intensity of popular resistance to the military 
displacement of the incumbent regime.  As Luttwak described, in the short run a 
successful coup puts the conspirators in physical control of the administrative levers of 
government, but this alone does not assure its success.  In order to hold on to power, the 
people have to acquiesce to the new regime.  Determined resistance could force the coup 
leaders to use their only lever of power, violence, against members of the mass public.  
While repression can be a highly effective strategy, it does have its costs.  The use of 
violence against protestors has the potential to tarnish the legitimacy of rulers and 
ultimately lead to their undoing by turning otherwise indifferent members of the mass 
populace against the regime (e.g. Karklins and Peterson 1993, 602-604; Siegel 2011).  
 Furthermore, acquiescence to the coup regime is an assurance game itself in 
which the relevant political actors in a society decide to accept and bandwagon around 
the new leadership to preserve social order, or to resist the usurpation and demand the 
                                            
25 Its prevalence is an example of the way state leaders often behave in ways that are rational for their 
individual self-interests rather than the unitary interests of the states that they lead (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 
2002). 
26 The coup-proofing data used by Belkin and Schofer (2003) and Powell (2012) are available only for 
1966-1999, and would thus overlap only partially with the period studied in this dissertation. 
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reinstatement of the previous government.  If there is a large public reaction to the coup, 
this may interfere with the acquiescence process in two ways.  First, it could demonstrate 
the ultimate outcome is in doubt in the minds of military participants, thus making it 
unwise to throw one’s lot in with a group that could be branded as traitors in the near 
future.  Second, evidence of determined resistance could show that the preservation of 
social order is not possible with the new regime, so there is no reason to acquiesce to 
their power for that reason.  Consequently “even one well-organized demonstration, or a 
well-timed strike, could pose a serious threat to the coup in the delicate transitional 
phase” (Luttwak 1969, 130), and “[t]he masses have neither the weapons of the military 
nor the administrative facilities of the bureaucracy, but their attitude to the new 
government established after the coup will ultimately be decisive” (Luttwak 1969, 173). 
 There are two ways described in Chapter 3 that democracy clauses could make 
public reaction to a coup d’etat more adverse for the coup leaders: it could alter the 
incentives of some social actors to set them more firmly against any such transfer of 
power, and it could legitimize resistance against such a transfer of power.  The incentives 
effect comes from the fact that activation of a democracy clause is almost always 
accompanied by the imposition of sanctions or the threat thereof.  The logic behind 
sanctions is that the imposition of these penalties will harm a state’s leadership by 
harming some portion of their constituency, who in turn put pressure on the leadership to 
make some concession to the sanctioning power (e.g. Marinov 2005).  The creation of an 
international legal “trip wire,” a guaranteed punishing response to a coup, immediately 
sets the interests of those actors involved in the sanctioned activity against any group that 
may wish to carry out the coup.  When it was predictable that states would normalize 
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relations fairly quickly, as during the Cold War, there would be little reason to worry 
about a dislocation of international trade and so those parties with an interest in trade 
could be indifferent to illegitimate transfers of power, at least on the basis of their 
business interests (Farcau 1994, 141).  However, now that there is a predictable adverse 
response from the regional international community that calculus may have changed.  
This shifting in interests certainly does not affect all citizens, or even a majority of them, 
but it does potentially influence an important constituency, because actors involved in 
international trade probably have substantial resources.  Given that one of the most 
important prerequisites for effective social mobilization is sufficient material resources 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977, McCarthy and Zald 2001), and that actors involved in 
international trade likely have such material resources, this could be an important shift in 
interests. 
 This mechanism would only apply in the case of trade pacts, or those regional 
IGOs that closely coordinate their activities with large regional states and/or international 
financial institutions, such as the OAS.  IGOs like the African Union and the 
Commonwealth of Nations are not likely to have the same degree of economic leverage.  
However, it is also possible that the activation of a democracy clause could increase 
domestic resistance to a nascent coup regime by legitimizing that resistance.  Simmons 
(2009) argues that this is one of the ways that international human rights treaties can 
influence human rights outcomes in member states.  The “intangible resource” of 
international legitimation of a rights demand can strengthen the will of activists and 
potentially also help them recruit more people to their cause.  Donno’s (2007) finding 
that opposition mobilization against election fraud was significantly strengthened by the 
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involvement of regional IGOs offers some empirical support for this idea in the 
democracy context.  The upshot is that the activation of a democracy clause during a 
coup could strengthen the domestic resistance to the coup leaders and decrease the 
likelihood that they could consolidate their power. 
 Finally, the dynamics of the assurance game returns to the theory in this analysis 
as well.  Even after the coup has been initiated, it is possible that some potential coup 
participants could choose to withhold their support if they get the sense that the coup is 
not going well.  Farcau describes how it was a common pattern in Latin American coups 
for one military unit to initiate a coup well before any other units were involved.  It 
would issue a pronunciamento, a statement of grievances and an intent to assume power, 
and then other military leaders would observe the public and government reaction to 
determine whether to participate or not (Farcau 1994, 22).  Something like that probably 
still occurs in coups today, and with the presence of a democracy clause there may be 
sufficient increased resistance to make military commanders more reticent to join in.  
This may of itself be sufficient to make coups fail.  But even beyond this direct influence 
it may be that a military leader undissuaded by resistance could be concerned that some 
other coup participants might be dissuaded by the resistance, and this concern could be 
great enough for them to believe that it is unlikely the coup will achieve a minimally 
sufficient number of coup participants.  The rational colonel then could conclude it is best 
to sit out the attempt to avoid being associated with a failed coup.  As in a security 
dilemma, a sort of infinite regress can occur between actors trying to guess the intentions 
and appraisals of other “players,” with the ultimate effect that cooperation fails.  The 
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combined effect might be that in states subject to democracy clauses, when coups are 
attempted, they are more likely to fail. 
 
Hypothesis and Research Design 
 The hypothesis proposed is as follows: 
H1:  Coups attempted in states subject to democracy clauses will be less likely to 
succeed than coups attempted in states not subject to such treaties. 
 
 For the purposes of this paper, I define a “democracy clause” as an international 
treaty committing the member-states to punish any other member-state that has a 
government come to power by unconstitutional means, and that such treaty specifically 
provide for suspension or expulsion from the organization as a means of punishment.  
Table 1 describes the IGOs that have democracy clauses according to these criteria.  
These are the same regional organizations used in Chapter 4 regarding coup attempts, 
supra. 
Table 1 
Regional Organization Treaty Year of Effect 
Council of Europe Statute of the Council of Europe 1949 
EU Treaty of Maastricht on European Union 1992 
The Commonwealth of 
Nations 
Millbrook Action 




MERCOSUR The Ushuaia Protocol 1996 
The OAS The Washington Protocol 1997 
The Andean Community Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement 2000 
The AU Constitutive Act of the African Union 2001 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2001 
 
 98 
 To test the hypothesis that democracy clauses reduce coup successes, I gathered 
data for the period 1991 to 2008 on coups, democracy clauses, and relevant control 
variables for all states with populations greater than 500,000 people.  The test here is 
restricted to the period after the fall of the Soviet Union to avoid the potentially 
confounding influence of the Cold War on coups prior to 1991 (e.g. Thyne 2010; Farcau 
1994; Luttwak 1969).  
 For data on coup attempts and coup outcomes I rely on the Powell and Thyne 
(2011) Global Instances of Coups Dataset.  Per Powell and Thyne,  
Coups d’etat are defined as… overt attempts by the military or other elites within the 
state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means…there is 
no minimal death threshold for defining a coup.  A coup attempt is defined as successful 
if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days.  
 
(Powell & Thyne 2011, 252).  There is one other coups dataset available from Marshall 
and Marshall (2009).  The datasets are similar but have some important differences (see 
Figures 1-4).  As can be seen from the figures, these differences are pronounced even in 
the recent past, and can sometimes be quite substantial, such as where Marshall and 
Marshall identify twice as many coup attempts in the mid-1990s as Powell and Thyne do.  
For this paper I use the Powell and Thyne data as the primary test, but use the Marshall 
and Marshall data for a robustness check.27  The dependent variable is coded “1” for coup 




                                            
27 Discrepancies between the two datasets was the subject of a lengthy discussion at a panel on military 
coups at the 2011 ISA Annual Convention in Montreal.  At that panel, Oberg, Moller and Taub (2011) 
presented the Uppsala/PRIO Coups Dataset for comment (though regretfully not for public use – it will not 
be available publicly until summer 2012).  The Uppsala data more closely matched the Powell and Thyne 
dataset, to the point that they sometimes deviated quite significantly from the Marshall and Marshall data.   
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 My first test was to examine the bivariate correlations.  From 1991 to 2008, the 
Powell and Thyne (2011) dataset counted 83 coup attempts, of which 31 succeeded.  
During the same period, Marshall and Marshall (2009) identify 118 coup attempts, of 
which 31 succeeded.28  The cross-tab of the Powell and Thyne data is shown in Table 2, 
and for the Marshall and Marshall data is shown in Table 3. 
Table 2 
Coup Success No Democracy Clause Democracy Clause Total 
Fail 34 18 52 
Success 19 12 31 
Total 53 30 83 
Success % 36% 40% 37% 
Powell and Thyne (2011). 1991-2008.  Chi2 = .1411, p value: .707 
 
Table 3 
Coup Success No Democracy Clause Democracy Clause Total 
Fail 58 26 84 
Success 20 11 31 
Total 78 37 115 
Success % 26% 30% 27% 
Marshall and Marshall (2009). 1991-2008. Chi2 = .2131, p value: .644 
 
There is no observable effect for democracy clauses in this data.  In the Powell and 
Thyne data about one third of coups succeeded when a democracy clause was present, 
compared to 40% of those coups that occurred in states not subject to democracy clauses.  
For the Marshall and Marshall data, those percentages were 26% and 30% respectively.  
In contrast to the theory provided above, it appears that coup attempts during this period 
                                            
28 Although it is interesting to note that they are not in agreement about which coups succeeded.  For 
example, Powell and Thyne code the coup in Ecuador in 2000 as a success because the president was 
removed from power, but Marshall and Marshall code it as a failure because he was replaced by the vice 
president and many of the coup participants were punished as criminals. 
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were slightly more likely to succeed when a democracy clause was present (although the 
difference is statistically insignificant). 
 This is not the final word on the matter though – there is also the issue of 
including relevant control variables.  In particular, the potential problem here is that it 
may be possible that democracy clauses have decreased the likelihood of coup success, 
but that this is leading potential coup leaders to refrain from conducting coups in such a 
state at all rather than proceed with a failed venture.  If this were true, then those states in 
which we do observe coup attempts are cases where conspirators made a priori appraisals 
that they were particularly likely to succeed.  In such cases, democracy clauses – or any 
other coup-prevention scheme – would be especially unlikely to have any demonstrable 
correlation with coup outcomes. 
 For this to be true about the larger population of states it would need to be the 
case that states subject to democracy clauses are, on average, slightly more likely to 
experience coups than other states.  On first consideration this may seem unlikely 
because democracy clauses have typically been implemented in regions with powerful 
democratic countries that may be expected to produce democratic diffusion effects.  
However, when one considers that the great bulk of cases coded as being subject to a 
democracy clause are in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, long coup hotspots, this 
may not be so implausible.  It might be precisely because they are particularly susceptible 
to coups that state leaders of these regions were willing to pay the sovereignty costs of 





 With a dichotomous dependent variable it is natural to reach for logistic 
regression, but there is a potential problem here with the possibility of selection bias.  In 
this study we are able to observe the effect of democracy clauses on coup outcomes only 
in states that have already had coups.  Our ability to observe the dependent variable at all 
is dependent on a selection process that is non-random and related to the dependent 
variable itself.  Put another way, the sorts of states that have coups are probably those in 
which coups are more likely to be successful. To just run a probit or logistic regression 
on coup success would produce biased results without accounting for this selection effect. 
 To deal with this selection problem for analysis of a dichotomous variable, the 
standard statistical model is the Heckman Probit.  Heckman two-stage models first 
estimate the likelihood of the dependent variable being observed, and then include the 
“selection hazard” as a control in estimating the probability of that dependent variable 
taking one value as opposed to another.  For dichotomous variables, the appropriate 
model is the Heckman probit first described by Van de Venn and Van Pragg (1981).  
Powell (2012) used this model for his work on the influence that military structure and 
resources have on coup outcomes, and this study is modeled after that one.  Furthermore, 
the Heckman probit also allows diagnostic tests to see whether selection is biasing the 
results.  If those tests are negative, it is possible to run an analysis using a more 
conventional estimator for a dichotomous dependent variable.  As will be shown, this is 




 In a study of coup outcomes it is necessary to include some control variables.  I 
have described these variables, their sources, and expected influence in Table 4.  In 
addition to these variables, cubic splines were included to deal with intertemporal 
dependence, as recommended by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998).  GDP per capita is 
included because power tends to be spread more diffusely in richer states, making it more 
difficult to seize control (e.g. Luttwak 1969; Farcau 1994).  For GDP change, It seems 
likely that a public would be less willing to acquiesce to an attempt to unseat an 
incumbent government that presided over recent economic growth.  Conversely, if the 
incumbent government is associated with economic decline, the public response to a coup 
might be more welcoming.  (e.g. Barracca 2007).  The Banks Weighted Conflict Index is 
a weighted measure of assassinations, general strikes, guerilla wars, government crises, 
purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations.  It is included because in 
times of significant social upheaval the public and other social actors like the business 
community, civil society, etc. may welcome any force that promises to restore order 
(Belkin and Schofer 2003; Thyne 2010; Powell 2012).29  The regional average Polity IV 
score accounts for the potentially confounding influence of democratic diffusion effects 
(e.g. Gleditsch and Ward 2006).  A dichotomous measure for military government is 
included in this model to account for the much higher susceptibility that such regimes 
have to coups.30  It turns out that to live by the sword really is to die by the sword: Belkin 
                                            
29 Because the Banks Index ranges from 0 to about 23,000, it is difficult to interpret the odds ratios 
produced by a bivariate analysis using the index as an independent variable.  Consequently, I log the 
instability index so a 1-unit change in the variable produces a more interpretable odds ratio. 
30 The reader will note that the population examined in this analysis is not limited to democracies.  This 
choice is based on the fact that regional organizations have not discriminated in their application of 
democracy clauses based on the de facto political conditions of the relevant states.  As evidenced by the 
AU suspensions of Togo in 2005, Guinea in 2008 and Niger in 2010, regional organizations have applied 
democracy clauses against states regardless of whether the displaced regimes met academically-accepted 
criteria for democracy.  Why this is the case has not been studied to this point.  It may be because all or 
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and Schofer (2003) showed that military regimes were significantly more susceptible to 
coup attempts, and Powell (2012, 24) found that coup attempts were four times more 
likely to be successful against military regimes than against non-military regimes.  I 
controlled for whether the preceding regime was democratic, based on the notion put 
forward by Lindberg and Clark (2008) and others that democratic regimes have more 
legitimacy and thus are more resilient to coups.  This was coded as a dichotomous 
variable (democratic / non-democratic) using the criteria developed by the Political 
Instability Task Force in their academic papers (e.g. Epstein et al 2006; Ulfelder and 
Lustik 2007; Goldstone et al 2010).  The number of military personnel is included 
because Powell (2012) found that states with larger militaries had fewer successful coups, 
likely because of intensified collective action problems.  Finally, a count variable for the 
number of years since the last coup is included as Farcau (1994) argues that coups are 
more likely to succeed when there have been coups in the recent past that can serve as 
models of how one succeeds or fails at the task.  Belkin and Schofer (2003) and Powell 
(2012) have found such results in their studies. 
 
Selection Model 
 I first ran the Heckman probit-probit model including all the variables listed 
above, plus democracy clauses, in the selection equation and the following variables in 
the outcome (i.e. coup success) equation: democracy clause, GDP per capita, regional 
                                            
nearly all of these states often proclaim themselves to be democracies even when the facts on the ground 
are clearly contrary to this.  This might lead regional IGOs to employ democracy clauses in support of the 
formal or de jure governmental form rather than its actual preceding nature.  Alternatively, it might be that 
IGOs are concerned about coup-diffusion effects not only from democracies but from all neighboring 
states, and therefore apply democracy clauses indiscriminately.  Regardless, these treaties are being 
implemented against states that do not meet the standard Polity criteria (or other measures) for democracy.   
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democracy, Banks instability, military government, and number of military personnel.  
Given that use of this model here required the observations to be country-years, it was 
necessary to construct two datasets to account for the fact that some states experienced 
multiple coups in a single year with divergent outcomes.  Regardless of whether multiple  
Table 4 
Variable Variable Source Expected Influence on Coup Outcomes 
GDP per capita World Bank World Development Indicators - 
Change in GDP per 
capita 




Cross-National Time-Series Data 
Archive + 
Regional average Polity 
score Polity IV - 
Democratic Political 
Institutions PITF classification - 
Military government World Bank Political Institutions Database + 
Number of military 
personnel 
Correlates of War National 
Material Capabilities Dataset - 
Number of years since 
the last coup 
Powell and Thyne (2011) Global 
Instances of Coups - 
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coups with divergent outcomes were coded as successes or failures, the Wald test of 
independent equations in the Heckman model was well outside significance.  This 
indicates that the selection model is unnecessary here and it is possible to directly test the 
dependent variable here using a normal bivariate correlation without an expectation of 
biased estimates (Baum 2006, 275).   
 
Logistic Regression 
 This leads to the final set of tests conducted here, which were logistic regressions 
for the populations of coup attempts detailed in the Powell and Thyne (2011) and 
Marshall and Marshall (2009) datasets.  The results are reproduced in Tables 5 and 6.  I 
report odds ratios instead of coefficients for ease of interpretation.  An odds ratio 
describes the anticipated influence on the dependent variable of a one-unit change in the 
independent variable of interest, holding all other variables constant.  Thus, the odds ratio 
of .564 for democracy clauses in Table 5 signifies that the applicability of a democracy  
was associated with a reduced likelihood of coup success by about 44%.  Within the 
Marshall and Marshall data (Table 6), democracy clauses were correlated with a 24% 
reduction in the likelihood of coup success.  This sounds impressive, but it is important to 
look at the 95% confidence intervals around those estimates.  It immediately becomes 
clear that these estimates are not very precise.  With 95% certainty, we can say that 
democracy clauses have an influence that is somewhere between reducing the likelihood 
of coup success by about 84%, or increasing that likelihood by 92%.  It is interesting to 
note that the control variables also have very large confidence intervals, suggesting that 
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the outcomes of coups during the post-Cold War period did not have any strong patterns 
along any of the dimensions accounted for in these models. 
 
Table 5:  Influence of Democracy Clauses on Coup Outcomes, 1991-2008 
Variable Odds Ratio (Std. Error) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Odds Ratio 
   
Democracy Clause .564 (.353) .165 – 1.923 
   
GDP per capita .615 (.253) .274 – 1.378 
   
GDP per capita % change .987 (.042) .908 – 1.073 
   
Regional Polity Average 1.194 (.152) .931 – 1.533 
   
Instability Index .939 (.072) .808 – 1.093 
   
Military Government 1.148 (.727) .332 – 3.974 
   
Democracy 1.280 (1.001) .276 – 5.930 
   
Years Since Last Coup .965 (.029) .910 – 1.023 
   
Observations 71  
!2 6.40  
Pseudo R2 .068  
Data from Powell and Thyne 2011.  Cases within the period dropped for lack of data: Afghanistan (1992), 




Table 6:  Robustness Check – Influence of Democracy Clauses on Coup Outcomes 
1991-2008 
Variable Odds Ratio (Std. Error) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Odds Ratio 
   
Democracy Clause .758 (.420) .255 – 2.248 
   
GDP per capita .724 (.259) .358 – 1.461 
   
GDP per capita % change .998 (.116) .926 – 1.075 
   
Regional Polity Average 1.154 (.116) .948 – 1.405 
   
Instability Index .949 (.066) .828 – 1.086 
   
Military Government .972 (.555) .318 – 2.978 
   
Democracy 1.202 (.813) .319 – 4.526 
   
Years Since Last Coup .991 (.015) .962 – 1.020 
   
Observations 99  
!2 3.97  
Pseudo R2 .034  
Data from Marshall and Marshall (2009).  Cases within the period dropped for lack of data:  Afghanistan 
(1992, 2002), Cambodia (1991), Djibouti (1991), East Timor (2008), Haiti (1991), Iraq (1991, 1992), 
Liberia (1994), Libya (1993), Qatar (1995, 1996), and Tajikistan (1992). 
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 It is important to note at the outset that none of the coefficients for any variable in 
either model achieves statistical significance.  However, the standard resort to statistical 
significance as a test of whether an effect is present may not be very helpful here, 
especially given the number of cases.  The analysis conducted above was done not on a 
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representative sample but from nearly the entire population of cases.  Missing data led to 
list-wise deletion of some cases in both the Powell and Thyne model and the model for 
the Marshall and Marshall data, but in each case there was data for about 86% of all 
coups that occurred in the period studied.  Statistical significance is a measure of how 
likely it is that a pattern observed in a sample will also be observed in the larger 
population from which that sample is drawn.  When we can directly observe the 
parameters of a population (or close to it), using statistical significance is a misleading 
measuring for the existence of the effect (see Cranmer and Siverson 2008, 798).  A 
related point was made by McCloskey and Ziliak (1996; Ziliak and McCloskey 2004).  It 
is more useful to consider the effect sizes of relevant variables, keeping in mind that they 
are derived from the data observed and that inference outside of that data should be 
considered speculative. 
 The results of these analyses do not present an unambiguous picture.  The simple 
bivariate correlations between democracy clauses and coup outcomes show little or no 
evidence that governments of states that participate in these treaties are any less likely to 
succumb to coups when they are attempted.  However, after accounting for variance 
caused by other likely explanations of coup outcomes, a weak effect for democracy 
clauses, within these data, is perceptible.  During 1991-2008, those states for which data 
are available were less likely to experience successful coups if they were members of a 
regional organization with a democracy clause, by about 44% in the Powell and Thyne 
(2011) data and 24% in the Marshall and Marshall (2009) data.   
 As a policy matter, a 24-44% decrease in the likelihood of coup success is no 
small matter, even if that effect is highly variable in individual cases.  This finding should 
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offer some encouragement to the architects of regional defense of democracy regimes, 
the states that have enforced them in the past, and the democratic leaders of 
unconsolidated democracies that are relying on them to act as a bulwark against would-be 
usurpers.  However, whether this pattern will continue to be observed in the future is 
another matter.  The degree of uncertainty in the data for the period studied here show 
that making claims about the likely influence of democracy clauses on coup outcomes in 
the future must only be done with great caution.  
 The test offered here cannot discriminate why potential coup conspirators fail to 
be more unambiguously hindered by international ostracism when they attempt a 
governmental overthrow.  There are several possibilities, however, that point the way to 
further research.  It may be that suspension from a regional IGO or even non-recognition 
is not a sufficiently severe detriment to dissuade the sort of actor that would contemplate 
a coup.  This sort of international condemnation may lack the teeth to have real 
consequences for coup conspirators, whether by economic dislocation or more general 
delegitimization.  This would suggest that suspension and non-recognition alone are 
insufficient to influence the outcome of coups d’etat, but one wonders whether those 
regional IGOs that have additional “sticks” at their disposal may be more effective.  For 
example, the category of “democracy clause” used in the analysis above does not 
distinguish trade pacts from purely political organizations.  In discussing the alleged 
success of MERCOSUR in dissuading the 1996 Paraguayan coup, Valenzuela (1997) 
placed great emphasis on the ability of that organization to impose substantial economic 
sanctions if it chose.  Future research could distinguish between predominantly economic 
and predominantly political IGOs and explore whether the additional tools available to 
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groups like the EU, MERCOSUR, and ECOWAS make their democracy requirements 
more effective than those of groups like the OAS or AU. 
 In addition, it may be that the collective action problem involved in international 
enforcement of a democracy clause is too great for an IGO to be able to respond 
adequately to a coup in a member states, and domestic actors know this and thus fail to be 
dissuaded by international sanctions.  The literature on enforcement of the OAS regime is 
littered with examples of half measures in responding to democratic crises (see Levitt 
2006, Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007, Boniface 2007).  Thomas Legler’s (2010) 
analysis of the tactics used by the coup leaders in Honduras in 2009 suggests that these 
actors were counting on an initially negative international reaction, but they believed that 
if they could just hold on to power long enough, international commitment to those 
sanctions would flag and the usurpers would be able to retain their position in the end.  
History appears to have proved them right in this regard.  If this is true, it raises a further 
question or whether there may be some subset of circumstances in which they could have 
a stronger effect.  Examples might be when states are particularly vulnerable to 
disruptions of international trade or finance, or when a regional hegemon considers it 
within its interest to see the treaty enforced.   
 This last point raises another possibility, that the ability of regional communities 
to affect coup outcomes is driven largely by the extent to which regional hegemons 
support that international action.  When a regional power does not wish to see a coup-
regime unseated because of its own foreign policy interests, there are many steps it could 
probably take to undermine the response of a regional IGO to a coup.  Cooper and Legler 
(2006) describe how the U.S. government’s implicit support for the coup in Venezuela in 
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2002 probably affected the ability of the OAS to respond to that event, and it may be that 
something similar happened in the many coups under the jurisdiction of the AU and 
ECOWAS. 
 Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this work, but the findings 
presented here can serve as a base point from which such research can proceed.  For 
academics and policymakers interested in the survival of democratic institutions in Latin 
America, Africa, and the Commonwealth of Nations, there are reasons to be cautiously 
optimistic that regional treaties to defend democracy may be dissuading coups.  However, 
this is far from certain, and only more time for data to accrue, and more research, can 














CHAPTER 6: DEMOCRACY CLAUSES AND 
STRATEGIES OF COUP LEGITIMATION 
 
“All happy families are alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”   
 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 
 
This chapter examines the hypothesis that coup leaders will use different legitimating 
strategies to consolidate their power in states subject to democracy clauses than they will 
in states without such restrictions.  The method here is case study, and this chapter 
examines coups that occurred in Honduras (2009), Mali (2012), and Thailand (2006).  By 
comparing the ways that coup leaders attempted to legitimate their power across these 
cases, the aim is to get a better idea of whether democracy clauses are forcing coup 
participants to alter their approaches to seizing power. 
 
 Why Coup Legitimation Strategies? 
In preceding chapters we looked at correlations between the presence of democracy 
clauses and 1) the incidence of coup attempts and 2) the incidence of successful coups.  
The findings produced by examining those statistical correlations provide a good sense of 
how effective these treaties are in the broadest sense.  However, statistics cannot tell us 
whether the mechanisms proposed in Chapter 3 are working; i.e. whether democracy 
clauses are influencing the calculations of potential coup leaders.  Failure to identify a 
statistically significant decline in coups does not necessarily mean that the theory is 
wrong – failure to observe a clear change in patterns of outcomes could be the result of 
other forces.  Moreover, any attempt to study the impact of democracy clauses needs to 
take a closer look at their operation in particular cases. 
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 Ideally, we would find some way of determining whether the presence of a 
democracy clause resulted in usurpers abandoning attempts to launch coups.  However, 
such a research project is not reasonably possible.  It is extraordinarily difficult within the 
social sciences to explain a non-event.  This is especially true for something like a coup 
where an actor could not admit having considered the action without serious 
repercussions.  No military officer (or other potential coup leader) would be likely to say 
that yes, they would have tried to overthrow the state, but they chose not to because they 
were worried about the international reaction.  To do so would be disastrous for his/her 
career and potentially safety or liberty as well.  Consequently, we have to consider other 
potential dependent variables to test the effectiveness of democracy clauses on the coup 
calculus. 
 The other complication in selecting this dependent variable is that it needs to be 
something observable across multiple contexts.  This research project is about a kind of 
international treaty, not political outcomes in a particular place, and its generalist focus 
makes it important to identify a dependent variable that is easily observable and unlikely 
to be misperceived because of local factors.31 
 These concerns led me to focus on two aspects of the coup process that are both 
easily observable and revealing of the mental states of coup leaders: the size of the coup 
coalition that attempts to overthrow the state and subsequently consolidate power, and the 
                                            
31 In its search for general rather than locally-specific findings, this project is closer to the model that 
Michael Coppedge (2012, 53) describes as that of the “whale” than the “octopus” in his discussion of 
differences in approaches to the study of comparative politics:   
“Both are renowned for their intelligence, but they use their intelligence in different 
ways.  Whales come to know great swaths of the earth in their tours of the globe; they 
lack limbs that would allow them to experience objects first-hand; and their eyesight is 
too poor to perceive fine detail.  They acquire a surface knowledge of general things.  
Octopuses, in contrast, dwell in one place and use their fine eyesight and eight infinitely 
flexible arms to gain an intimate knowledge of local, specific things.” 
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kinds of justifications that coup leaders offered to legitimate their subversion of the 
previous order.  These are explained in the next two sections. 
 
 Coup Coalitions 
Coup leaders usually prefer to keep the coup coalition as small as is feasible – i.e. to 
restrict the number of participants to that minimally sufficient to carry off a successful 
coup (Luttwak 1969).  There are two reasons for this.  First, a smaller coup coalition 
means a greater share of the spoils – power, prestige, and material benefits – to be shared 
out among the coup leadership.  Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) describe this as a general 
principle of authoritarian politics, in which the leadership tries to minimize the size of the 
governing coalition so as to maximize the rents for all the members of that coalition.  
Second, a smaller coup coalition reduces the severity of collective action problems in 
organizing and executing the coup.  With fewer people involved there is a reduced 
likelihood that the plot will be betrayed to the authorities, purposefully or not.  Moreover, 
the effects of uncertainty on the assurance game of coup membership described in 
Chapter 3 are less pronounced with fewer actors.  From the usurper’s perspective, so long 
as the coalition is sufficient to seize the state, the smaller the better. 
 However, the theory proposed here is that there may be circumstances in which it 
could be rational to expand the coup coalition beyond the size minimally necessary to 
seize control of the state.  Democracy clauses could make it more difficult for coup 
leaders to retain power after unseating an incumbent, whether directly via diplomatic and 
economic sanctions, or indirectly by providing legitimacy to domestic opposition to the 
coup (see Chapter 3).  One way to counter this may be for coup leaders to include within 
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their coup coalition mainstream political actors such as important members of the 
executive, legislative and/or judicial branches of government and/or representatives from 
influential groups in civil society.  While a broader coup coalition means the spoils of 
government must be spread thinner, it probably also makes for a more robust post-coup 
regime; i.e. more resistant to external or internal challenges. 
 
 Legitimating Rhetoric 
The other dependent variable proposed here is the legitimating language used by coup 
leaders to justify their seizure of power.  It is common, perhaps even universal, for 
political actors to offer rhetorical justifications for their actions, particularly when it 
involves the overthrow of the status quo the way that a coup d’etat does.  There are good 
reasons to doubt whether the justifications provided describe real or true motivations of 
the coup leaders (Farcau 1994, 25-26).  However, there are also good reasons to believe 
that the choice of justification is not random.  More likely, the choice of legitimating 
rhetoric by coup leaders is a strategic choice, aimed at offering whatever justifications 
coup leaders think will be most successful in aiding their bid to maintain power.  Public 
statements thus can give us insight into a speaker’s beliefs about the relative efficacy of 
different lines of argument.  If so, by considering the justifications offered by coup 
leaders in specific cases, we can learn something about what forces they are most 
concerned with or that they think will have the most important influence on the outcome 
of the coup attempt. 
 Finer (1962, 30) described a pattern in the justifications offered by coup leaders in 
the first part of the twentieth century.  As he says “All armed forces which have become 
 118 
politicized . . . hold in some form or another a similar belief: that they have some special 
and indeed unique identification with the ‘national interest.’”  Koonings and Kruijt (2002, 
19) expanded on this idea when they described military justifications as commonly of 
two types, based on the idea of the military being above politics and therefore uniquely 
suited to guide the nation (the “birthright principle”), and being more competent than 
venal civilian politicians (the “competence principle”).  The most common forms of 
justifications along the lines of the birthright principle emphasized national unity, public 
order, the nation’s values or mythic history, anti-imperialism or anti-communism, and the 
like.  The competence principle was a rhetorical resort to what is sometimes called 
“performance legitimacy” (e.g. Diamond 1999), where extra-constitutional or oppressive 
actions are justified because of some alleged economic or social benefits in the future. 
 The theory proposed here is that in states with democracy clauses, this pattern will 
be disrupted and that rhetorical justifications rooted in nationalism or performance will be 
supplanted by justifications rooted in constitutionalism.  In other words, I expect 
democracy clauses to cause leaders to justify their actions as legal, not merely good.  If 
this is correct, coup leaders in states subject to democracy clauses will be forced (or will 
at least find it useful) to claim that their actions were consistent with the terms of pre-
coup constitution.   
 This would be true for two reasons.  First, while regional actors may be willing to 
intervene in the event of a transparent overthrow, they are less willing to intervene in the 
murkier case of a domestic constitutional crisis.  As described by Arceneaux and Pion-
Berlin (2007; supra Chapter 2), the OAS has responded forcefully to every coup that has 
occurred within it members since the promulgation of the Santiago Commitment but has 
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generally demurred when both parties have a plausible claim to constitutional action.  
Regional organizations do not like to be placed in the situation of interpreting the 
constitutions of their member states.   
 Second, phrasing justifications in the language of the pre-existing constitution can 
also blunt domestic opposition to the coup.  As Weingast (1997) describes, one of the 
most important obstacles to collective opposition to governmental transgressions is 
identifying when those transgressions occur.  Constitutions serve as focal points that help 
domesic actors identify what actions are within the scope of appropriate authority and 
what actions are improper.  By claiming a constitutional basis for their actions, coup 
leaders could therefore disrupt the collective action of those supportive of the existing 
regime by making it harder to determine whether a true subversion has occurred.  This 
could be useful to coup leaders if the theory advanced in Chapter 3, that democracy 
clauses assist domestic mobilization against coups, is correct. 
 If the hypothesis proposed above is correct, coup leaders will find it useful to 
claim that their actions were consistent with the terms of pre-coup constitution.  It would 
not be enough to satisfy the hypothesis that coup leaders make increased reference to 
“democracy” in the abstract – that would probably not be sufficient to mollify the 
increased domestic and international opposition that is foreseeable when a democracy 
clause is present.  The key indicators to look for are references to the constitution, the 
preservation of the pre-coup constitution rather than replacement, claims of acting within 
the terms of legal impeachment procedures, and so on. 
 It is important to note that this would be suboptimal for coup leaders – it is a 
“costly signal” that they would theoretically prefer not to make.  Retaining the pre-
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existing constitution will inevitably mean allowing for the continuance of institutions that 
could restrict the ability of the new government to achieve its policy aims.  Being based 
on force, a coup-founded regime would likely be able to muscle its way to its preferred 
goals, but even if the constraint happens at the margins this would be a hindrance.  This is 
probably why it has been so common for coup leaders to write new constitutions when 
they come into power.  If they would choose not to because of democracy clauses, this 
would be a telling shift in power dynamics. 
 
 Case Selection 
The theory above is examined in three cases: the 2009 coup in Honduras, the March 2012 
coup in Mali, and the 2006 coup in Thailand.  Case selection is often tricky in qualitative 
research, and this study is no exception.  The strategy I use is to compare “typical” cases 
of the OAS regime, the AU regime, and from states without democracy clauses, for 
which there is as much data available as possible. 
 The Honduras case is the most obvious case to include because it is the only 
instance of a coup attempt lasting more than a single day in the Western Hemisphere 
since the creation of the OAS defense-of-democracy regime.  The only other possible 
cases within the OAS are the coup in Venezuela in 2002 and the pseudo-coup led by 
disgruntled police officers in Ecuador in 2010.  Both of these coup attempts failed and 
were over in a matter of hours, leaving very little evidence of legitimation strategies.  
Perhaps more importantly, the Venezuelan and Ecuadoran cases had unique factors that 
probably dominated their outcomes and makes them not very useful for broader 
generalization.  The Venezuelan coup failed in large part because of a series of major 
 121 
political miscalculations by one of the coup leaders, Pedro Carmona (Cooper and Legler 
2006, Chapter 4).  The Ecuadoran case was probably not a premeditated coup at all.  
President Raphael Correa was giving a speech to an organization of police officers when 
he announced he was cutting police bonuses.  The group became unruly and President 
Correa was affected by tear gas that was used in an attempt to disperse the crowd.  He 
was then taken to a police hospital but then not allowed to leave.  Fearing a police-led 
coup, the Ecuadoran army secured the hospital, exchanging gunfire with police in the 
process, and freed Correa.  The entire incident lasted only a few hours.  Neither the 
Venezuelan nor Ecuadoran cases are therefore well-suited for generalization, or at least 
they are relatively unsuitable compared to the Honduran case.32 
 The 2006 coup in Thailand is a nice comparison case for the Honduran case.  
They are similar cases in several important ways.  First, both had significant experience 
with democratic institutions at the time of their coups.  Using the Cheibub, Gandhi and 
Vreeland criteria, Honduras had been a democracy since 1983 at the time of its coup – 
Thailand since 1992.  Both of them therefore had more than a decade of democratic 
experience and this similarity helps control for the potentially confounding effects of 
political culture.  Moreover, both cases have relatively high linkage to the West, 
particularly the United States, because of security ties.  Finally, both are relatively recent 
cases, which helps control for global diffusion of democratic values.  These similarities 
set up a “controlled comparison” as described by George and Bennett (2005, 81) 
the comparison of most-similar cases which, ideally, are cases that are comparable in all 
respects except for the independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases 
having different outcomes on the dependent variable. 
 
                                            
32 It is noting in passing that there was substantial popular mobilization against both the Venezuelan and 
Ecuadoran coups despite their brevity. 
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That independent variable is the applicability of a democracy clause – one was present in 
the Honduran case and not in the Thai case.   
 Selecting the African case is more difficult.  Selecting a representative case for 
the AU regime is difficult because of varying circumstances in the different coups that 
occurred there since the creation of the democracy requirement in the African Union 
Constitutive Act.  I looked to typicality along key independent variables: GDP per capita 
and the number of years since the last coup.  Comparing the mean scores of African 
states that experienced coups since 2001 with the scores of individual countries, there are 
three candidates for typicality across these dimensions: the coup in Togo in 2005, the 
coup in Guinea in 2008, and the coup in Mali in 2012.  Of these I selected the Malian 
coup because of advantages in collecting data.  The Malian coup received heavy press 
coverage in the international media.  This provided information – including, crucially, 
interviews with coup leaders – that allowed for more in-depth analysis and more 
triangulation of findings.  These efforts do not eliminate the problems that come from 
trying to make general inferences based on a specific cases, but hopefully limit them as 
much as possible. 
 
Cases33 
 A.  The Honduran Coup of 2009 
  1.  The Coup 
                                            
33 Because of the extensive use of non-academic sources in this chapter, the standard in-text citation form 
of social science journals initially proved to be bulky and rendered the text unreadable.  Consequently, for 
this chapter only, I use the legal citation form of the Bluebook (18th ed.) with some in-text citation as it felt 
appropriate.  Hopefully this will make for a more pleasant reading experience. 
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Honduran President Manuel Zelaya Rosales was unseated by a coup on June 28, 2009.  
Zelaya was elected in 2006 from the conservative Liberal party, but in his first few years 
in office he drifted steadily to the political left.  He lowered fees required for public 
schools, pushed through a raise in the minimum wage, and opposed the privatization of 
the country’s telecommunications industry, in the process angering fellow party members 
and some elements of the Honduran business community.34  Even more threatening to 
some was the way Zelaya reached out to Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.  In 2008 he 
signed an import agreement with Venezuelan national oil company Petrocaribe, and later 
that year Zelaya led Honduras into ALBA,35 a regional group of Central and South 
American states led by Chavez as an alternative to the OAS and other regional 
organizations.36  Also generating domestic opposition were allegations that Zelaya 
attempted to manipulate the selection of judges for the Supreme Court, and accusations of 
corruption.37  The final straw, however, came in early 2009 when Zelaya ordered that a 
“national consultation” be held on June 28, 2009, to determine whether to hold a 
convention to draft a new constitution.38   
 Zelaya’s conservative opponents feared that this was a stratagem to eliminate the 
term limits that would force Zelaya to step down in 2010.39  Furthermore, there were 
irregularities in the way this ballot was proposed.  The Contentious-Administrative Court 
held the poll was unconstitutional because Article 5 of the Honduran Constitution 
                                            
34 William Finnegan, “An Old-Fashioned Coup; As elections loom, can a deposed leader return?” The New 
Yorker, November 30, 2009. 
35 The Spanish acronym for the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America. 
36 Noah Feldman, David Landau, Brian Sheppard and Leonidas Rosa Suazo, “Report to the Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation of Honduran Constituttional Issues.” March 26, 2011, at 10 [hereinafter Feldman 
et al Report]. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid at 11. 
39 Finnegan, supra note 1. 
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requires Congress to approve any referendum.  However, Zelaya ordered General Romeo 
Vasquez Velasquez, chief of the Honduran armed forces, to carry out the poll anyway.40  
On June 18, the Court sent an order to General Vasquez to desist in any participation with 
the poll,41 and on June 24, Vasquez notified the Court he would comply with this order.  
Later that day Zelaya fired General Vasquez along with Defense Minister Edmundo 
Orellana Mercardo.42  On June 25 Zelaya led a large crowd of supporters to a military 
base near Tegucigalpa and seized the ballots printed for the poll,43 apparently with the 
intent of going ahead and conducting the poll without the assistance of the military.   
 On June 28, shortly before 6 a.m., approximately 200 soldiers stormed the 
presidential residence.  They quickly overcame Zelaya’s guards and seized Zelaya 
himself.  He was taken to a waiting military airplane and flown to Costa Rica where they 
left him on an airstrip, still in his pajamas.44  The next day the de facto leadership claimed 
the army was executing an arrest warrant that had been issued by the Honduran Supreme 
Court for treason, usurpation of functions and abuse of authority.  The warrant was 
eventually produced and claimed by the Supreme Court, though some commentators later 
observed it was impossible to know if the warrant was created before or after Zelaya was 
exiled.45 
 Shortly after noon on the day of the coup, the Honduran Congress convened and 
considered the report of a secret commission that had ostensibly been created on June 25 
to consider the constitutionality of Zelaya’s actions regarding the referendum.46  A letter 
                                            
40 Ibid. at 13. 
41 Ibid. at 14. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. at 15. 
44 Finnegan, supra note 1. 
45 Feldman et al Report, supra note 3, at 16 
46 Ibid. at 17. 
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of resignation from Zelaya was also produced.47  The letter was almost certainly a forgery 
– Zelaya denied writing one and the letter was dated June 25, three days before the 
coup.48  The Congress voted to accept Zelaya’s “resignation” and then declared President 
of the Congress Roberto Micheletti Bain to be interim President until elections in 
November.49  In accepting the position, Micheletti said “I do not arrive at this position via 
the ignomious route of a coup d’etat, I arrive as the product of an absolutely legal 
transition.”50   
 
  2.  International Reaction 
International condemnation of the coup was immediate and forceful.  On June 28, the day 
of the coup, OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza issued a press statement that 
condemned the coup and he called an emergency session of the Permanent 
Representatives to the OAS that met that morning to discuss the crisis.51  Also on June 
28, United States President Barack Obama called on Honduran officials to “respect 
democratic norms, the rule of law, and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter.”52  Secretary of State Hilary Clinton issued a statement that is worth quoting in 
full to show the place of the OAS democracy clause in the response: 
The action taken against Honduran President Mel Zelaya violates the precepts of the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, and thus should be condemned by all. We call on all 
parties in Honduras to respect the constitutional order and the rule of law, to reaffirm 
their democratic vocation, and to commit themselves to resolve political disputes 
peacefully and through dialogue. Honduras must embrace the very principles of 
democracy we reaffirmed at the OAS meeting it hosted less than one month ago.53 
                                            
47 Ibid. at 18. 
48 Finnegan, supra note 1. 
49 Feldman et al Report, supra note 3, at 19. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Press Release, Organization of American States, Secretary General, E-212/09. June 28, 2009. 
52 Elisabeth Malkin, “Honduras President Ousted in Coup” The New York Times. June 28, 2009. 
53 Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, “Situation in Honduras”, 
PRN 2009/653 (June 28, 2009), at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/06/125452.htm  It is worth 
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 The European Union condemned the coup, as did the leaders of many Latin 
American states.54  On June 30, Zelaya appeared before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to demand condemnation of the coup, and the Assembly passed a one-
page resolution that called for Zelaya’s reinstatement and urged UN member-states not to 
recognize the new regime.55  In the first weeks after the coup, the Micheletti regime was 
not recognized by a single country.56  In addition, the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank both “paused” loans to Honduras.  World Bank President 
Robert Zoellick said the World Bank was “looking to the OAS to deal with . . . the crisis 
under its democratic charter.  In the process we have put a pause on our lending [to 
Honduras].”57  The total amount of the suspended credits came to at least U.S. $200 
million.58   
 On July 1, the OAS met as a Special General Assembly and issued a resolution 
“vehemently” condemning the coup and requiring the de facto regime to turn power over 
                                            
noting that in an extensive discussion via conference call between reporters and State Department officials 
that took place on June 28, the response of the United States was framed predominantly as action within the 
framework of the IADC.  See “Background Briefing on the Situation in Honduras” at: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/125453.htm However, even after State Department officials and 
President Obama had described the event as a coup, the official U.S. position on whether the displacement 
was a “coup” was unsettled for several months.  See Doug Cassel, “Honduras: Coup d’Etat in 
Constitutional Clothing?” ASIL Insight.  Available at: http://www.asil.org/insights090729.cfm; Arshad 
Mohammed, “US moves to formal cutoff of aid to Honduras.” Reuters News. August 28, 2009. 
54 BBC News, “World Reaction: Honduran crisis” (June 28, 2009), available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8123434.stm  
55 United Nations General Assembly, “Situation in Honduras: democracy breakdown” UN Doc 
A/Res/63/301 (June 30, 2009); Marc Lacey, “After Losing Honduras, Ousted Leader Wins International 
Support”, The New York Times, June 30, 2009.  Interestingly, Mexico was one of the sponsors of the 
resolution, suggesting that its foreign policy position had shifted since the time it had refused to accede to 
the Washington Protocol in 1997. 
56 Peter J. Meyer, “Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009 – January 2010.” Congressional Research Service. 
February 1, 2010. 
57 Reuters News, “World Bank ‘pauses’ loans to Honduras.” June 30, 2000; Reuters News, “IADB says 
pausing loans to Honduras over coup.” July 1, 2009. 
58 Juana Casas, “Isolated Honduras hunkers down; Zelaya vows action” Reuters News July 11, 2009.  
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to Zelaya within 72 hours or face suspension.59  When this ultimatum was ignored, the 
Special General Assembly met again on July 5 and unanimously agreed to a resolution 
that suspended Honduras from participation in the OAS.60  This was the first time the 
OAS had formally invoked the suspension clause in Article 21 of the IADC. 
 
  3.  The Post-Coup Struggle for Power 
Under pressure from the OAS, the United States, and other regional powers, the 
Micheletti regime agreed to negotiations with Zelaya beginning July 9.  The OAS 
negotiations centered on a proposal whereby Zelaya would be reinstated as president, but 
would rule with a unity government until his term ended in January 2010 following the 
November 2009 elections.  Both sides agreed to the basic principles in mid-July, but the 
agreement broke down almost immediately over the issue of Zelaya’s return, specifically 
what powers he might hold and the applicability of outstanding charges against him for 
treason, abuse of authority and corruption.  Zelaya demanded reinstatement to his full 
powers and for the charged to be dropped.  In response, the Micheletti regime shifted its 
position to the view that Zelaya could not be reinstated as president under any 
circumstances, and that the crisis should be resolved by the November elections.  The two 
sides’ intransigence on these positions prevented any progress in negotiations until 
October.   
 It was only after increased economic pressure and political pressure from the 
United States that the impasse was broken and the two sides reached an agreement on 
                                            
59 Organization of American States General Assembly, “Resolution on the political crisis in Honduras” 
AG/RES 1 (XXXVII-E/09). 
60 Organization of American States General Assembly, “Suspension of the Right of Honduras to Participate 
in the Organization of American States” AG/RES. 2 (XXXVII – E/09). 
 128 
October 30, the so-called Tegucigalpa Accord.  This agreement provided that Zelaya 
could return upon a favorable vote from the Honduran Congress and authorization from 
the Supreme Court.61  However, the Congress took advantage of the agreement’s 
omission of a deadline for the vote, and put it off for more than a month, after the 
November 30 elections that selected the de facto regime’s favored candidate Porfirio 
Lobo as president.  When Congress held the vote on December 3, they refused to 
reinstate Zelaya.62  On December 9 the U.S. announced it would recognize the Lobo 
government if Micheletti handed power over to a unity government for the remainder of 
Zelaya’s term (at that point only slightly more than a month) and if a truth and 
reconciliation commission was created to investigate the coup.63  These conditions were 
agreed to and the United States recognized the Lobo government in January.  However, 
opposition from Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador and other states meant that Honduras was 
not readmitted to the OAS until June of 2011.64 
 
  4.  Influence of the Inter-American Democratic Charter 
There are good reasons to believe that the IADC played an important role in the way the 
post-coup period played out.  For example, even though Zelaya’s ties to Hugo Chavez set 
him at odds with the regional hegemon, the United States, U.S. diplomats consistently 
referenced the IADC in explaining American opposition to the coup.  One journalist 
claimed his sources told him “the golpistas were privately stunned . . . by the firmness of 
                                            
61 Reuters News, “Honduras Zelaya set to return to power” (October 30, 2009). 
62 Deborah Charles, “U.S. says disappointed with Honduras vote on Zelaya.” Reuters News. December 3, 
2009. 
63 David Alexander, “Clinton says Lobo trying to reconcile Honduras.” Reuters News. December 9, 2009. 
64 Deborah Charles, “Honduras readmitted to OAS after coup.” Reuters News. June 1, 2011. 
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the U.S. reaction.”65  As described above, the international financial institutions also 
framed their suspensions of Honduran credit in terms of the OAS requirements.   
 Furthermore, the economic sanctions did appear to have some bite: one report 
claims prices for some everyday goods increased as much as 30% within Tegucigalpa.66 
It is difficult to identify precisely what impact the international ostracism had on the 
Honduran economy (particularly since the global financial crisis occurred at about the 
same time), but it is worth noting that World Bank World Development Indicators data 
show per capita income growth slowing to 1.1% in 2009 after averaging 7.9% growth per 
year for the six years previous.  One World Bank official noted that the effects of the 
public debt the Honduran government accumulated in 2009 alone would probably reduce 
Honduran growth by 1-2% a year until 2015.67  These costs were also affected by a sharp 
decline in Honduras’s international reserves in July and August, leading Standard and 
Poor’s to adjust its sovereign debt rating for Honduras from “B+” to “B” in September.68 
 In addition to an increase in government spending as a way to counteract public 
discontent, it also appears that some members of the Honduran business community 
agreed to impose a price-freeze on some basic goods to try to keep prices stable.69  It is 
difficult to know what influence these efforts may have had, but they offer some evidence 
that the de facto regime and its supporters considered the international sanctions serious 
enough to take costly measures to counter them. 
                                            
65 Finnegan, supra note 1.  However, he also notes that the same people believed the U.S. reaction would 
have been different with a Republic administration.  This is a useful reminder that the influence of 
international law on state behavior is probably heavily mediated by domestic politics. 
66 Juana Casas, “Isolated Honduras hunkers down; Zelaya vows action.” Reuters News. July 11, 2009. 
67 The Economist, “The Cost of a Coup: Honduras’s indebted economy.” June 9, 2011. 
68 Daniel Bases, “S&P cuts Honduras rating to B from B-plus.” Reuters News. September 11, 2009. 
69 Juana Casas, “Isolated Honduras hunkers down; Zelaya vows action.” Reuters News. July 11, 2009.  
Micheletti himself confirmed this arrangement in a press statement he made on July 31, and that they 
would do so “for as long as necessary.”  Mica Rosenberg, “Interview – ‘No one can push Honduras around’ 
– de facto leader.” Reuters News. August 1, 2009.  
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  5.  The Coup Coalition 
The coup coalition in the Honduran case was broad, including not only the military but 
also most of the civilian political establishment, the courts, and the business community.  
While it was the military that seized and exiled President Zelaya, a wide range of actors 
in the Honduran political establishment directly participated in the actions taken on June 
28-30 that transferred power to Micheletti.  The Honduran attorney general filed 
complaints asking for warrants for Zelaya’s arrest on June 25 and June 26, and those 
complaints furthermore asked that the arrest be conducted by the army because of 
concerns that the police were unduly politicized.70  The Supreme Court agreed and issued 
the warrants, and during the post-coup period the Court made several statements 
supporting the removal.  For example, on the 28th the Supreme Court issued a press 
release that said “the Supreme Court of Justice ratifies that the orders of the court have 
been executed and will continue to be executed within the parameters of the Constitution 
and the law.”71  They furthermore claimed that the military’s action was justified as a 
defense of the Constitution against “those who had publicly spoken out and acted against 
the Constitution’s provisions.”72  Another statement issued on July 3 said the removal 
was “contemplated by our laws and followed legal process.”73  In addition, the great 
majority of representatives in the Congress voted for the removal, including three of the 
four opposition parties and a majority of Zelaya’s own Liberal party.  The coup also had 
strong support from the business community and media establishment.  Even key leaders 
                                            
70 Feldman et al Report, supra note 3, at 16.   
71 Ibid. 
72 Malkin, supra note 22.   
73 Ibid. 
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of the Catholic Church and Protestant evangelical groups in Honduras offered rhetorical 
support for the coup after the fact.74 
 This was a broad coalition from across Honduran political life.  In the Honduran 
case we see that the actors who took control of the president, military officers, 
subsequently shared power with many other actors and in fact were probably junior 
partners to civilians in the process.  Throughout the post-coup period the military did 
issue statements about the coup, but the message was consistently one of obedience to the 
Constitution and to their civilian leaders.  On July 1 the Honduran army’s top lawyer 
stated that the army was simply enforcing an order from the Supreme Court.75  In an 
interview with CNN en Espanol on July 8, army chief General Vasquez said he was 
following orders, acting on behalf of an “inter-institutional consensus” and that he had to 
follow “because the Constitution commands the armed forces to protect the rule of 
law.”76 On July 28, General Vasquez gave an interview to the Spanish newspaper La 
Vanguardia in which he repeatedly cited the subordination of the military to civilian 
authority and claimed that soldiers had simply been carrying out the arrest order of the 
Supreme Court when they exiled Zelaya.77  Speaking to Honduran press the same week, 
he said “the armed forces are not the ones responsible for this internal division.”78   
 The division between the military and the civilian leaders can be seen most 
clearly in an instance in which a statement by the military regarding the OAS 
                                            
74 Legler 2010, 12.  
75 Marc Lacey, “Leader’s Ouster Not a Coup, Says the Honduran Military” The New York Times. July 1, 
2009. 
76 Feldman et al Report, supra note 3, at 17. 
77 La Vangardia, “General Romeo Vasquez: ‘Somos soldados, no asesinos’” July 28, 2009, via BBC 
Monitoring Latin America - Political July 29, 2009 “Spanish daily reports Honduran general’s views on 
president’s overthrow”. 
78 Julia Rios, “Honduran military repositions as Zelaya seeks sanctions.” Agence France Presse. July 26, 
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negotiations was at odds with the negotiating position of the Micheletti government at the 
time.  This happened on July 26, when a statement by the Honduran military claimed 
“unrestricted support” for the OAS-mediated San Jose Accord.79  This was at a time 
when the Micheletti position was rejection of that agreement because it provided for 
Zelaya’s return to the position of president.  A somewhat similar set of differences was 
observed in press statements made by Vasquez and Micheletti in mid-October on the 
OAS-led negotiations, with Vasquez expressing hope for a quick resolution and 
Micheletti reiterating objections to Zelaya’s return.80  The picture that emerges from 
these events is one where the military was much less invested in the consolidation of 
power than the civilians and more concerned about external pressures from the 
international community.  It was the military leaders who were the softliners in 
Honduras, and the civilians who were the hardliners. 
 Vasquez was forced to step down from the military as a result of international 
pressures associated with Honduras’ attempt to secure recognition from other Latin 
American states and readmittance to the OAS.  When the Honduran Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission released its report in July 2011, it blamed the army for 
excessive use of force, but did not otherwise accuse it of improper interference in 
politics.81  Vasquez’s response to the report suggests more than a little bitterness with the 
way civilian politicians acted during the 2009 coup: “[The armed forces] were unfairly 
                                            
79 Rios ibid.  The San Jose Accord was the agreement providing for Zelaya’s return with limited powers. 
80 Frank Jack Daniel, “Honduras de facto leader dampens hope of Zelaya deal” Reuters News. (October 14, 
2009). 
81 Comision de Verdad, April 13, 2010. 
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the victims of a crisis generated by politicians and we [the military] tried everything we 
could to have it resolved in the political sphere.”82   
 The Honduras coup did not follow the theoretical and historical script of those 
with power using it to secure their own positions.  The key coercive actor, the Honduran 
military, played a subordinate role throughout the coup consolidation phase and appeared 
to be more willing to give up some power than were the civilians in the Micheletti 
government.  Furthermore, the coup coalition in 2009 included a broad range of 
Honduran political society.  This pattern of behavior offers some support for the 
hypothesis proposed here that increased international pressure brought on by defense-of-




  6.  Legitimating Rhetoric 
Throughout the coup consolidation period, the Micheletti regime legitimated its actions 
by claiming that the removal of Zelaya had been done in accordance with Honduras’ 
constitution.  As mentioned above, on June 28 the Congress purported to accept Zelaya’s 
“resignation” before it voted Micheletti into the President’s office.  As President of the 
Congress, Micheletti was constitutionally next in line for the presidency, but when doubts 
about the resignation letter proved too great, the de facto regime began putting greater 
emphasis on its other argument: that Zelaya had violated the constitution and was guilty 
of impeachable offenses.  The Congress issued a communiqué to this effect on July 1,83 
                                            
82 Laurence Allan, “Former Armed Forces’ Chief Reacts to Honduran Truth Commission Report.” IHS 
Global Insight. July 11, 2011. 
83 Feldman et al Report, supra note 3, at19. 
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and it became the standard talking point for the regime thereafter.  For example, in a 
statement describing his decision to participate in the OAS negotiations in San Jose, 
Micheletti said “[w]e’ll work tirelessly to seek a solution within the framework of the 
Constitution.”84  Many similar statements were made throughout the crisis, emphasizing 
Zelaya’s refusal to comply with court orders regarding the referendum/poll and 
corruption allegations.  In explaining the refusal to allow Zelaya to be reinstated as 
president, Liberal Party leader Valentin Suarez pointed to the competence of domestic 
institutions for interpreting constitutional requirements:  “The executive branch, the 
judiciary and Congress can’t all be wrong.  It’s a crazy recommendation for 
Hondurans.”85   
 However, in addition to claiming constitutional succession, the coup regime also 
used repression to consolidate its hold on power.  Micheletti imposed a curfew on the day 
of the coup that was periodically renewed throughout the remainder of the year, 
something Human Rights Watch and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
pointed out was without basis in the Honduran constitution.86  Tight controls were placed 
on the media as well.  Reporters critical of the coup faced harassment, beatings, and 
murder.87  In April 2010, Reporters San Frontieres noted that Honduras had become one 
of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists, citing the murders of six 
journalists critical of government just in the time from January to April of that year.88   
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  7.  Honduras as Tentative Evidence for Democracy Clauses 
 
The 2009 coup in Honduras was successful.  President Zelaya was removed from power, 
the Micheletti regime resisted sanctions long enough to conduct elections several months 
later, and the preferred candidate of that regime won the election and assumed power.  
However, the coup did not follow the script for military coups that one sees in the 
theoretical literature.  Rather than minimizing the size of the coup coalition to maximize 
gains to coup conspirators, there was a broad coalition of the great majority of the 
Honduran political establishment.  The military had a minor role to play in the post-coup 
regime, and made clear it held a subservient role to civilians during the period.  
Additionally, the top leaders of the Honduran military, including Army chief General 
Vasquez, were forced out of the military in January 2010 in an attempt to placate 
international condemnation.89  The legitimating rhetoric was consistently that of 
compliance with the constitution and no attempt was made to scrap or amend the 
constitution in the immediate post-coup period.  These findings offer some support for 
the theory presented above that international regimes for the defense of democracy can 
force coup leaders to adopt democratic guise if they want to succeed in seizing power.  
While these limitations did not ultimately prevent democratic institutions from being 
subverted in this case, it is possible to conjecture that this coup could not have succeeded 
without the cooperation of so many different elements of Honduran political society.   
 The 2009 Honduras coup is the only incident to date where the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter has been implemented, and it offers some useful lessons.  Would-be 
coup leaders in other American states might well compare the Honduran episode and the 
Venezuelan case where the coup coalition fell apart because of infighting and decide to 
                                            
89 Al Jazeera, “Honduras to try ‘coup generals.’” January 15, 2010.  
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refrain from attempting an overthrow unless they can count on such widespread support 
as there was in Honduras.   
 
 B.  The 2012 Coup in Mali 
  1.  The Coup 
Prior to March 21, 2012, Mali was sometimes described as a success story of African 
democracy (e.g. Diamond 2008, 262).  Mali democratized after 1991 when long-time 
ruler Moussa Traore was overthrown in a coup by General Amadou Tomani Toure.  
Toure gave up power and elections were held in 1992, opening the way for 20 years of 
formally democratic rule.  Toure returned to politics by successfully running for president 
in 2002 and was approaching the end of his tenure in 2012, as term limits prevented him 
from running in the presidential elections scheduled for April 29, 2012.  Toure was 
widely unpopular in Mali for being the face of a government with serious corruption 
problems in one of the poorest countries in Africa and indeed the world.90 
 In late 2011 and early 2012 the country had been destabilized by a rebellion in the 
northern part of the country.  Ethnic Tuaregs had long agitated for autonomy in the 
northeastern region of Mali, an area Tuaregs call Azawad.  Many Tuaregs had 
participated in the civil war in Libya in 2011, armed and employed by both Muammar 
Gaddafi and the oppositionist National Transitional Council.  When Gaddafi was 
defeated, Tuaregs with arms and battle experience began returning to Mali in large 
numbers and an organization called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
                                            
90 Xan Rice, “Coup Leader Keeps Mali on Edge.” The Financial Times. June 5, 2012; Par Sidiki Guindo, 
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(the French acronym is MNLA) was created to advance their separatist claims.  Two 
Islamist organizations, Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in Mali (AQIM), also benefitted from 
the influx of arms and soldiers.  In early 2012 the three groups created a tacit alliance and 
handed multiple defeats to the Malian army in the desert regions of the country’s 
northeast.  
 The Malian military blamed the civilian government for these losses, claiming 
that they lacked the equipment needed to fight the rebels.91  By mid-March military 
personnel were giving interviews to newspaper reporters complaining about corruption, 
blaming generals and civilian leaders for diverting resources intended for the army into 
their own pockets.92  This dissatisfaction finally bubbled over on March 21, 2012 when 
the Malian defense minister Sadio Gassama went to the Kati military base near the capital 
city of Bamako and gave a speech that soldiers there considered derogatory.93  Soldiers 
shouted down Gassama, took weapons from the base’s armory and drove into Bamako 
toward the presidential palace.  The evidence suggests that this was probably not an 
organized coup attempt at the outset but a mutiny in which the soldiers became 
increasingly bold as they encountered little resistance from the authorities.94  By late on 
the 21st mutineers controlled the presidential palace, the international airport and the state 
radio and television station.  President Toure abandoned the presidential palace and went 
into hiding, most likely at the barracks of the “Red Beret” presidential guard.  Soldiers 
                                            
91 This claim is supported by U.S. State Department assessments revealed in the Wikileaks scandal.  
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looted the presidential palace and other government buildings and were seen flagging 
down and seizing civilian cars.95 
 Early on March 22 a group of military officers appeared on state television to 
announce that the constitution was suspended and that control of the country now 
belonged to a military committee called the National Committee for Recovering 
Democracy and Restoring the State (CNRDRE).  A military spokesman claimed the coup 
was motivated by the “incompetence” of the government and a “lack of adequate material 
to defend the nation.”96  Furthermore, he said the coup leadership “solemnly commits to 
restore power to a democratically elected president as soon as national unity and 
territorial integrity are re-established.”97  The leader of the coup was declared to be 
Captain Amadou Sanogo, an American-trained English instructor in the Malian army.98  
Sanogo reiterated that he had no intention of staying in power and would step down as 
soon as the army received sufficient support to fight the rebels.  “We are not here to 
confiscate any power but we are here to have an army and security forces available to 
assure the national security. . . . [There is] a lack of equipment, a lack of training and our 
comrades are dying all the time.”99  He went on: “So once this has been fixed, I’ll be able 
to say, ‘Ok, go for election’ in a short period of time.  I promise.”100 
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  2.  International Reaction 
The international reaction to the Malian coup was one of the most robust repudiations of 
a coup yet seen, with ECOWAS, the AU, and the larger international community united 
in their condemnation of the junta.  The sanctions imposed by international actors, 
particularly ECOWAS, outstripped previous such reactions as well. 
 On March 21, even before the coup was formally announced, the ECOWAS 
Commission issued a statement strongly condemning the “mutineers”, stating:  
The Commission wishes to remind the military of its responsibility under the 
Constitution, and to reiterate ECOWAS’ policy of “Zero Tolerance” for any attempt to 
obtain or maintain power by unconstitutional means.101 
 
The AU used similar “zero tolerance” language in a denunciation that was issued on 
March 22.  When it was clear that the coup had successfully displaced Toure, both 
organizations suspended Mali from membership, the AU on March 23,102 and ECOWAS 
on March 27.103  Neither organization imposed sanctions right away, preferring to 
threaten an escalation of sanctions as a negotiating tactic with the coup regime leadership.  
A communiqué from the ECOWAS summit of heads of state is clear about this, 
threatening that suspension would be followed by a travel ban and financial embargo on 
CNRDRE members, and more significant measures if necessary.104   
 Condemnation also came from the international community more generally.  On 
March 22, major powers with regional interests China, the EU, France, and the United 
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States released statements calling for Toure’s reinstatement,105 as did neighbors and 
regional powers Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria and South Africa.106  The United 
Nations Security Council also weighed in, with Council President Mark Lyall Grant 
issuing a press statement on March 22 condemning the coup and calling for the 
restoration of Toure.107  Furthermore, as in the Honduran case, the World Bank 
suspended development assistance to Mali, as did the African Development Bank.108  The 
European Union suspended development assistance on March 23, followed by the United 
States on March 26.109  
 
 3.  Coup Consolidation and Regional Diplomacy, Part 1 
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In the first days after the coup, the CNRDRE junta110 held domestic power unchallenged.  
Stores in Bamako remained closed and the city was relatively quiet, while military 
leaders appeared on national television to broadcast appeals to soldiers to cease 
looting.111  There were some protests against the coup, but they were small and dwarfed 
by pro-junta protests that attracted several thousand people.112  However, despite the lack 
of a robust domestic opposition, this section will shows that the coup leadership’s actions 
suggest they were struggling to find ways to legitimate their rule.  The evidence shows 
that it was the international response, particularly that of ECOWAS, that complicated 
post-coup consolidation of power. 
 On March 28, one week after the coup, the junta announced the end of the curfew 
and the creation of a new constitution.  The AU and ECOWAS rejected the constitution 
and a joint meeting of ECOWAS heads of state declared that the junta must step down or 
they would impose a long list of sanctions against the Malian government.  In addition to 
suspension from ECOWAS, all ECOWAS ambassadors would be recalled, all ECOWAS 
members were to seal their borders with Mali (except for humanitarian purposes) and 
deny Mali access to their seaports, Malian accounts at the Central Bank of West African 
States (BCEAO) were to be frozen,113 financial assistance through the West African Bank 
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be shown, the post-coup regime consisted overwhelmingly of military officers and more closely fits the 
connotations of the word “junta.” 
111 “After Mali’s coup, fear empties streets of capital.” Agence France Presse. March 25, 2012.  Adam 
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for Development and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development suspended, 
and Mali would be suspended from all sporting and cultural events in ECOWAS states.114   
 On April 1, hours before the ECOWAS ultimatum was to go into effect, Sanogo 
held a press conference to announce the restoration of the 1992 constitution.  However, 
he refused to allow Toure to regain the presidency, claiming he was guilty of crimes of 
corruption and treason.  The ECOWAS heads of state found this position unsatisfactory 
and imposed the sanctions threatened in the March 30 declaration.  They further signaled 
their resolve by placing the regional military organization ECOMOG on standby.  The 
AU Peace and Security Council subsequently issued a statement supporting the 
ECOWAS sanctions, imposing their own travel ban and asset freeze, and calling on AU 
member states to support them in their bilateral relations with Mali.   
 Sanogo and the coup leadership responded on April 3 by calling for a national 
conference, to be held two days later, to choose a new president.115  The junta appeared to 
be searching for some mechanism by which they could satisfy the international 
community’s demands for a restoration of democracy without reinstating Toure.  
However, on April 4 a coalition of political parties and prominent civil society 
organizations announced they would not attend such a conference, and Sanogo was 
forced to call it off.  Meanwhile, the sanctions started to take their toll.116  By April 4, 
there were long lines at banks as depositors tried to withdraw cash, and also at gas 
stations.117  By April 5, state utility companies were rationing electricity and water, one 
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large bank had closed, and the prices of basic goods, particularly food and fuel, had 
started to rise.118 
 The next day ECOWAS and the CNRDRE announced an agreement had been 
reached in which the junta would step down and Toure agreed to resign.  The vacancy in 
the presidency would trigger the succession rules of the Malian constitution, which call 
for the speaker of the parliament to serve as interim president for a period of forty days 
while an election would be held to determine a new president.119  Toure agreed to this 
and resigned on April 10, opening the way for Speaker of the Parliament Diouncounda 
Traore to be sworn in as interim president on April 12.120 
 An important element in these negotiations was that the situation in the north had 
gone from bad to disastrous in the days after the coup.  Rebels successfully took the 
major northern cities of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, giving them control of two-thirds of 
the country by April 4.  That day the MNLA and Ansar Dine jointly announced the end 
of the offensive, and on April 6 they declared the new and independent state of 
Azawad.121  Statements from the AU Commission,122 AU Peace and Security Council,123 
the ECOWAS heads of state,124 and UN Security Council125 show that the international 
                                            
118 Bruce Whitehouse, “Brief update for Thursday, April 5.” Bridges from Bamako. April 5, 2012. At: 
http://bamakobruce.wordpress.com/2012/04/05/brief-update-for-thursday-april-5/ ; “West Africa leaders hit 
Mali with sanctions.” Agence France Presse. April 3, 2012; Lydia Polgreen and Fabien Offner, “Junta in 
Mali to Step Down.” The New York Times. April 8, 2012.  Interestingly, Whitehouse notes that the Senegal 
border may have never been closed and price increases may have been driven has much by speculation as 
by actual shortages. 
119 “Mali junta to stand down under deal with W. African bloc.” Agence France Presse. April 7, 2012. 
120 “African Union hails Mali power handover.” Agence France Presse. April 12, 2012. 
121 “Mali junta, ECOWAS confirm transition deal.” Agence France Presse. April 7, 2012. 
122 Chairman of the Commission of the African Union, “The African Union welcomes the signing of the 
Framework Agreement of Bamako and the prospects for the restoration of constitutional order in Mali.” 
Press Release. April 7, 2012. 
123 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique. PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXVI). April 3, 2012. 
124 Economic Community of West African States, “Statement by H. E. Alassane Ouattara, Chairman of the 
Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on the Positive Development in the Political 
Situation in Mali.” April 6, 2012. 
 144 
community was very concerned about the success of the rebels.  There were several 
different concerns: diffusion of instability through the region, the ties between the rebels 
and groups like Al Qaeda in Mali, human rights violations in the occupied region because 
of looting and the imposition of a rigid conception of sharia, and what appeared to be an 
impending humanitarian emergency from lack of food and medicine for the 200,000 
refugees that had fled their homes since the rebel offensive began in early March.126   
 One might consider it a puzzle why the regional and international community 
were willing to impose such heavy sanctions on Mali for abrogating the democratic 
constitution, but also willing to accept less than full restoration of the previous order.  
The most likely reason is that they were balancing two competing interests: a desire to 
punish the coup leaders and a desire to keep the rebels in check and the Malian state 
intact.  As circumstances in the north progressively deteriorated, ECOWAS and the AU 
likely became more willing to accept an agreement that satisfied a lesser standard of 
democratic restoration than they would have if the rebellion had not complicated matters.  
This is an interesting case where the traditional foreign policy interests of regional states 
were weighed against their interests in seeing the democracy clause enforced.  It might 
well have been in regional states’ interests to see a new chief executive come to power 
who was more committed to fighting the insurgency; this is one reason sometimes given 
for the support the United States gave to Latin American coup leaders during the Cold 
War (see Farcau 1994; Thyne 2010).  However, in the Malian case the balancing 
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demonstrated by the April 6 agreement shows that interests embedded in the democracy 
clause were valued by regional actors (not to mention other relevant actors that were 
probably involved in the negotiations like France and the United States) sufficiently that 
these conventional security interests were not the sole determining factor in how they 
responded to the coup. 
 
 4.  Coup Consolidation and Regional Diplomacy, Part 2 
Traore’s ascension to the interim presidency was not the end of the military’s 
intervention in Malian politics.  Given the disorder in the north elections could not 
feasibly be conducted within forty days as required by the constitution.  In the days after 
the handover, it became clear that Sanogo and ECOWAS were at odds over what would 
happen at the end of the interim period.  In essence it was ECOWAS’s position that 
Traore would remain interim president until elections, whenever that might be, while the 
junta believed that a new president must be chosen.  Furthermore, the junta sought to 
entrench its position in the new government assembled by Traore and his selection for the 
new prime minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra.  The junta kept a garrison at the state radio 
and television station throughout this period, and indeed into June.127  Moreover, soldiers 
arrested twenty prominent officials in the week before Diarra announced his cabinet on 
April 25.  All those arrested were released in short order, but one observer believes this 
gambit paid off when junta members were named to three top jobs in the cabinet: the 
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ministries of defense, interior, and civil protection.128  It was clear to actors both domestic 
and international that the junta was not willing to walk away from politics. 
 ECOWAS met to discuss the issue on April 26 in Abidjan, where the heads of 
state decided that Traore’s tenure as interim president would be one year, and that 
ECOMOG soldiers would be sent to Mali “to assist Mali in regaining its unity and 
territorial integrity.”129  The decision was made without consulting the junta, angering 
Sanogo and his supporters.  He stated ECOWAS soldiers could enter Mali only with 
permission (implying that it was his permission that mattered), and that he would succeed 
Traore on May 22.  Tensions only increased when the loyalist Red Beret paratroopers 
launched a counter-coup on April 30.  The junta stifled the attempt; at least 14 people 
were killed in the fighting, 40 were wounded, and hundreds were imprisoned on 
suspicion of being involved.  By the next week an impasse had been reached in which the 
CNRDRE was determined to retake power after the forty-day period was over,130 and 
ECOWAS threatened new sanctions. 
 On May 20 the junta caved into ECOWAS demands and accepted that Traore 
would serve a one-year term as interim president, after which elections would be held.  It 
is unclear what finally tipped the balance, but it is worth noting that the Malian 
parliament passed an amnesty for coup participants on May 18, and that as part of the 
ECOWAS deal Sanogo himself was given the status of a former head of state, complete 
with free housing and a pension of US $9,000 per month, fifty times greater than his 
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army salary.  The next day a large crowd of CNRDRE supporters gathered at the 
presidential palace, with some shouting the agreement was a betrayal and that Sanogo 
had committed treason by accepting it.131  The demonstration turned violent and some 
participants evaded presidential guards to break into Traore’s office, where they beat him 
unconscious.132 Traore was taken to a hospital and initially believed to have minor 
injuries.  However, he was flown to Paris for medical tests, where he remained until late 
July. 
 Malian politics then appeared to be in stasis for the next few months, as Traore 
governed, but Sanogo continued to exercise significant informal power from his seat at 
Kati army base outside Bamako.  Tensions between them escalated in late 2012, and on 
December 10 Sanogo’s soldiers arrested Traore’s prime minister Cheick Modibo Diarra 
as he was preparing for a flight to Paris.  The military appeared to be trying to exert 
control over the state without seizing the formal offices of government.  The situation 
was not resolved at the time of this writing. 
 
  5.  Legitimation Strategies 
The Malian coup presents an interesting test of the hypothesis advanced here regarding 
legitimation strategies because the coup was probably not planned.  The tactics of coup 
consolidation appear to have been improvised by the CNRDRE as they 
extemporaneously identified their own political goals and the constraints, domestic and 
international, that influenced their ability to achieve them.  The tactics thus provide “real-
time” insight into the thinking of the coup participants as they assessed their political 
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context and updated those assessments as domestic and international actors reacted to the 
junta. 
 
   a.  The coup coalition 
The coup coalition in this case was consistently narrow.  The CNRDRE was a classic 
junta composed of military officers and the coup coalition never expanded beyond the 
original cadre.  It is interesting to note that the CNRDRE leadership were mostly junior 
officers.  Sanogo was a captain, CNRDRE chief spokesman Amadou Konare was a 
lieutenant, and the highest-ranking members were colonels.  The group never 
incorporated more senior military officers, and indeed it arrested many former generals 
during the week before Diarra announced his government, and in the week after the 
counter-coup.  This pattern probably flowed from widespread dissatisfaction within the 
rank and file because of what was perceived as corruption, ineptitude and indifference in 
the top brass and the civilian leadership, particularly regarding the war against the rebels 
in the north.   
 If the coup had been planned by a small group of officers aiming to take power 
for themselves it would have been evidence that the conspirators discounted the influence 
of regional democracy clauses.  Here, however, the coup appears to have evolved out of a 
mutiny, and the leadership that emerged during that mutiny adopted its tactics on the fly.  
In Captain Sanogo’s first interview on Malian television, he said:  
I salute these non-commissioned officers and troops around me.  The initiative came from 
them.  Following unsatisfied requests and demands, their meeting with the defense 
minister went awry, they took up arms and munitions to defend themselves. . . . I said to 
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myself, with a few colleagues, why not profit from the situation and not let these men act 
on their own, because enough is enough.  That’s what led us to this coup.133   
 
In the first days the CNRDRE tried to keep power for itself, as evidenced by the 
promulgation of the new constitution, but they were forced to rescind it and reintroduce 
the 1992 constitution on April 1, the day ECOWAS sanctions were to take effect if 
democracy was not restored.  They then were conscribed in their powers by the combined 
influence of other actors: their influence over the media was constrained, Sanogo was 
denied the presidency, and CNRDRE members were limited to only three ministries in 
the interim government. To be sure, the defense, interior and civil protection ministries 
were the most important to the junta, but it is worth noting that they were not able to 
secure more portfolios, even when they were the dominant coercive power in the country. 
 The two failed attempts at national conferences are also instructive.  The junta 
called for a national conference to legitimate their rule in early April while under 
international sanctions, but when the Malian political establishment refused to participate, 
the CNRDRE was forced to accept the ECOWAS-brokered deal that made Traore the 
interim president.  The junta apparently could not (or would not) offer sufficient 
incentives to bring other domestic actors to this conference and thereby expand their coup 
coalition.  The same is true of the CNRDRE’s failed call for a conference to choose a 
successor to Traore in mid-May.   
 Why this occurred is unanswerable given the evidence available, but there are 
only a few likely explanations.  One is that the junta leadership made the decision not to 
expand their coup coalition, and the result was that they found their political role 
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increasingly circumscribed.  Another is that they did reach out and attempt to bring other 
actors into the coup coalition through these conferences but failed.  Whether the failure to 
expand the coup coalition was intentional or not, the result was an increasingly difficult 
political position for the junta.  Given the relative weakness of other domestic actors, the 
most likely cause of the CNRDRE’s failure to hold on to executive power is the pressure 
placed on Mali by the international community, led by ECOWAS and the AU. 
 
   b.  Legitimating Rhetoric 
In the early days of the coup, the CNRDRE framed their actions in terms of saving the 
state from the incompetence and corruption of the previous leadership, and made no 
pretense about acting within the parameters of the Malian constitution.  In other words, 
they preferred a frame of “performance legitimacy” (Diamond 1999) to one of 
constitutional legitimacy.  In the junta’s first public statement, they said the coup was 
undertaken because of a “lack of adequate material to defend the nation,” and democracy 
would be restored only after “national unity and territorial integrity are re-established.”134  
On March 24, Captain Sanogo made the same point in an interview, “When a state is 
already 50 years old, and unfortunately the armed forces and security operate under 
minimal conditions to defend its territory, this is a failure.”135 
 However, it is interesting to note that while the junta did not frame their actions in 
constitutional terms, they did consistently claim that their goal was an eventual 
restoration of democracy.  Sanogo claimed that the old regime was rotten and had to be 
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entirely replaced.  One sees this in interviews of Sanogo136 and in the announcement of 
the national conference to be held in early April.137  The short-lived constitution of March 
28 to April 1 is further evidence of this, which provided for a democratic government and 
specifically barred members of the CNRDRE from standing in future elections.  
Speculating on the motivation for this, it seems likely to have been one of three things: 1) 
the coup leaders did not believe they could maintain power because of democratic 
expectations of the Malian people, 2) the coup leaders did not believe they could 
maintain power because of the democratic expectations of the international community, 
or 3) the coup leaders themselves did not desire to assume autocratic power because of a 
ideational preference for democratic government.  Hints at all three of these motivations 
can be seen in Sanogo’s interviews.  With more certainty, one can say that Sanogo did 
not tailor his language to the requirements of ECOWAS or AU democracy requirements. 
 
  6.  Conclusion to Malian coup analysis 
The facts of this case do not fit squarely within the expectations set out by the hypotheses 
regarding legitimation strategies, and yet we see stronger evidence of the influence of 
democracy clauses here than in the Honduran case. In the early days the CNRDRE 
leaders tried to conduct this coup in the Cold War mode, keeping power within the junta 
and basing their legitimacy on appeals to performance and nationalism.  However, the 
CNRDRE’s moves to consolidate power were repeatedly thwarted by the pressure from 
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ECOWAS.  The sanctions imposed had real effects on the Malian economy: on June 12, 
2012, the Malian Minister of Economy and Finance estimated that the coup had cost the 
Malian economy more than US $1.1 billion.138  In interviews, when Sanogo discussed 
international pressure, he consistently referred to it in terms of ECOWAS and AU 
sanctions, indicating that, at least from his perception, it was their efforts that had the 
greatest influence on Mali.139  These effects forced the junta to try to expand their 
coalition in the failed attempts at national conferences, and eventually forced them to 
accept ECOWAS’s demands that Traore ultimately would be head of state and organize 
elections rather than CNRDRE members.  To be sure, the CNRDRE was not completely 
thwarted and they were able to retain an elevated position in Malian politics.  However, 
when it comes to the core hypothesis advanced in this dissertation that regional regimes 
for the defense of democracy have the potential to significantly influence coups d’etat, 
the Malian case is far more supportive than nullifying.
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 C.  The Thai Coup of 2006 
  1.  The Coup 
From 1932 to 1991 Thailand experienced 18 coups, 10 of which succeeded in taking 
power.  However, this cycle appeared to be broken with the establishment of a new 
democratic government in 1992.  The army had been embarrassed the year before when 
its use of force against civilians in a coup d’etat was widely condemned in Thai society, 
including by the highly influential King Bhumipol Adulyadej, and the generals retreated 
to the barracks.  It was hoped that the new constitution created in 1997 set the conditions 
for a stable Thai democracy.  But that was not to be the case. 
 The seed of the 2006 coup was planted with the 2001 electoral victory of the 
populist Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) party, led by media mogul Thaksin 
Shinawatra.  Thaksin quickly became an extraordinarily powerful politician based on his 
popularity in the populous and under-developed north.  His policies of universal 
healthcare and expanded access to credit, combined with what was probably an extensive 
patronage scheme, made him the first real challenger to the network of military officers, 
bureaucrats and palace insiders that had informally ruled Thailand for decades.140   
 Thaksin’s popularity led to another electoral victory in 2005, but he faced 
increasing criticism, particularly in Bangkok, for a range of abuses of power.  Corruption 
was a serious problem in Thaksin’s government, and there were allegations that the TRT 
intervened in the courts to protect allies and pressured the media for favorable 
coverage.141  Thaksin directed anti-corruption bodies to investigate his political 
opponents, and packed the supposedly independent electoral commission with 
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supporters.142  In 2003 he launched a “War on Drugs” that used extrajudicial executions 
as a policy tool, giving provincial authorities quotas of minimum numbers of drug dealers 
to kill.  This led to the deaths of many people on the basis of little more than hearsay or 
unfounded accusation.143  Furthermore, a harsh crackdown on separatists in the 
predominantly Muslim south resulted in a violent insurgency in which more than 1,700 
people died in 2005 and 2006.144 
 Matters came to a head in January of 2006 when Thaksin sold his family’s stake 
in the Thai media conglomerate Shin Corp. to a Singaporean company for US $1.9 
billion, and the media reported that he had arranged the sale so that he paid no taxes on 
the windfall.145  Large protests led by a group called the People for the Advancement of 
Democracy (PAD) called for Thaksin’s resignation.  Instead, Thaksin called snap 
elections in April.  Opposition parties refused to participate, and the TRT actually 
strengthened its hold on government.  However, the judiciary set the vote aside because 
of procedural irregularities and new elections were scheduled for October 2006.  
Furthermore, the king privately asked Thaksin to step down, which he agreed to do after 
a new prime minister was chosen in the October elections.  However, by every indication 
the TRT appeared to be using all its tools, legitimate and less so, to ensure an October 
win.  It is interesting to note that a Gallup poll conducted in June and July of 2006 
showed that only 34% of surveyed Thais were confident in “the honesty of the election 
system,” but that 86% expressed confidence in the military.146 
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 On September 19 Thaksin was in New York for the annual meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly when the Thai military launched the coup d’etat.  Tanks and 
infantry occupied intersections and key buildings in Bangkok and other cities, and 
national broadcasters switched from their normal schedule to show pictures of the royal 
family and to play patriotic songs.  International broadcasters such as CNN and the BBC 
had their transmissions blocked.147  That evening General Sonthi Boonyaratklin appeared 
on national television to announce that Thaksin and the parliament were dismissed, that 
the constitution was suspended, and that the military was imposing martial law.148  A 
junta spokesman said a new constitution would be drafted under military auspices and 
elections would be held sometime the next year.  Two days later, the king gave his 
blessing to the coup in a ceremony broadcast on national television.149 
 The public reaction to the coup was muted.  Reporters noted that Bangkok was 
quiet in the days after the coup and life went on pretty much as usual.150  One academic 
noted that an unpublished poll taken that week showed broad support for the coup (Ockey 
2007, 6).  Several weeks later there were small demonstrations against the coup, but they 
attracted nearly as many journalists as protestors.151  The first big protest occurred on 
October 14 when about 500 people gathered in Bangkok, but they were protesting not the 
coup but the continuation of martial law.152 
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 Consolidation of the coup was therefore never in difficulty.  The junta appointed 
an interim parliament composed of military officers, bureaucrats and academics, led by 
the interim prime minister General Surayud Chulanont.  The junta also created a body 
called the Council for National Security (CNS) composed of junta members to share rule 
with the interim government, and retained the power to dismiss the interim government at 
the CNS’s discretion.  As CNS spokesman Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn said it was “a 
partnership rather than a hierarchical relationship. . . . The power is there in reserve.  If 
things do not work out, the Council for National Security would not have to resort to non-
peaceful means to effect change.”153  General Phasit Sonthikan later explained it was 
necessary for the military to retain a role in politics because “otherwise the country 
cannot escape from coups.”154  
 The CNS appointed a group to write a new constitution and this document was 
approved in a referendum in August 2007.  Furthermore in May 2007 a newly-created 
Constitutional Tribunal dissolved the TRT and banned more than 100 of its top members 
from participating in politics for five years.155  Former TRT members created a new party 
called the Phak Palong Prachachon (People’s Power Party; PPP) to contest the election in 
December 2007.  Based on Thaksin’s continuing popularity in the north and Surayud’s 
lackluster tenure as prime minister the PPP seized a commanding majority in the 
parliament.156  However, the judiciary again stepped in to dissolve the PPP in 2008 for 
alleged electoral fraud.  Power then shifted to the Democrat Party (PD), a party with ties 
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to the CNS, PAD, and palace insiders.  It is worth noting that under the PD the military’s 
budget more than doubled over what it was in 2006.157   
 In 2009 and 2010 Thailand was rocked by large demonstrations of both pro- and 
anti-Thaksin groups.  Thaksin’s youger sister Yingluck Shinawatra was elected prime 
minister in August 2011, but tensions between the two factions remain high and Thailand 
remains politically unstable as of this writing in early 2013.158 
 
  2.  International Reaction 
The international reaction to the Thai coup was strikingly different from that observed in 
the cases of Honduras and Mali.  The tone of the reaction was diplomatically-stated 
dismay rather than condemnation.  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s response was to 
say that the coup d’etat was “not a practice to be encouraged.”159  Finnish Prime Minister 
Matti Vanhanen, speaking for the European Union, said the coup was “highly 
regrettable,”160 language echoed by the official statements from the foreign ministers of 
Japan and South Korea.161  The harshest language used came from Australia and New 
Zealand, using terms more similar to what was observed in the cases of Honduras and 
Mali; both states condemned the takeover and claimed that the coup was unacceptable.162  
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Regional actors Indonesia163 and the Philippines164 called for a return of democracy and a 
quick end to martial law, but otherwise accepted the outcome. 
 It is worth noting the responses of China and the United States given their strong 
ties with Thailand and their relative strength – attributes that gave them the most outside 
leverage on the domestic politics of Thailand and thus would be of most concern to the 
coup leaders.  China immediately recognized the CNS regime and pledged cooperation 
with the new government, stating “[w]hat happened in Thailand is its own internal affair.  
The Chinese government has always upheld the principle of non-interference.”165  
Furthermore, in the next year that support was forthcoming, with China providing $40 
million in new military aid in 2007.166  A WikiLeaks cable from 2007 shows that China’s 
ambassador to Thailand told his American counterpart that China viewed the coup as an 
“aberration” in Thai politics and not something to be concerned about in the long term.167 
 These responses by the Chinese government probably influenced the response of 
the United States.  The United States had (and continues to have) close relations with 
Thailand.  Thailand is home to the US’s fifth largest diplomatic mission, it serves as the 
regional base for US agencies like the DEA and CIA, and every year the two countries 
hold the largest annual joint military exercises in Asia, known as “Cobra Gold.”168  
Concern for maintaining those ties, and preventing a closer relationship between Thailand 
and China, probably played a role in how the U.S. thought about the coup. 
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 The first statement of the US on the coup came from US Assistant Secretary of 
State Christopher Hill in an interview with the Associated Press:  
Obviously we want to see what this military has in mind.  Any time you get news of 
military coups, one has to pay attention. . . . [However] it’s really too early to form any 
hardened judgments. . . . It’s very early in the process to be evaluating the state of 
democracy.  I’d rather reserve judgment at this point.169 
 
This is a clearly different tone than the US used to respond to the Honduran and Malian 
cases.  One can see this again in a statement made by US Ambassador to Thailand Ralph 
Boyce after he met with the new Prime Minister Surayud on October 2: 
“We had a very good discussion.  I think it’s very well known that the United States 
urges a speedy return to a democratically elected government and protection of civil 
liberties during the interim, and the prime minister assured this would be the case.”170   
 
That Boyce met with Surayud at all shows the United States was not interested in 
isolating the new regime and represents another distinction in the international response 
to the Thai case compared to Honduras and Mali.  The United States did impose a 
sanction on Thailand, suspending US $24 million in military aid until the return of 
elections.171  However, the US continued its counter-terrorism support and the May 2007 
iteration of the Cobra Gold joint exercises went ahead as previously scheduled.172 
 McCargo (2008, 350) relates that there was “considerable quiet American 
sympathy for the coup,” and in fact a WikiLeaks cable from September 2006 shows that 
the US may have been aware of the coup plot before it occurred.173  In the cable 
Ambassador Boyce relates a discussion he had with junta leader General Sonthi on the 
                                            
169 Foster Klug, “U.S. concerned about Thai coup but not rushing judgment.” Associated Press 
Worldstream.  September 20, 2006. 
170 Denis D. Gray, “Central bank governor accepts post in Thailand’s interim Cabinet.” Associated Press. 
October 2, 2006.  A similar statement was made the next day by White House spokeswoman Dana Perino. 
Rungrawee C. Pinyrat, “Thailand’s civilian government lineup to be finaled by weekend.” Associated Press 
Worldstream. October 4, 2006. 
171 Pinyrat, ibid. 
172 McCargo 2008, 351. 
173 WikiLeaks cable | id = 06Bangkok5811 
 160 
day after the coup, in which Boyce claims to have reminded Sonthi of a previous 
conversation in August about the automatic nature of U.S. sanctions in the event of a 
coup, and that Boyce counseled Sonthi to hold new elections soon in order to regularize 
relations.   In the same cable Boyce claims that communications with the CNS were 
good, but that  
“Meanwhile, a coup is a coup is a coup and we believe a strong U.S. statement 
announcing the suspension of assistance and a call for an early return to civilian rule and 
eventually elections is entirely warranted….”174 
 
  3.  Legitimation Strategies 
   a.  The coup coalition 
The evidence available shows that the coup coalition was a classic military junta, and that 
this group did not reach out to other actors to strengthen their position, with the important 
exception of securing the blessing of the king.  As would be predicted from the Cold War 
pattern of coups, the coup conspiracy consisted of a small group of military officers and a 
bandwagon effect pulled the rest of the military in line when it was clear that power had 
shifted.  Even Supreme Commander General Ruangroj Mahasaraon, a Thaksin appointee, 
joined the junta the night of the coup though it appears he had no role in planning it.175   
 The role of King Bhumipol is not clear.  The king gave his blessing to the coup in 
a televised ceremony three days after the coup.  He also gave his approval to the interim 
government and the new constitution.  Whether he supported the coup beforehand or only 
afterwards is not known.  However, one interesting piece of evidence in this regard is the 
September 20 WikiLeaks cable in which US Ambassador Boyce relates the contents of 
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his discussion with General Sonthi the day after the coup.176  Sonthi told him that the 
previous evening the king had held an audience for himself, other top military officers, 
and the leader of the king’s Privy Council, former General Prem Tinsulanonda.  This 
supports the view that at least Prem was involved in planning or assisting the coup.  
Regardless of direct involvement, the audience appeared to have been a turning point as 
Thaksin ended his attempts to rally military support against the coup when he learned of 
it.177   
 Beyond the possible involvement of the palace, the CNS junta did not reach out to 
other political actors, even the aligned PD, in constructing the interim government that 
held power until the December 2007 elections.  The interim parliament was composed of 
junta members and technocrats.  Prime Minister Surayud was himself a general, and the 
CNS controlled the choice of delegates to the committee that drafted the 2007 
constitution.  Moreover the CNS retained the power to dismiss the interim government 
and appoint a new one at their discretion.  To summarize this analysis of the coup 
coalition in Thailand, this was not a case of shared power.  The coup leaders never felt 
the need to seek out domestic partners to withstand international pressure to restore 
democratic rule. 
 
   b.  Justifications 
Even stronger evidence exists that the junta never acted under any pretense that their 
actions were consistent with the existing constitution or democratic institutions.  They 
were clear in their intention to sweep away the previous constitutional order and replace 
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it with a new one, and that the basis for this lay not in any violation by Thaksin of 
constitutional rules, but because the military simply preferred a different political order. 
 The first public statement by the junta regarding the coup was a televised address 
by General Sonthi that was aired on national television the night of September 19.  In that 
speech Sonthi said:  
We have seized power because the caretaker prime minister has caused an unprecedented 
rift in society, widespread corruption and nepotism, and interfered with the country's 
independent agencies, crippling them so that they could not longer function properly.178 
 
Speaking to the Times of London several days later, junta spokesman Major General 
Thawip Netyonom was even more blunt.  When asked whether the coup was legal, he 
said: 
It is against the law. If I say it's not against the law, I shouldn't be here...But sometimes, 
to break the deadlock, someone has to do something. Just like when your computer is 
hung up and you cannot do anything about it, what you're going to do is push the reset 
button or unplug it, and that's the only way to solve it.179 
 
 Throughout the post-coup period the CNS reiterated the non-constitutional 
justifications that Thaksin’s government was corrupt and that his leadership had divided 
the country, and furthermore claimed that the coup was justified because Thaksin and his 
followers had not demonstrated proper respect for the king.180 
 The CNS took a similar approach to legitimating their continued oversight role in 
the post-coup government.  In a press conference on September 26, Sonthi claimed the 
CNS would not control the cabinet but would continue to provide their “expertise” 
because “there are still concerns about security issues, since we don’t know yet what will 
                                            
178 Larry Jagan, “Thailand: Army Removes Thakin in ‘Silk Coup.’” Inter Press Service. September 2, 2006. 
179 “Thai generals will seek Thaksin’s return.” United Press International. September 25, 2006. 
180 E.g. George Wehrfritz, Sonia Kolesnikov-Jessop and Joe Cochrane, “The Quiet Coup.” Newsweek. 
October 2, 2006; Sutin Wannabovorn, “Thailand’s new leaders embark on post-coup damage control with 
diplomats.” Associated Press Worldstream. October 12, 2006; “Thai coup leader plans PR blitz over anti-
graft probes.” Agence France Presse. October 30, 2006. 
 163 
happen.”181  As described above, junta spokesmen claimed it was necessary for the CNS 
to retain a role in politics to prevent the interim government from succumbing to 
corruption; “so that there is no loophole for the executive branch” as Sonthi put it in a 
newspaper interview.182  Even more revealing is the Orwellian claim that maintaining the 
military’s role was necessary to prevent future coups.183   
 These statements show that junta leaders and their spokesmen felt no need to 
cloak their actions with constitutional forms, probably because there was no pro-
democratic force, domestic or international, with sufficient power or will to require it of 
them.  This is what was predicted by the hypothesis proposed at the outset of this chapter: 
in the absence of a democracy clause, coup leaders will make claims of legitimacy based 
on national unity and performance criteria rather than claims based on constitutional 
procedure.  There was no pretense about compliance with the 1997 constitution, and the 
junta immediately set about forming a committee to create a new constitution that had no 
connection to the old one and was more favorable to their interests.  This provides some 
evidence of the underlying balance of power in Thailand at the time of the coup.  If pro-
democratic forces would have had greater leverage it would have been necessary for the 
coup leaders to attempt to legitimize their acts by claiming congruence with the existing 
constitutional order, something more akin to what was seen in Honduras or the later days 
of the Malian coup.  The fact that they did not shows the free hand the Thai junta had in 
conducting the coup and consolidating their regime afterwards – at least for the next few 
years. 
                                            
181 “Thai junta to keep grip on power.” Agence France Presse. September 26, 2006. 
182 Griffin Shea, “Doubts over Thai junta’s pledge to restore democracy.” Agence France Presse. 
September 27, 2006. 
183 Seth Mydans and Thomas Fuller, “Thai junta plans to step back, with limits: Military retains right to 
oust government after it is appointed.” The International Herald Tribune. September 30, 2006. 
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 Conclusion to Chapter 6 
The picture that emerges from these case studies is murky but modestly supportive of the 
hypotheses proposed.  In Honduras the coup coalition was about as large as can be 
conceived, encompassing most of the government and business community.  Moreover, 
the Micheletti government was adamant that Zelaya’s removal was constitutional.  In 
Mali the coup coalition began small but the CNRDRE quickly reached out to others in 
their failed bid for a national conference, and were shortly thereafter forced to reinstate 
the previous constitution and allow for an interim government according to that 
constitution’s provisions.  However, the justifications offered by Sanogo and other junta 
members were not legal; they stuck to a narrative about corruption and restoring the state.  
This cuts against this dissertation’s hypotheses, unless one considers attaching a limiting 
principle to them that they are less likely to be effective when a coup is as spontaneous or 
“accidental” as the Malian coup.  Finally, Thailand very closely followed the script 
described by the Cold War coup theorists described in the literature review.  The coup 
coalition was narrow, consisting of military officers and the blessing of the king.  
Furthermore, they were never unclear that they were acting outside the constitution and 
that their intent was to remake the political order to more closely suit their preferences.   
 Clearly, no three cases can definitively settle the question of whether regional 
democracy treaties are contributing to democratic lock-in in their member states.  As 
alluded to by the Tolstoy quote that opened this chapter, different countries tend to fall 
apart in different ways.  However, as cases that are typical of the OAS, AU/ECOWAS, 
and states not subject to democracy clauses, they allow for some inferences about what 
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might be occurring within the democracy clause class more generally.  Coup leaders’ 
tactics do appear to by influenced by international pressure brought under democracy 
clauses, and this change could affect the prospects for democracy in these countries by 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
In the last thirty years a huge proportion of the world’s population has experienced a 
change in how they are governed.  Prior to the Third Wave of Democracy, authoritarian 
leaders ruled over the vast majority of the states in the world.  By the 2000s autocratic 
regimes were in the minority.  Figures 1 and 2 visualize this change.  Figure 1 shows the 
total number of countries labeled as democratic and not democratic using the Cheibub, 
Gandhi and Vreeland (2011) criteria for democratic government.  This change observed 
here is not merely an artifact of the increased number of states in the international system 
– Figure 2 shows the percentage of states in the international system with each regime 
type.  As can be seen, the change is impressive.   
 




 Figure 2:  % of States that are Democracies and Autocracies, 1950-2010 
 
 The change is dramatic not only in scale but in import.  Research in international 
relations and comparative politics increasingly supports the view that democracy matters 
for many of the social outcomes that we most value.  Democratic regimes are less likely, 
on average, to engage in international wars, at least with other democracies (e.g. Russett 
and Oneal 1999), and they experience fewer civil wars than autocracies (Hegre et al 
2001).  Democracies do a far better job of protecting human rights than do autocratic 
regimes (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007).184  Democratic institutions 
are more effective at preventing systematic corruption and encouraging long run 
economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006b; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009) 
                                            
184 It should be noted that this is only true of fully democratic regimes.  “Mixed” regimes do no better than 
autocracies on human rights protections. 
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while at the same time doing better than autocracies at protecting the environment (Farzin 
and Bond 2004).  In Pinker’s (2011) description of the astonishing decline in global 
violence over the last four hundred years, one of the key explanations he points to is the 
increasing prevalence of democratic governments (Pinker 2011, 278-94).  Even setting 
aside democracy’s intrinsic merits, the evidence shows that a more democratic world is 
likely to be a better world. 
 However, the persistence of the democratic governments that have been 
established in the Third Wave is no sure thing.  Kapstein and Converse (2008) showed 
that about half of the states that democratized between 1950 and 2004 reverted to 
authoritarianism at some point.  Moreover, Freedom House (2012) has shown that the 
average level of democracy in the world has declined again in their latest analysis, the 
fifth year in a row this has been the case.  This is a particularly striking assessment given 
that the Arab Spring overturned several long-standing autocracies during that time 
period.185  The fragility of nascent democracy creates good reason to look for means by 
which democratic institutions can be supported against backsliding.   
 Unfortunately, such means are not easily at hand.  Research on democratic 
consolidation has identified a variety of important influences on the survival of 
democratic regimes, including most importantly levels of economic development and 
equality, economic growth, institutions like parliamentarism and federalism, historical 
legacies of the previous autocratic regime, and having democratic neighbors (see Chapter 
1).  The difficulty is that these are characteristics that new democracies have little or no 
control over.  A state cannot change its history, its region, or its baseline level of 
                                            
185 Though it might also be the case that, more than any other recent events, the difficulties in achieving 
democratic governments in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya demonstrate how difficult that process is. 
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economic development.  That economic growth is desirable does not mean it is easily 
achievable, a fact for which one can find evidence from every country on the globe.  
Finally, leaders in new democracies rarely have the luxury of taking the long view when 
making choices about institutions like parliamentarism versus majoritarianism or 
federalism versus unitary government because of the distributional politics of creating a 
new regime (Frye 1997).  Briefly put, constitutions usually reflect the distribution of 
political power at the time of their drafting.  Furthermore, reform afterwards is difficult 
because of entrenched interests.  All in all, the extant scholarship has identified many 
factors that bear on the likelihood of democratic survival, but few ways that political 
actors can actively try to achieve it.   
 However, within the theoretical literature on democracy there are some 
indications as to where we might look for strategies that could shore up democracy.  Of 
particular interest is Przeworski’s (2006) highly influential theory that institutions are 
endogenous to the balance of political forces in a polity.  Przeworski showed that a 
democratic constitution must act as a self-enforcing contract if it is to persist over time, 
i.e. that democracy lasts only so long as relevant social groups continue to see democratic 
participation as in their interests.  This self-enforcing contract has some inherent 
weaknesses.  The lack of a third-party enforcer creates both the temptation and 
opportunity for actors to overthrow the constitutional order and install themselves as 
rulers.  If one could find a plausible third-party enforcer to the constitutional contract, the 
likelihood of overthrow would thus be reduced.  While he does not phrase it in 
contractual language, Diamond (1999) proposes that the mass public can play a third 
party role between contending elites if democratic culture is strong enough, but in a new 
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democracy that is unlikely to be the case.  Pointing to political culture as a cure for 
consolidation problems in newly created democracies is the political science equivalent 
of assuming a can opener.186 
 One of the main reasons democracy clauses are interesting is because they are 
explicitly designed to serve the role of third-party enforcer to the democratic regimes of 
their member states.  They are targeted directly at one of the most important weaknesses 
of democratic regimes.  If a domestic faction oversteps its bounds and attempts to 
overthrow the constitution, the regional community is formally committing to use its 
combined weight to punish the usurpers.  The idea has been analogized to collective 
defense pacts between states against international aggression (e.g. Farer 1996; Parish and 
Peceny 2002).  The logic is the same, except that democracy clauses are aimed at 
dissuading aggression at the domestic level instead of the international.   
 If these treaties were to work, they could substantially change the power 
dynamics of unstable countries.  As Alexander (2002) showed in his case study of the 
destabilization and fall of Spanish democracy in the early 1930s, for democracy to be the 
“only game in town” means that actors must commit to pursuing their political aims 
through institutional means.  When extra-institutional means remain on the table – i.e. 
when actors believe that they can achieve their aims by ignoring the constitution and 
using force, or when they believe that other actors believe this – this creates a security 
                                            
186 An engineer, a chemist and an economist are stranded on a deserted island.  Luckily they find a pile of 
canned foods that washed up on shore, and they begin talking about how they will open the cans.  The 
engineer does some quick calculations in the sand and says “If we have a rock of 8 pounds and drop it from 
a height of 5 feet it will convey enough force to split these cans open.”  The chemist says “That is a terrible 
idea; the food will splatter and some of it will be wasted.  I have a better idea: we’ll sprinkle sea water 
around the lids and the salt will corrode through, making it possible to get to the food.”  The engineer and 
the economist both object that this will take too long and they would be likely to starve in the interim.  
Then the chemist turns to the economist and asks if he has any ideas.  The economist furrows his brow for a 
bit and then lights up with a satisfied look on his face: “Assume a can opener…” 
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dilemma between political factions that in turn creates a strong temptation to divert some 
political resources into preparing for contingencies requiring forceful seizure of the state 
(Alexander 2002).187  Like other security dilemmas, this dynamic can be self-fulfilling.  
However, if the security dilemma is alleviated by the promise of third-party intervention 
from a regional organization, factions have incentives to devote a greater percentage of 
their resources to pursuing their political aims through institutional channels.  At some 
point it becomes inefficient and politically imprudent to devote resources to maintaining 
coercive capacity because of the opportunity costs involved – those resources would be 
more likely to result in desired political outcomes if they were devoted to more 
conventional democratic politics.  If that happens, then democracy really does become 
“the only game in town,” factions commit to pursuing their goals through democratic 
politics, and democracy is consolidated. 
 Moreover, it should be noted that these treaties could produce politically 
significant changes in autocracies as well as democracies because they have been 
enforced without regard to academic distinctions of regime type.  Coups have been more 
common in autocratic states than democratic states during the post-Cold War period, a 
fact that holds up regardless of which dataset one uses to count coups or democratic 
governments.  However, regional IGOs do not enforce democracy clauses only when 
“democracy” (as defined by scholars) is overthrown.  The history of democracy clause 
enforcement shows that regional organizations have enforced these treaties in all or 
nearly all cases in which a member state experienced a coup (see Chapter 2).  Indeed, one 
of the criticisms Omorogbe (2011) makes of the African regimes is that they are enforced 
                                            
187 Examples of how factions do this would include maintaining private armies, militias, violent youth 
groups or developing ties to sympathetic military officers.   
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too stringently; they sometimes punish “noble coups” that remove long-standing 
autocrats, such as was the case in Guinea-Bissau in 2003 and Niger in 2010.   
 The reason for this consistency in enforcement is probably that state leaders think 
about these treaties as mutual protection pacts for themselves – incumbents – more than 
they think about them in terms of protecting a regime type.  This helps explain why state 
leaders have been so willing to accept the extraordinary sovereignty costs of allowing 
international organizations to have a say in the legitimacy of domestic successions.  The 
cynic, or the realist, might argue that the emphasis on “democracy” in these treaties may 
be more window dressing than substance.  It is after all not uncommon in politics for 
high-minded language to be attached to less than high-minded policies. 
 In the case of both democracies and autocracies we would therefore expect to see 
a decline in the number of coup attempts and coup successes when a regional democracy 
clause is enacted.  Some might question whether this is a net gain for democracy.  
Goemans and Marinov (under review) make the case that, since the early 1990s, a coup 
has been more likely to lead to a transition from autocracy to democracy than a transition 
from democracy to autocracy, at least when the regime is examined two years after the 
coup.  In other words, the coup d’etat has becomes a means by which authoritarian states 
democratize.  Could it be that the advent of incumbent-protecting “democracy” clauses 
are actually stifling democracy rather than protecting it? 
 The opinion of this author is that this unlikely to be the case, for two reasons.  
First, one has to balance the potential good of protecting unconsolidated democracies 
against the good of encouraging democratic transitions.  It is difficult to measure whether 
a democracy is “consolidated” or not (see e.g. Svolik 2009), but it is probably the case 
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that there are currently more weak democracies in the world than there are autocratic 
regimes, even after the slippage of the last several years.  Second, long-term trends 
distinct from the spread of democracy clauses continue to favor democratic transitions, at 
least in the short to medium term.  The globalization of economic activity and of norms 
about human rights and democracy undergird this trend and they continue to exert 
pressure on autocratic states today.  As can be seen in Figure 3, even since the “end” 
Figure 3 
 
of the Third Wave of Democracy around the turn of the century (Diamond 2008), the 
number of democratic transitions in the world continues to exceed the number of 
reversals in most years.  A comparison of the Powell and Thyne (2010) coups data with 
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this transitions data shows that only a minority of these transitions occurred via coup.188  
Autocracies continue to exist, and they continue to oppress people in egregious ways, but 
global trends favor democratic transitions for now.  The continued democratization of the 
world’s states may come to a screeching halt with the rise of China (see Boix 2011), but 
currently it appears that the most important work in democratization is not in 
overthrowing established dictators but in indentifying ways for new democracies to avoid 
slipping back into authoritarianism or languishing in unstable “mixed” regimes.  In other 
words, even if democracy clauses prevent some coups against dictators, if they help 
commit political actors in fragile democracies to constitutional politics, that is likely to be 
a net gain for global democracy. 
 
 Theoretical Debates and Gaps 
These hopeful prospects presume that democracy clauses work.  As shown in Chapters 2 
and 3, there is an interesting divergence of expectations within the academic literature on 
this question.  The general literature on international law would lead one to be skeptical.  
International law’s strongest enforcement mechanisms are in reciprocity, retaliation and 
reputation (Guzman 2008), and none of those apply cleanly to regional democracy 
treaties.  If a party to a democracy regime violates the treaty by undergoing a coup, 
another party cannot punish that breach by undergoing a coup itself.  The legal process 
theories (e.g. Chayes and Chayes 1995; Koh 1997) are no more promising because they 
are premised on the actions of domestic governmental institutions that are by definition 
up-ended in a coup.  Moreover, constructivist theories (e.g. Checkel 1999) are not 
                                            
188 The Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data is not fine-grained enough to describe precisely how 
transitions occur – I can only tell that most of these transitions do not correspond with observations for 
coups. 
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promising because the persons that would need to undergo an ideational change for 
democracy clauses to work – would-be authoritarians – are probably in that portion of the 
population least amenable to identity change by way of exposure to international norms.  
Scholars of international law would likely anticipate little effect from democracy clauses 
because of the absence of recognized mechanisms in the literature that could explain how 
they work. 
 However, in the literature looking specifically at democracy clauses (Chapter 2) 
we see opinions that range from cautious to unambiguous optimism.  Scholars that have 
looked at the implementation of the OAS and AU regimes in particular cases see plenty 
of problems, especially when democratic usurpations are attempted by incumbent 
executives (e.g. Cooper and Legler 2006; Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007), but on the 
whole they appear to work at least in preventing coups (e.g. Boniface 2007).  The most 
optimistic finding comes from the only quantitative cross-national study currently 
published, which finds that both regimes cut the likelihood of coups in half in each of 
their respective regions (Powell and Lasley 2011).  The promise in these findings 
warrants further study, particularly given the stakes outlined above. 
 In order to do so, however, it was first necessary to fill in the gap in the 
international law literature regarding mechanisms of efficacy – the assertion of a causal 
relationship requires a causal mechanism.  This required a foray into the literature on the 
dependent variable, the coup d’etat.  The theory here takes inspiration from Jon 
Pevehouse (2005) and Beth Simmons (2009) and considers the way international law can 
impact the calculations of domestic actors in their competitions with each other.  This 
dissertation proposes that democracy clauses could influence coups in two principle 
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ways: by making it more difficult to assemble minimally sufficient coup coalitions, and 
by making consolidation of power over the state in the days immediately after a coup 
more difficult (see Chapter 3).  If this theory is true, then three empirical implications 
should follow: that states subject to democracy clauses ought to experience fewer coup 
attempts, that coup attempts in such states ought to be less likely to succeed, and that 
when coups do occur in member states, coup leaders may try to legitimate their rule by 
taking measures to counter the influence of democracy clauses.  These measures would 
include broadening the size of their coup coalitions and attempting to legitimate their 
power-grabs by emphasizing constitutional procedures (constitutional legitimacy) rather 
than emphasizing patriotism or effectiveness (performance legitimacy).  Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 tested these hypotheses.  The findings that emerge are not dispositive but offer 
support to the view of “cautious optimism.” 
 
 Summary of Findings 
 Democracy Clauses and Coup Attempts 
Chapter 4 asked whether states that were subject to democracy clauses were less likely to 
experience coup attempts than were states not subject to such treaties.  Looking at the 
period of 1991-2008, I found that democracy clauses were negatively correlated with 
coup attempts, even after controlling for the most likely alternative predictors.  In the 
simplest model, the presence of a democracy clause reduced the likelihood of a coup 
attempt by about 18%.  Comparable effect sizes were found in a variety of models using 
two different measures of coup attempts and several different sets of control variables.  
This is a substantially smaller effect than that found by Powell and Lasley (2011), which 
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is probably do to the inclusion here of variables to account for global and regional 
diffusion effects.  A reasonable inference is that a significant portion of the effect that 
Powell and Lasley found was misattributed to democracy clauses but actually flowed 
from international democratic pressures that helped lead the creation of these treaties in 
the first place. 
 It needs to be noted that the confidence intervals around the estimates in Chapter 
4 were large, and the correlations in the models run there did not meet conventional 
standards of significance.  I address this issue below in the section entitled “What is the 
Significance of Statistical Significance?” 
 
 Democracy Clauses and Coup Outcomes 
Chapter 5 examined the impact of democracy clauses on coup outcomes.  The research 
question asked was: when a coup occurs in a state subject to a democracy clause, is that 
coup more likely to fail than if no such treaty had been in effect?  It turns out that it is: in 
one dataset of coups (Powell and Thyne 2011) democracy clauses were associated with a 
44% decrease in the likelihood of a coup success, while in another dataset (Marshall and 
Marshall 2009) a 24% decrease was observed on average.  However, once again the 
confidence intervals around these estimates were very large, i.e. they were not 
statistically significant.   
 This is the first time this dependent variable has been studied in a cross-national 
quantitative way, and thus provides a baseline from which future study can occur.  As 
addressed in greater detail below the lack of statistical significance shows that the effect 
is not consistent, but the average size shows a substantively significant effect, and must 
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be considered seriously when there are relatively few cases to base an inference on, and 
when there are so few other options identified in the literature for how to reduce the 
likelihood of overthrow by coup. 
 
 Democracy Clauses and Coup Tactics 
The question pursued in Chapter 6 was whether democracy clauses changed the way that 
coup leaders attempt to consolidate their rule.  The size of coup coalitions and the choice 
of legitimating rhetoric are interesting dependent variables because they are strategic 
choices that give us some insight into what aspects of the political environment coup 
leaders believe are most threatening and/or most likely to stymie their bids for power.  In 
the Honduran coup of 2009, subject to the OAS democracy regime, we saw a very broad 
coup coalition and consistent resort of constitutionalism as a way of justifying the coup.  
The coup in Thailand in 2006, without a democracy clause, was led by a coup coalition 
consistently narrow and consisted of top military officers with the support of the 
monarchy.  Furthermore, the legitimating rhetoric explicitly rejected constitutionalism 
and was based on references to performance legitimacy.  The Honduran and Thai cases 
thus map well onto the hypotheses presented here. 
 The Malian case of 2012 is more complicated.  The coup was probably 
unplanned, and in the first days the CNRDRE junta tried to keep their coup coalition 
small and create a new constitution, claiming that the old regime was corrupt and 
incompetent.  However, within weeks they were forced to accept the reinstatement of the 
pre-coup constitution and of some pre-coup officials.  The CNRDRE retained a 
prominent role in Malian politics, even up until the day of this writing, but they were not 
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able to secure as much power as they initially desired.  This is important because the 
domestic balance of power did not favor the incumbent regime.  The most likely 
explanation for the junta’s moderation was pressure from ECOWAS.  This result in turn 
probably would not have been the case prior to the creation of the regional democracy 
regime.  
 The Malian case is an interesting test of my hypotheses because the junta did not 
take either of the actions of broadening their coup coalition or adopting constitutional 
rhetoric, at least, not right away.  However, I argue this actually supports my theory 
because the CNRDRE’s failure to undertake these “rational” strategies resulted in them 
squandering a significant political advantage and thereby losing their dominant position 
to an internationally-supported interim government.  The failure to broaden their coalition 
and legitimate their actions with constitutional rhetoric heightened their exposure to 
international pressure.  This in turn supports that part the fundamental theory offered here 
that democracy clauses make it more difficult for coup leaders to consolidate their control 
over a country in the days and weeks immediately after a coup.   
 
 What is the Significance of Statistical Significance? 
Several times I have made clear that the lack of statistical significance for the analyses of 
coup attempts and outcomes should not be taken as conclusive evidence that these 
treaties do not work.  Statistical significance is a particular kind of test of data that serves 
some purposes and not others.  Specifically, it is a way of estimating whether a pattern 
observed in a sample drawn from a larger population is likely to be observed in that 
larger population.  There are two reasons this is not a dispositive test when it comes to the 
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analyses conducted in this dissertation.  The analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 were conducted 
on populations, not samples.  The models in those chapters included all country-years for 
which data were available, which added up to more than 88% of all country-years for 
both kinds of tests.  As populations, the patterns observed are ipso facto “true;” here there 
is no process of inference from sample to population that requires estimates of a likely 
probability of being true.  It is true that without statistical significance it is highly 
problematic to make conclusive inferences outside the time period sampled, but this 
widely known to be the case for time-series data anyway, even when statistical 
significance is observed (e.g. Pedhazur 1997).   
 Moreover, statistical significance does not equal substantive significance.  
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) and Gelman and Hill (2007, 26) argue that large effect 
sizes in the context of large standard errors have to be taken seriously because even 
though they may turn out to be false positives, their potential consequence requires 
further study.  An 18% decrease the likelihood of coup attempts, and 20-40% drop in the 
likelihood of coup successes seems to fit that standard, especially when we consider there 
are few alternatives available.  Regional organizations and their member states should not 
give up on democracy clauses yet.  We do not know if the pattern will become clearer as 
more of the picture is revealed, or if more observations will just reveal more static. 
 
 Contributions and Implications 
These findings contribute to four different academic literatures: the literature on 
democracy clauses themselves, the literature on democratic consolidation, the literature 
on coups, and the literature on international human rights law. 
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 The Literature on Democracy Clauses 
First, this dissertation adds to the literature on democracy clauses.  Dozens of book 
chapters and journal articles have examined various aspects of democracy clauses (see 
Chapter 2), but to date only Powell and Lasley (2011) have attempted a cross-national 
test of their effectiveness at preventing coups.  The test provided in Chapter 4 shows that 
Powell and Lasley’s findings that democracy clauses cut coup attempts by 50% are 
probably over-stated due to lack of several important control variables.  However, the 
general trend within the democracy clause literature is borne out.  Even in the more 
demanding statistical test conducted in this study, democracy clauses continue to be 
correlated with a reduced likelihood of coup attempts in the post-Cold War era.  
Moreover, this dissertation presents the first analyses of the influences of democracy 
treaties on coup outcomes and coup tactics, and these also offer tentative support for the 
optimistic view.   
 These findings contribute to the literature on democracy clauses in two ways.  
First, they contribute to an accumulation of evidence on the general influence of these 
regional treaties.  The use of cross-national quantitative analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 
provides a different kind of evidence than is usually used in this area of scholarly inquiry 
and helps triangulate and flesh out findings in an area that has mostly been studied 
qualitatively. 
 Second, this work expands the number of dependent variables considered in the 
study of democracy clauses.  The bulk of previous work looks at the influence of 
democracy clauses on democratic reversals as an undifferentiated concept.  I argue that 
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this approach threatens to significantly obscure our understanding, specifically because 
reversals can happen in different ways, and these different pathways have different 
causes, accelerants and inhibitors.  This is an insight increasingly accepted within the 
literature on democratic consolidation (e.g. Geddes 2009) that can be applied fruitfully in 
this area.  Coups are different social processes from executive reversals, impeachment 
coups, or rebellions (Maeda 2010, Ulfelder 2010).  When scholars examine regional 
democracy treaties and simply make a judgment as whether they protect democracy as a 
regime type they only scratch the surface of what we could know about their operation.  
This dissertation attempts to go deeper than previous work by focusing on one specific 
pathway that regimes can be overthrown, coups d’etat, and then considering several 
different dimensions of this dependent variable: the likelihood of attempts, the likelihood 
of successes, and the tactics used to seize and consolidate power.  This approach and the 
resulting findings add considerable nuance over what was previously available in the 
democracy clause literature.  It also can hopefully serve as an example of the benefits of 
digging deeper into the dependent variable and consider multiple potential implications of 
the adoption of these treaties. 
 
 The Literature on Democratic Consolidation 
The study of democratic consolidation has come a very long way since Linz and Stepan 
initiated the field in 1978 with their book series entitled The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes.  For the first two decades of consolidation research the predominant focus of 
scholars was on domestic determinants of regime survival: levels of economic 
development and inequality, the nature of democratic institutions, and the like.  More 
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recently, however, research by Whitehead (1996), Boix (2003; 2011) Pevehouse (2005), 
Vachudova (2005), Gleditsch and Ward (2006), Brinks and Coppedge (2006), Ulfelder 
(2008) and others has shown that international forces bear on the consolidation process in 
many different ways.   
 It is interesting to note, however, that these authors for the most part are 
describing the influence of structural international forces, especially diffusions effects 
and the weight of global hegemons.  Even Pevehouse, with his discussion of the role of 
inter-governmental organizations, posits that their democratizing influence is mostly as a 
conduit for diffusion effects, rather than an independent influence exerted by the 
organization itself.  This focus on structural factors is understandable, but there are also 
actors in the international arena that are intentionally trying to influence the likelihood of 
democratic consolidation.  Steven, Perez-Linan, and Seligson (2006), for example, have 
shown that foreign aid conditioned on democratic government does appear to reduce the 
likelihood of democratic reversals. 
 This study adds to this literature by looking at another kind of conditionality, not 
only conditionality on foreign aid but also conditionality on foreign relations.  The 
findings presented here show that democracy clauses are silver bullets to the problem of 
authoritarian reversals, but that they work at all, however weakly, provides an interesting 
addition to the growing literature on international dimensions of domestic order.   
 
 The Literature of Coups d’Etat 
This dissertation is primarily about the effectiveness of treaties, but in order to be able to 
make any kind of pronouncement on that question here required that I develop an 
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understanding of the thing to be affected, the dependent variable here, the coup d’etat.  
Unfortunately, there is very little scholarly work on how coups occur.  It is the case that 
the study of coups has enjoyed a small renaissance in recent years as scholars have come 
to appreciate the importance of different pathways of democratic reversal (Maeda 2010; 
Ulfelder 2010; Geddes 2009).  Scholars like Belkin and Schofer (2003), Thyne (2010), 
Powell (2012), Heins and Goemans (under review) and Powell and Thyne (2012b) have 
outlined the causes and consequences of coups in the Post-Cold War era.  However, there 
has been almost no published work since Farcau (1994) on the way that coups occur.  
The exceptions to this are the game theoretic model of Sutter (2000) and the discussion of 
collective action problems in Powell (2012). 
 The theory provided in Chapter 3 contributes to this literature by providing a 
novel theory of the way coups work, or, more precisely, on the ways coups may fail.  My 
theory is based on the work of Luttwak (1969) and Farcau (1994), but goes beyond them 
by clarifying the distinct stages of the coup conspiracy and post-coup consolidation as the 
key inflection points of the coup process, and by making clear that these stages can be 
and should be understood separately if we want to know why coups occur (or do not) and 
succeed (or do not).  Identifying these mechanisms can point the way for deeper 
understanding of the coup process. 
 
 The Literature on International Human Rights Law 
Finally, the findings from this research have implications that speak to an emerging 
debate in the study of international human rights law.  When we talk about how 
international human rights law works, there are essentially two ways that violators can be 
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brought into accord with their treaty obligations: either some domestic actor causes the 
state to come into compliance or some international actor causes the state to come into 
compliance.  Enforcement from international actors has received the lion’s share of 
attention over the years, and this pathway of enforcement takes prominence in the major 
academic overviews of international human rights (e.g. Forsythe 2012; Donnelly 2013), 
and is the principle motivating recent innovations in international law like the creation of 
international criminal courts and the promulgation of the doctrine of a Responsibility to 
Protect.   The idea is theoretically clear: when states enter a treaty, other states should 
punish them if they fail to meet their obligations.  However, the practice of this 
mechanism of enforcement is highly problematic (Forsythe 2012; Gibney 2008). 
 There is another view, however, that the most important driver of the enforcement 
of international human rights law occurs at the domestic level.  Henkin (1979) discusses 
this, and it has received its most influential recent descriptions in Koh’s (1997) theory of 
vertical legal process and Simmons’s theory of domestic mobilization (2009).  Vertical 
legal process describes the way that domestic courts and administrators use international 
human rights law to make decisions about domestic issues, not because other states are 
forcing them to do so, but because the norms themselves are useful and/or attractive to 
those decision-makers.  The domestic mobilization perspective posits that international 
norms can provide “intangible resources” to domestic actors advocating liberal reforms 
by exposing contrary government policies to claims of hypocrisy, by providing focal 
points for reform efforts, and by providing assurance that the rights demanded are 
legitimate claims to make on a government (see Simmons 2009, Chapter 4).  Simmons 
takes direct aim at the inter-state enforcement theorists when she says: 
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International human rights treaties have a singularly unusual property: They are 
negotiated internationally but create stakeholders almost exclusively domestically 
Simmons 2009, 126). 
 
and:  
Peers cannot act as reliable enforcers of the regime.  They have incentives to ignore 
violations, either because they are essentially unaffected by practice elsewhere, or 
because other foreign policy objectives swamp the concerns they have in a particular 
case, or because they hope that someone else will pay the costs of enforcement.  The real 
politics of change is likely to occur at the domestic level (Simmons 2009, 126. Emphasis 
in the original). 
 
Whether international human rights law is enforced primarily internationally or 
domestically is a question worth answering.  It is important to both scholars that wish to 
understand human rights and to practitioners in governments and NGOs that try to 
achieve human rights gains.  If we want international human rights law to work, we  
want to figure out how best to use the strategies available for effective gains and avoid 
the opportunity costs of putting a disproportionate amount of effort into relatively 
ineffectual means of enforcement. 
 The findings presented in this dissertation can speak to this debate because of 
unique properties of democracy clauses.  One the one hand, democracy clauses share the 
reciprocity problem of human rights treaties.  State A cannot punish State B’s breach by 
refusing to comply with State A’s obligations.  On the other hand, democracy clauses do 
implicate the self-interest of state leaders189 to the extent that they are mutual protection 
pacts for incumbents.  A state leader may be indifferent to whether an international civil 
rights regime is effective because freedom of speech or association in another country do 
not have much influence on his welfare.  That same leader may, however, be very 
interested in the effectiveness of an incumbent-protection regime if he is at all worried 
                                            
189 Not state interests, but state leaders’ interests. 
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about being deposed in a coup.  In other words, democracy clauses are like human rights 
treaties in that they can only be enforced by interrupting cooperation in some policy area 
outside the scope of the treaty, but different from human rights treaties in that state 
leaders are relatively highly motivated to see them succeed. 
 That they do not perform any better than they do thus has important implications 
for the inter-state model of human rights enforcement.  As discussed above, from 1990-
2008 regional democracy regimes reduced the likelihood of coup attempts, they reduced 
the likelihood of coup successes, and they appear to have required a shift in coup tactics 
by would-be usurpers.  However, the inconsistency of these effects, reflected by the wide 
confidence intervals in the quantitative studies and by the fact that the Honduran and 
Malian coup leaders managed to hold on to power even after the implementation of 
unprecedented sanctions against them, casts serious doubt on how effective we can 
expect inter-state enforcement to be.  Democracy clauses probably represent the upper 
bound of effectiveness for inter-state enforcement.  When state leaders have even fewer 
interests in seeing an enforcement effort succeed, as would be the case with most 
international human rights treaties, we would expect less success.  In fact, we should 
probably anticipate far less success. 
 This finding therefore supports the view that both scholars and practitioners 
should be putting more emphasis on domestic mechanisms of international human rights 
law enforcement.  There may not yet be clear evidence that the domestic mechanism 
works either, but for now it is worth knowing that international mechanisms are highly 
unlikely to produce the significant gains that are desired by those of us interested in 
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